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INTRODUCTION
With the approval by the United States and other major trad-
ing countries of the Uruguay Round revisions to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),1 the world is poised to
1. GATT Secretariat, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1143 [here-
inafter Final Act]. The U.S. Congress approved implementing legislation for the new
trade agreement at .a lame duck session in December 1994, opening the way for ratifi-
cation by all 124 GATT signatory states. See David E. Sanger, Senate Approves Pact to
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enter a new stage in global economic integration. The Uruguay
Round agreements will lower global tariffs by over $700 billion
while increasing world income by an estimated $510 billion per
year.3 Most controversially, they call for an entirely new legal
system for international trade dispute resolution that some say will
greatly erode traditional concepts of state sovereignty.4
Under the Uruguay Round agreements, GATT member states
have created two powerful new trade institutions: the World Trade
Organization (WTO)5 and a trade "supercourt"6 called the WTO
Ease Trade Curbs; A Victory for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at Al, A22. The
GATT as originally signed in 1947 is found in General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade,
opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. See infra notes 34-39
and accompanying text.
2. Sanger, supra note 1, at A22 (reporting that the Clinton administration estimates
that global tariffs will go down by $744 billion).
3. The GAIT Secretariat has projected these gains, measured in 1992 dollars, to
occur by the year 2005. A $510 Billion Boost to World Income, Focus: GATT NEWS-
LETTER (GATT Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland), Nov. 1994, at 2 (citing GATT SECRE-
TARIAT, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND-MARKET ACCESS FOR GOODS AND
SERVICES: OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS (1994)). This figure is an increase from the
Secretariat's prior estimate that the increase in world income as a result of the Uruguay
Round would be $230 billion. GAIT Secretariat, An Analysis of the Proposed Uruguay
Round Agreement, with Particular Emphasis on Aspects of Interest to Developing Coun-
tries, MTN.TNCIWI122, at 41 (Nov. 29, 1993). The Uruguay Round agreement also ex-
tends GATT treatment for the first time to trade in services, sets a 10-year timetable for
eliminating the world quotas on the sale of certain agricultural products and textiles, and
creates a structure to harmonize intellectual property laws among trading states. Alan
Riding, Seven Years of Struggle End as 109 Nations Sign Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1994, at Al, A48 (noting that Uruguay Round reduced import barriers "by an aver-
age of 40 percent" and embraced "for the first time such areas as agriculture, textiles
and financial services," including a 10-year phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement);
Sanger, supra note 1, at A22.
4. See John Harwood, GATT Backers Are Given Edge in the Senate, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 1, 1994, at A3 (quoting Senator Robert Byrd as stating that the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) will be "a Tyrannosaurus" that will "ransack" U.S. laws); Ralph Nader,
WTO Means Rule by Unaccountable Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 1994, at A12 (ar-
guing that the proposed WTO dispute resolution process "would be a staggering rejection
of our due process and democratic procedures"); Sanger, supra note 1, at A22 (reporting
that opponents of the new GATT agreement in the United States sought to defeat the
deal by arguing that the WTO "would become an all-powerful bureaucracy, able to un-
dercut American sovereignty").
5. Final Act, supra note 1, art. 1, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1144; see Miquel
Montafih i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution of Inter-
national Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103, 141-59 (1993) (giving a gen-
eral description of the new WTO legal system). The WTO officially commenced opera-
tions on January 1, 1995. David E. Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on
China Exports, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at 14.
6. Cf Phillip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L.
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Appellate Body.7 The WTO is an umbrella organization for trade
policymaking, surveillance, and reporting.' The Appellate Body
oversees the work of all dispute resolution panels interpreting the
GATT and associated trade codes.9 Appellate Body decisions, as
well as decisions of dispute resolution panels if parties elect not to
appeal to the Appellate Body, are formally binding under interna-
tional law for signatory states unless all the states (including those
that win their cases) vote unanimously to overrule them. As a
practical matter, this rule means that WTO dispute resolution de-
cisions will automatically "come into force as a matter of interna-
tional law in virtually every case."1 The new "judges of interna-
tional trade"'" thus have jurisdiction to rule that governments
must amend or repeal domestic laws that are inconsistent with
world trade norms or risk imposition of trade sanctions.12
REV. 1016, 1019, 1025 (1985) (book review) (arguing against a proposal to create a trade
"supercourt" within the GATT).
7. Final Act, supra note 1, pt. 2, Annex 2, art. 17, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at
1236-37. The dispute resolution provisions of the Uruguay Round, including the articles
governing the Appellate Body, are contained in Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Final Act, supra note 1, pt. 2, Annex 2, reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. at 1226-44 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding].
8. The WTO will oversee a variety of international economic agreements, including
the GAIT, supra note 1, pt. 2, Annex 1A, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1154-66, agreements
related to trade in services, id. Annex 1B, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1168-96, a treaty
regarding intellectual property rights, id. Annex IC, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1197-225,
and a number of "Plurilateral Trade Agreements," id. Annex 4.
9. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 17(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
10. John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The World Trade Organization
and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY 131,
141 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994). Under the new procedures, the WTO will establish a
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) composed of all WTO member countries to oversee the
dispute resolution process. Final Act, supra note 1, art. 4(3), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at
1145. When not all WTO members have signed the agreement in dispute, such as the
"Plurilateral Agreements" contained in Part 2, Annex 4, only those states that have
signed the agreement will be allowed to vote in the DSB. Understanding, supra note 7,
art. 2(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1226. The DSB will have the power to reverse deci-
sions of the Appellate Body, or of dispute panels if no appeal is taken, but only by
unanimous vote. Id. arts. 16(4), 17(14), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1235, 1237. The WTO
dispute regime is so formally legalistic that the treaty provides for binding arbitration as
an alternative to the panel and appeal process. Id. art. 25(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at
1242 (stipulating that arbitration is available as an alternative to the panel procedure to
"facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by
both parties"). When arbitration is selected, the parties must "agree to abide by the
arbitration award," and other member states may participate only with permission of the
disputants. Id. art. 25(3), reprinted in 33 1.L.M. at 1242.
11. Sigvard Jarvin, The Sources and Limits of the Arbitrator's Powers, in CONTEMPO-
RARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 50, 67 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1987).
12. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 22, reprinted in 33 1.L.M. at 1239-41. Under
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This new international dispute resolution system marks a dra-
matic departure from past international trade practice. Formerly,
winning plaintiffs were required to obtain approval from the
GATT Council before dispute settlement panel decisions were
final and effective, and losing defendants had the formal right to
veto panel decisions at the GATT Council stage. In addition,
there was no court of appeals and no mechanism for authorizing
retaliation short of obtaining the affirmative votes of all GATT
signatories. 3 Indeed, in the entire history of the GATT, there
was only one instance when the organization formally authorized a
complaining country to withdraw trade benefits in retaliation for a
defendant's violation of GATT rules. 4
Within the legal academy, the new WTO system represents a
stunning victory for international trade "legalists"'" in their run-
ning debate with trade "pragmatists ' '16 over how international
trade dispute resolution should be structured. Pragmatists have
supported formally nonbinding methods of dispute resolution
based on their belief that such systems provide the best means of
coping with power relationships between countries. A diplomatic
approach to dispute resolution, say pragmatists, renders trade poli-
tically sustainable in a rapidly changing world economy. 7 For
their part, legalists have advocated the creation of rule-based trade
tribunals that can move world trade toward a governance system
the new WTO rules, losing defendants may attempt to negotiate a settlement involving
payment of compensation to winners rather than change their trade policies. Id. art.
22(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1239. If no such mutual agreement can be reached, the
winner may seek approval from the DSB to withdraw treaty benefits in the amount of
the nullification and impairment it has suffered. Id. The amount and shape of these trade
sanctions is subject to a separate WTO dispute resolution procedure. Id. art. 22(6)-(7),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1240-41.
13. Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in
HANDBOOK OF GATT DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT 3, 36 (1991).
14. Id. at 7 n.7; see Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the Unit-
ed States, Nov. 8, 1952, GATT BISD 1st Supp. 32 (1953).
15. Trimble, supra note 6, at 1017.
16. Id.; see also OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITS IN THE GAIT MULTILATER-
AL TRADE SYSTEM 71 (1985) (stating that "the primary objective of [the GATF] dispute
settlement procedures is not to decide who is right and who is wrong ... but to pro-
ceed in such a way that even important violations are only temporary and are terminated
as quickly as possible"); id. at 73 ("[L]egalism does not contribute to trade liberaliza-
tion . . ").
17. Fred L. Morrison, The Future of International Adjudication, 75 MINN. L. REV.
827, 838 (1991) (arguing that "the relative success of the GATT mechanism has been
because of, not in spite of, its recognition of a political role in the process").
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based on "the rule of law."18 They have argued that rule-based
adjudication systems are fairer to both rich and poor nations and
provide predictability and stability in the otherwise anarchic and
volatile field of international trade.1 9
The creation of the WTO dispute resolution system opens a
new stage in the debate regarding trade legalism. This debate will
now focus on normative differences among legalists that have been
largely submerged while legalist advocates have pressed for cre-
ation of a global trade adjudication system.' The coming debate
will center both on efforts to reform the WTO and on the way
WTO judges should approach the task of adjudication within the
new legal system. These debates will not be merely matters of
academic interest within international law circles; as global trade
accelerates, billions of dollars and thousands of jobs may hang on
the way this discussion evolves.
Drawing on international relations, economic, and legal theo-
ry,2 this Article conceptualizes and then critiques three compet-
ing normative approaches to, or models of, WTO trade legalism.
These embrace differing and sometimes conflicting visions of the
proper functions of a world trade governance system. The three
legalist models I present are the Regime Management Model,'
18. George M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent Practice
in GATT, 16 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (1991) (stating that the dispute
resolution system reforms negotiated during Uruguay Round establish "the GATI system
as a system governed by the rule of law").
19. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW xli-xlii (1991) (discussing need for a
"paradigm shift" in international trade law from "coexistence" to "integration" among
states through the use of "rule-oriented" legal processes).
20. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE 93, 98 (1978).
21. This Article owes a particular debt to the work of Kenneth Abbott and Ann-
Marie Slaughter Burley (formerly Ann-Marie Burley) for rendering the international rela-
tions literature accessible to legal scholars. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International
Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989)
[hereinafter Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory]; Kenneth W. Abbott, The
Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade, 26 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 501 (1985) [hereinafter Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma]; Kenneth W.
Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution: Building a Private-Interests System
of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111 [hereinafter Abbott, The Uruguay Round and
Dispute Resolution]; Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Ann-Marie Burley &
Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L
ORG. 41 (1993).
22. See infra notes 139-236 and accompanying text.
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the Efficient Market Model,23 and the Trade Stakeholders Mod-
el.24 Each of these is grounded in an international relations theo-
ry of trade policy, each regards international trade policy forma-
tion as influenced, if not dictated, by domestic politics, and each
has profoundly different implications for the operation of the
WTO legal system.
The Regime Management Model derives from "regime theo-
ry' ') 5 in the international organization literature of political sci-
ence. Regime theory assumes that states are the primary actors in
the international system and that states are motivated to achieve a
set of sometimes conflicting, self-interested goals, such as wealth
enhancement, power, and domestic political control. This model
views trade treaties as "contracts" among sovereign states that
help them resolve potentially conflicting interests over these di-
verse goals. Additionally, binding, rule-oriented trade adjudication
is an enforcement mechanism by which states solve a multiparty
"prisoner's dilemma' 26 arising out of trade contracts.
Legalists favoring the Regime Management Model see the
WTO legal system as a means to generate legitimate normative
standards around which states will bargain with one another to
gain wealth through more open trade while retaining the control
they need to achieve the domestic political objectives that call for
limiting trade. Regime-oriented legalists assert that inteinational
legal rules can induce states to negotiate "in the shadow of the
law" rather than purely on the basis of power relationships even
though international law lacks a centralized police power.2 7 The
WTO's authority to announce binding trade standards backed by a
credible threat of economic retaliation will, these legalists hope,
23. See infra notes 237-316 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 360-405 and accompanying text.
25. See Burley, supra note 21, at 217-19.
26. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
27. Jackson, supra note 20, at 99 (arguing that the rule-oriented approach to
resolving trade disputes involves negotiation "by reference to what [parties] would expect
an international body would conclude about the action of the transgressor in relation to
its international obligations"). When parties bargain "in the shadow of the law," they
must take into account not only their relative power positions and interests, but also
their predictions about how tribunals will interpret rules in particular cases. When the
rules are clear enough, they become bargaining chips favoring the side with the better
legal endowments. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.i. 950, 968-69 (discussing how legal rules
confer "bargaining endowments").
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level and order the playing field of international trade between
states.28
The Efficient Market Model of legalism derives from a combi-
nation of the foreign relations theory of "liberalism" and rigorous
application of neoclassical economic free trade doctrines embodied
as rules of law. Under liberalism, nations are not conceived of as
autonomous, self-maximizing actors, nor are they the ultimate sub-
jects of international law. Rather, private actors are the "essential
players in international society who, in seeking to promote their
own interests, influence the national policies of States., 29 Pure
free trade theory, meanwhile, posits that business firms, consum-
ers, and workers all benefit most when states subject themselves to
the competitive rigors of the global market under the economic
doctrine of comparative advantage. As seen by the Efficient Mar-
ket Model, the WTO is part of an emerging "global business civi-
lization"3 that transcends states and requires its own, semiauton-
omous legal system to operate effectively.
3'
28. These goals were often invoked by current and former U.S. trade bureaucrats in
their arguments supporting congressional approval of the WTO. See Hearings on General
Agreement dn Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, Federal News Service, June 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Li-
brary, Fednew File (testimony of U.S. Trade Rep. Michael Kantor) [hereinafter GATT
Hearings] ("From time to time, we will get into disputes with other countries. They will
challenge our trade practices and we will challenge theirs. But that does not mean we
lose our sovereignty. It does mean that we need a strong, effective, and fair dispute
settlement process."); Julius L. Katz, GATT Is Threatened by the Squeamish . . . , WALL
ST. J., Aug. 30, 1994, at A10 (arguing that Congress should approve the WTO because
"[ilf we expect other countries to observe international trading rules, we must also be
prepared to observe the rules we helped to write" and noting that "the WTO ensures
that member countries agree to the obligations of all of the agreements, not just those
they like").
29. Linda C. Reif, Multidisciplinary Perspectives on the Improvement of International
Environmental Law and Institutions, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 723, 738 (1994) (book review)
(characterizing Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley's theory of liberalism).
30. Susan Strange, The Name of the Game, in SEA CHANGES: AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY IN A WORLD TRANSFORMED 238, 260 (Nicholas X. Rizopoulos ed., 1990) [here-
inafter Strange, The Name of the Game]:
By the end of the 1980s, a metamorphosis of the international political econo-
my had begun: the old, close relationship between state, civil society, and econ-
omy is in the process of being replaced by a new relationship between authori-
ty and economy, and between authority and society. A global business civiliza-
tion had emerged ....
According to Strange, this "civilization" is composed of millions of individual economic
actors held together in a "complex network or web of transnational, bilateral bar-
gains-bargains between corporations and other corporations, between corporations and
governments, and between governments." Susan Strange, Protectionism and World Politics,
39 INT'L ORG. 233, 234 (1985) [hereinafter Strange, Protectionism].
31. As Professor Strange has put it, "When states . . . try to use their power to
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Legalists advocating the Efficient Market Model see binding
international trade rules as instruments with which to achieve effi-
cient international capital and consumer markets by eliminating
needless government interference and intrusion in international
trade.3" Ideally, this model would give businesses direct access to
both supranational and domestic dispute resolution machinery to
enforce international trade rules and reduce the legal transaction
costs of global trade.
Both the Regime Management Model and, to an even greater
extent, the Efficient Market Model seek to promote trade over
other domestic and transnational values. The third model present-
ed here, the Trade Stakeholders Model, offers an alternative vi-
sion of the interplay between trade and other social policies. This
model emphasizes broader participation in trade adjudication,
democratic processes for resolving trade conflict, and open dia-
logue regarding the goals of economic trade. Like the Efficient
Market Model, the Trade Stakeholders Model is based on liberal-
ism's insight that individuals, not states, should be the primary
subjects of international law. Unlike the Efficient Market Model,
the Trade Stakeholders Model sees trade legalism as an opportuni-
ty for domestic and transnational interest groups of all kinds, non-
business as well as business, to participate with nations in the
activity of constructing common economic and social norms that
will make global trade a sustainable aspect of a larger transnation-
al society.
With its emphasis on participatory norms, the Trade Stake-
holders Model has much in common with the civic republicanism
recently advocated by legal scholars such as Cass Sunstein for the
influence where and how international production takes place, they find they cannot di-
rect, as with trade. They can only bargain." Strange, The Name of the Game, supra note
30, at 243; see also Meinhard Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International Economic Orga-
nizations: Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 285, 321 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Meinhard Hilf
eds., 1988) (arguing that in an interdependent world economy "[s]tates are beginning to
loose [sic] their freedom to act as they want" and that "[i]nternational economic integra-
tion, influenced by a multitude of uncontrolable [sic] actors, entails a loss of sovereign-
ty").
32. PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 210-21; Jan Tumlir, Need for an Open Multilater-
al Trading System, 6 WORLD ECON. 393, 406 (1983) (stating that "international [trade]
rules represent a truer expression of the national interest of all the countries concerned
than the mass of national [economic] legislation").
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U.S. legal system.3 Ultimately, all of the domestic and transna-
tional political forces with a stake in trade policy deserve "places
at the table"-including standing to litigate cases-in domestic and
international trade governance systems. According to this view, the
WTO legal system has the potential to serve as a forum for artic-
ulating global norms on such issues as global welfare, labor rights,
environmental protection, and other trade-related issues that are
frequently marginalized when trade discussions focus narrowly on
technical issues such as subsidies, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers.
Substantial institutional reforms will be needed, however, before
the Trade Stakeholders Model can be used as a blueprint for
future jurisprudential developments and systemic reforms within
the WTO.
The three legalist models for the World Trade Organization
are preliminarily summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Models of International Trade Legalism
Types of Parties with Theories Underlying
Standing Model
Regime Management States Realism and Regime
Model Theory
Efficient Market States and Businesses Foreign Relations
Model Liberalism and Free
Trade Theory
Trade Stakeholders States and All Trade Foreign Relations
Model Stakeholders Liberalism and
Republican Theory
The Article is organized as follows. Part I provides back-
ground information concerning the history, structure, and negotia-
tion process underlying the WTO dispute resolution system. Part
II discusses two foundations for any discussion of trade gover-
nance: free trade theory and the foreign relations theory of real-
33. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,
45-48 (1985); see infra notes 369-74 and accompanying text.
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ism. I then present the two currently dominant approaches to le-
galism, the Regime Management Model and the Efficient Market
Model. For each of these two, the Article discusses the theoretical
bases of the model, gives some empirical examples of the model
in operation in existing transnational society, and demonstrates
how the model can help us understand international trade jurispru-
dence as practiced by trade adjudicators.
Part III uses the Regime Management Model and Efficient
Market Model of trade legalism to investigate three questions
about the new WTO system. First, what normative visions underlie
and help explain the structures of the new WTO legal system?
Second, what sort of dispute resolution system reforms are people
who hold these visions likely to demand as global economic inte-
gration proceeds into the twenty-first century? Third, what kind of
justice can participants expect from this new legal system?
Part IV explores shortcomings exhibited by both the Regime
Management Model and the Efficient Market Model. I conclude
that for the WTO system to achieve stability as well as legitimacy
as a representative institution, innovative political processes and
adjudicative techniques reflecting the values of the Trade Stake-
holders Model will need to be developed. I describe the Trade
Stakeholders Model, give examples of the model in operation,
demonstrate how the model can be applied jurisprudentially, and
argue for reforms within the WTO that are consistent with the
model's vision.
I. BACKGROUND
Before undertaking an in-depth analysis of the WTO dispute
resolution system, one must understand the system's history and
former structure. This Part first reviews the GAIT dispute resolu-
tion mechanism as it existed prior to the Uruguay Round agree-
ments. Next, it discusses the negotiation process that generated the
proposals for change. Finally, it describes the operation of the new
WTO system.
1995]
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A. The GATT Dispute Resolution System: From Diplomatic Dis-
pute Settlement to Nonbinding Arbitration
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was originally
negotiated in 1947 by twenty-three countries' as a provisional
trade agreement to lower tariffs in conjunction with the establish-
ment of three global economic institutions: the International Trade
Organization (ITO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and
the World Bank.35 Collectively, the designs for these institutions
came out of the Bretton Woods conference of July 19446 and
were intended to bolster trade and stabilize the world economy in
the wake of World War II.' Both the IMF and the World Bank
came into existence as a direct result of the conference,38 but
Congress refused to approve the ITO, and it was eventually aban-
doned,39 leaving the GATT as the legal structure within which
world trade policies would be developed. 4' The demise of the
ITO meant, among other things, abandoning the ITO's consensus-
based dispute resolution system, which included resort to the In-
ternational Court of Justice for "advisory opinions '41 and a bind-
ing arbitration option outside the ITO for disputing ITO mem-
bers.42
The provisional nature of GATT's early history shaped its dis-
pute resolution processes, which began as a diplomatic system of
dispute settlement and gradually evolved into a rule-oriented but
34. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM 5 (1990) [hereinafter
JACKSON, RESTRUCrURING GATr].
35. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 31-37 (1989) [hereinafter
JACKSON, WORLD TRADING].
36. PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 246.
37. ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM & WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
5 (2d ed. 1990).
38. PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 246.
39. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 34.
40. Id. at 15. The GATT took legal effect through the "Protocol of Provisional Ap-
plication," under which GATT is applied as a treaty obligation under international law.
Id. at 13-14. The Protocol permitted the executive branches of the signing states to im-
plement the GATT without seeking legislative approval by giving "grandfather rights" to
trade legislation existing in 1947 that was inconsistent with the GATT. Id. at 14. These
grandfather rights exist to the present day. Id.
41. HUDEC, supra note 37, at 28-30.
42. Id. at 31 n.18. The ITO Charter provided that such arbitration decisions "shall
not be binding for any purpose on the Organization." Id. (quoting ITO CHARTER art.
93(2)).
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formally nonbinding arbitration scheme. As negotiated in 1947,
GATT contained only a few paragraphs devoted to dispute settle-
ment. The most important of these was article 23, which permitted
the "Contracting Parties" (i.e., the collective of GATT signatory
states, which also acted as the GATT "Council"'43) to make rul-
ings on complaints by states. Article 23 also authorized suspension
of GATT obligations whenever a state was determined to have
caused "nullification and impairment" of benefits under the trea-
ty' through its trade policies or actions.'
In the early years of the GAIT, the contracting parties han-
dled disputes by acting jointly or by setting up working groups of
diplomatic representatives to investigate complaints.' In 1955,
however, the GAIT Secretariat established dispute resolution
panels of three to five experts to act as independent arbitrators to
facilitate dispute resolution. The GAT] used this general arbitra-
tion framework for disputes until the WTO came into existence in
1995.' 7 Between 1955 and 1995, the GATT system gradually grew
more "legalistic" and professional,' but it remained formally
nonbinding.4 9
Under the article 23 process as it existed prior to the estab-
lishment of the WTO, a state could complain that its benefits
under GATT had been nullified and impaired by the action of
another state.50 If efforts at consultation and attempts to negoti-
ate a mutually satisfactory solution failed,5' the Council would
43. The Contracting Parties set up the "Council" in 1960. JACKSON, WORLD TRAD-
ING, supra note 35, at 48. The Council consisted of representatives of all GATT mem-
bers who wished to participate and met monthly in Geneva. Id.
44. It is worth noting that "nullification and impairment" under article 23 did not
depend on the actual breach of a treaty obligation, although the vast majority of com-
plaints over the years involved allegations that members had violated the GAIT. JACK-
SON, RESTRUCTURING GAT, supra note 34, at 62.
45. Id. at 62-63.
46. Id. at 63.
47. Id.
48. One of the most important innovations was the establishment in 1981 of a per-
manent GATT Office of Legal Affairs. PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at xxix.
49. For a general description of the various modifications in panel procedures that
have been implemented since 1955, see JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GAT, supra note 34,
at 61-65.
50. The clearest and most realistic description of how the GATT dispute system
worked in practice can be found in a work by a former GAT official. See Rosine
Plank, An Unofficial Description of How a GATT Panel Works and Does Not, 4 J. INT'L
ARB. 53 (1987).
51. Id. at 60-62.
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convene a GATT panel of experts from countries not involved in
the dispute. 2 The chairman of the GATT Council, in consulta-
tion with the parties and with the help of the Secretariat's staff,
selected the panel to hear the dispute. 3
The panel took evidence, heard argument, and eventually
issued a written decision responsive to the complaint. In an inter-
esting deviation from both international arbitration and Anglo-
American legal traditions, the GAIT Secretariat, in particular the
Office of Legal Affairs, played a strong role in the decisionmaking
process.5 4 Representatives from the Office of Legal Affairs at-
tended all panel meetings, provided guidance on GATT caselaw,
expressed views to panelists, and even drafted opinions to "im-
prov[e] their legal reasoning."5 5 The panel then submitted its de-
cision to the GATT Council for adoption. At this point even one
vote-including the vote of the party that lost the case-could
block approval of the decision and prevent it from becoming
"GAIT law.
56
B. The Political Dynamics of Reform: Fear and Loathing of Uni-
lateral Trade Sanctions
The GATT system, which processed nearly 250 complaints
between 1947 and 1992,57 underwent a radical transformation as a
result of changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round. These changes
52. Id. at 63-64.
53. Id. at 65.
54. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the
New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 485 (1994) (noting that the GAIT "secretariat has
played an important--sometimes decisive-role" in panel proceedings and describing how
members of both the economie and legal staffs have "sat with the panelists, prepared
drafts of the findings of fact, and in some instances drafted the dispositive parts of the
panel reports"); Plank, supra note 50, at 76.
55. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GAT, supra note 34, at 65.
56. Although one might think that no state could ever "win" a case in such a sys-
tem, the relational pressures within the world trading community and the flexible nature
of GATT compliance processes led to mutually acceptable solutions to trade problems in
most cases. ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 273-355
(1993) (providing a detailed statistical profile of 207 GATT complaints filed between 1948
and the beginning of 1990 and concluding that 77% of the rulings (68 out of 88) found
that the complaint was justified and that in 60 of those 68 cases (88%) there was either
full or partial satisfaction of the claim); JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GAT'T, supra note
34, at 65-69 (summarizing the process and results of GAIT dispute settlement, including
the "precedent effect" of panel reports); Plank, supra note 50, at 88-92 (describing the
process by which panel reports were adopted and their influence on dispute settlement).
57. HUDEC, supra note 56, at 273-355, 357.
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are the result of complex interactions between states at the inter-
national level and between private businesses and governments at
the domestic level. The main players in the reform movement
were the United States, the European Union, and domestic export
industries within these two GAIT powers.
The United States and Europe are frequent antagonists in
trade matters and historically have disagreed regarding the need
for a strong, binding system of dispute resolution for the
GAT." In part, this disagreement has been philosophical, re-
flecting domestic cultural differences between the United States
and Europe. The United States, comfortable with the notion of a
strong legal system serving as a unifying force within its federal
system, has viewed the GAT primarily as a "legal" organization.
The Europeans, used to seeking negotiated, power-based solutions
to differences among European states, have thought of the GAT[
as a "diplomatic" institution.59 In addition, the United States has
tended to be a plaintiff in GAIT cases, leading it to favor reforms
that would bring more pressure on losing defendants to comply
with panel rulings.' Again by contrast, Europe has been slower
to reduce trade barriers and has tended to be a GATT defendant,
particularly in the area of agriculture. Europe has thus enjoyed the
right to delay or veto panel decisions that go to the GATT Coun-
cil for approval.6'
As a result of frustration with the GATT dispute resolution
system and the urgent need to open European, Japanese, and
other foreign markets in the context of a growing trade deficit,
American business interests in the 1980s began lobbying U.S.
trade policymakers to take "unilateral" action to suspend trade
benefits to GAIT trading partners not living up to their treaty ob-
ligations.' The statutory vehicles for unilateral action were sec-
58. Mora, supra note 5, at 128-33.
59. Id. at 129, 131 (noting that the United States has tended to approve a "legalist"
view of the GAIT and Europe has tended to emphasize "negotiation or conciliation").
60. Id. at 129 (stating that no state has initiated more GATT dispute procedures
than the United States).
61. Id. at 131-33 (stating that Europe favored consensus procedure in the GAT in
part to protect its agricultural policies that were frequently attacked in GAT proceed-
ings).
62. Jagdish Bhagwati, Aggressive Unilateralism: An Overview, in AGGRESSIVE
UNILATERALISM: AMEICA'S 301 TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 1
(Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds., 1990) (discussing the combination of export
lobbying interests and economic ideology that provided "the momentum for the market
1995]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tion 301,63 "Super 301,"' and "Special 301, ''65 all of which are
parts of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. 6
Under section 301, private business groups may petition the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate
whether a foreign government has unfairly blocked access to a
foreign market.67 If the USTR finds the complaint meritorious,
the statute requires the government to undertake negotiations, file
appropriate complaints, and take other actions to persuade the
foreign government to change its protectionist practices. Ulti-
mately section 301 gives the President authority to retaliate against
foreign protectionist practices by various unilateral measures, in-
cluding trade sanctions.69 Significantly, while the filing of GATT
complaints was a part of the section 301 process, there was no re-
quirement that the United States await the final results of GATT
dispute resolution proceedings before taking unilateral action."
The resulting use of section 301 as a unilateral trade weapon71
opening thrust in the U.S. trade policy" represented by section 301).
63. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411(a) (1988)).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)-(b) (1988); Elizabeth K. King, The Omnibus Trade Bill of
1988: "Super 301" and Its Effects on the Multilateral Trade System Under the GATT, 12
U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 245 (1991).
65. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2242(a), 2412(b)(2) (1988); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
"Special 301". Its Requirements, Implementation, and Significance, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
259, 259 (1989-1990).
66. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416 (1988). See generally Bhagwati, supra note 62 (discussing
the history of § 301 and U.S. trade policy). Partly in response to the U.S. adoption of
various § 301 provisions, the European Union in 1984 adopted its own analogous unilat-
eral trade weapon, Council Regulation 2641/84, and began using it against the United
States and other trading partners for alleged "illicit" trade practices against EU exporters.
See Wolfgang W. Leirer, Retaliatory Action in United States and European Union Trade
Law: A Comparison of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Council Regulation
2641/84, 20 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 41, 44 (1994).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(a) (1988). The USTR may also initiate an investigation on its
own initiative. Id. § 2412(b); Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in Internation-
al Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
263, 285 (1991-1992).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (1988).
69. The USTR determines whether a sanction is appropriate and what that sanction
should be, but the President has the last word on whether to impose the sanction. Id.
§ 2411(a)(1); John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade:
Costs and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1585
(1984).
70. Indeed, § 301 sanctions may be imposed even when the foreign action in ques-
tion is not a breach of the GATI' or any other international obligation. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 105-06.
71. Alan Sykes has analyzed nearly 90 § 301 and related complaints brought between
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against foreign governments and industries outside the legal frame-
work of the GATT upset many U.S. trading partners72 and be-
came a major issue in the Uruguay Round.73
As it became clear that section 301 was a target for foreign
trade negotiators, Congress let it be known that the weak GAT
dispute resolution system made section 301 a necessity and that no
revisions of section 301 could be expected unless there were major
changes in the dispute resolution process.7 It is not clear wheth-
er this bargaining move was made in hopes that European and
other nations would back away from demands that the United
States scuttle section 301 or whether Congress made a sincere
effort to frame a bargaining quid pro quo. In either case, events
took an unexpected turn as four interests converged to support a
proposal for a new WTO system for dispute resolution when the
Uruguay Round moved toward its conclusion in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
First and most importantly, there was a general desire by all
nations to stem the growing reliance on unilateral threats and
trade sanctions and replace this free-for-all with a stable dispute
resolution system that could be relied on to eliminate protectionist
trade rules.' This movement coincided with the historical U.S.
position favoring legalism based on U.S. interests as a GATr
plaintiff seeking a stronger, more binding system.
1975 and 1991. Sykes, supra note 67, at 318-30; see also Warren Maruyama, Section 301
and the Appearance of Unilateralism, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 394, 397 (1990) (calling § 301
the "Schwarzenegger of U.S. Trade Law").
72. Leirer, supra note 66, at 44-45 (noting that Europeans were especially upset be-
cause nearly one quarter of all section 301 cases had been aimed at Europe).
73. Mora, supra note 5, at 130-31, 134-36; Sykes, supra note 67, at 265; Transcript
of Discussion Following Presentation by Kenneth W. Abbott, in 1992 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 151, 154 (remarks of Professor Hudec) (stating that "the pressure of Section 301"
was responsible for the "dramatic" changes in the WTO dispute resolution proposals and
that "[w]hat you see in this dispute settlement response is an answer that GATT will do
what Section 301 asks to be done").
74. Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND
180, 192 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1990) ("Congress is demanding a 'great leap forward' in
GATT dispute settlement as the price for correcting section 301."); Sykes, supra note 67,
at 267 (noting that the retaliation feature of section 301 makes strategic sense in light of
the "imperfections of dispute resolution under GATT"); Alan 0. Sykes, "Mandatory
Retaliation" for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of
Section 301, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 301, 324 (1990).
75. 2 THE GAIT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at
2761-62 (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND].
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Second, based on proposals floated by the United States,76
the Negotiating Group on Dispute Resolution,77 Professor John
H. Jackson,' and others, GATT chairman Arthur Dunkel circu-
lated a Draft Final Act to the Uruguay Round to serve as a focal
point for final negotiations as the round came to a conclusion.79
These recommendations turned the old GATT voting system on
its head by making all decisions of dispute resolution panels bind-
ing unless the GATT Council voted unanimously to overrule
them.' Such a rule effectively meant that all GAITT dispute reso-
lution panels would be binding, because winning plaintiffs would
have to vote to overturn their own victories. To add a measure of
assurance that these binding decisions would be carefully consid-
ered and consistent, the Negotiating Group also recommended the
establishment of a permanent trade court to hear appeals from
dispute resolution panel decisions. While the full story of how
these recommendations arose remains to be told, one prominent
commentator has stated that the "momentum of legal develop-
ment" within the elite community of GAIT professional partici-
pants was an important factor."1
76. 2 id. at 2765.
77. Negotiating Group 13 dealt with dispute resolution issues and was chaired by
Ambassador Julio A. Lacarte-Muro of Uruguay and Ambassador Julius Katz of the Unit-
ed States. 2 id. at 2726.
78. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATT, supra note 34. Professor Jackson's study was
sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and, in arguing for the estab-
lishment of a "World Trade Organization," became a "seminal work" in the debates that
took place prior to the final agreements of the Uruguay Round. Gardner Patterson &
Eliza Patterson, The Road from GATT to MTO, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 35, 41
(1994).
79. GATT Secretariat, Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 20, 1991, GATT Doc. MTN.TNCIW/FA.
80. Id. Annex S, 1 14.4.
81. HUDEC, supra note 56, at 365 (stating that the "momentum of legal develop-
ment" within the GATT community was a force leading to reform). Interestingly, a
stronger GAIT system promises these participants gains in status as advocates, judges,
and commentators. Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 55 ("[S]upranational actors
are ... not immune to utilitarian thinking. They seek unremittingly to expand the man-
date of their own institutions to have a more influential say in [supranational] affairs.").
It is also worth noting that Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, an outspoken free trade advocate,
acted as secretary for the Negotiating Group on Dispute Resolution. Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Strengthening the GAIT Dispute Settlement System: On the Use of Arbitration
in GATT, in THE NEW GATT ROuND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LE-
GAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, supra note 31, at 323. Petersmann, a former head of
the GAT Office of Legal Affairs, was a devoted student of the renowned conservative
economist and philosopher F.A. Hayek at Freiburg University. PETERSMANN, supra note
19, at xxix, xxxi. In his trade policy writings, Petersmann has called for the Unites States
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Third, other major GATT players, notably Europe, discovered
that they could use the GATT dispute resolution machinery to ad-
vance their trade interests, so they swung into the legalist camp.
Responding to aggressive use of the GATT dispute resolution sys-
tem by the United States and others, Europe changed its litigation
strategy within the GATT? and filed a series of claims as a GATT
plaintiff, acquiring a new appreciation for the plaintiff's perspective
within the GATT system.' Europe followed this move with a
change in its bargaining position on dispute resolution,83 throwing
its weight in favor of the proposal for a binding system, provided
that the United States would curtail its use of section 301 in trade
disputes. With the Dunkel Draft's strong recommendations for
strengthening the GATT dispute resolution system on the table,
Europe also realized that the traditional U.S. "legalist" orientation
would make it difficult for the United States to oppose these re-
forms and insist on maintaining its unilateral riglit to use section
301.' As Europe had correctly anticipated, the United States
found it impossible to credibly withdraw from its legalist position
just because it found itself being a defendant in an increasing
number of GATT cases. The most the United States could do was
argue for reform of the existing closed nature of GATT panel
proceedings' and insist on language prohibiting WTO dispute
and other trading states to adopt constitutional amendments that would enshrine the
"right to trade" as a protected constitutional liberty. Id. at xxvi (arguing for binding free
trade rules to "constitutionally" constrain the "discretionary trade policy powers of gov-
ernment[]" so as "to protect the equal freedoms and property rights of domestic citi-
zens").
82. Mora, supra note 5, at 134 (stating that during the 1980s Europe filed more
cases than it had in all its previous GATI history).
83. As recently as 1988, Europe had argued that binding arbitration within the
GATT would not be proper because interpretations of treaties cannot apply to parties
without their consent. 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 75, at 2742.
84. Mora, supra note 5, at 134-35 (noting Europe's realization that "[a] binding dis-
pute settlement mechanism would deprive the US of the arguments traditionally made to
defend the maintenance of Section 301"); Patterson & Patterson, supra note 78, at 53
(commenting, based on information from U.S. trade negotiators, that Europe's support for
the WTO was "based on its belief that the [W]TO would do away with section 301").
85. The United States was not successful in opening up the GAIT dispute resolution
process to public scrutiny, but the U.S. Trade Representative has testified in Congress
that he is continuing to press for reforms in this area. GATT Hearings, supra note 28
(testimony of U.S. Trade Rep. Michael Kantor) (stating that one of the major issues for
the United States vis-A-vis the GATT dispute resolution system "is the lack of transpar-
ency in GATT panel proceedings, the failure to make briefs public, the not allowing
these proceedings to be held in public, not allowing non-governmental organizations to
19951
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resolution tribunals from adding to or diminishing the substantive
rights of signatory states.8 6
Finally, developing countries, which had long sought to level
the GATT playing field with the larger industrial democracies,
swung over to the legalist position. These countries gave their sup-
port to the proposal for strengthening the role of dispute reso-
lution processes within the GAIT structure because they thought
a stronger dispute system would give them additional leverage in
negotiating with wealthier states over protectionist laws that limit-
ed their ability to export to these states.87
C. The WTO Dispute Resolution System
The WTO officially came into existence on January 1, 1995.'
The new WTO legal system differs from its GAIT predecessor in
five major ways. First, all dispute settlement procedures under the
GAIT, the Subsidies Code, and a variety of other trade-related
agreements are brought under a single dispute resolution process
overseen by a institution called the WTO "Dispute Settlement
Body. ''89 This ends the potential for forum-shopping within the
WTO that exists under current GAIT rules.90
Second, there are strict timetables for processing disputes91
and substantial changes in the rules governing the adoption of
participate under proper circumstances" and noting that "[w]e're trying to change that
[and] have been very aggressive in pursuing that").
86. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
87. See David M. Trubek, Protectionism and Development: Time for a New Dia-
logue?, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 345, 364-65 (1993) (contending that less developed
countries may be seeking "greater enforcement of the basic principles and disciplines the
developed countries have officially endorsed" as they come to recognize that "non-dis-
criminatory access to developed country markets may be more desirable than preferential
treatment").
88. See Sanger, supra note 5, at 14.
89. The Dispute Settlement Body has a shifting set of members consisting of repre-
sentatives of signatory countries to the particular code or treaty that is the subject of the
dispute. This structure of governance is necessary because different treaties overseen by
the WTO have different signatories. Final Act, supra note 1, pt. II, Annex II, art. 2(1),
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1226.
90. See Patricia Kalla, Note, The GAT' Dispute Settlement Procedure in the 1980s:
Where Do We Go from Here?, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 82, 92 (1986) (noting that former
GATT practice involved procedures under six disparate dispute mechanisms adopted by
nine codes at the Tokyo Round).
91. The rules stipulate that cases should be disposed of within twelve months of es-
tablishing a panel if the case is appealed and within nine months is no appeal is filed.
Understanding, supra note 7, art. 20, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1237-38.
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dispute resolution panel reports. The first stage of the panel pro-
cess closely resembles the old GATT system described above and
involves the convening of a panel,' the taking of evidence, and
the rendering of an opinion.93 In sharp contrast to the old GATT
system, however, a WTO panel decision "shall be adopted [by the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)] unless a party to the dispute for-
mally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal [to the WTO
Appellate Body] or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt
the report."'94 Thus, dispute resolution decisions will be formally
binding on WTO signatory states unless the winner of the case
can be persuaded to vote to overrule its own victory.
Third, as indicated above, the WTO procedures provide for
appeals from panel decisions to a new global trade institution, the
WTO "Appellate Body." The Appellate Body is a permanent,
seven-member trade court that will oversee the work of all dispute
resolution panels, regardless of the treaty or code that is the sub-
ject of the dispute. Judges will be appointed by the DSB to serve
four-year terms,9 5 and the court will sit in three-judge panels.96
Each judge may be reappointed once.97 According to the Uru-
guay Round agreements, Appellate Body judges are to be people
"of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, inter-
national trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements
generally. They shall be unaffiliated with any government."98
92. The proposed rules state that panelists shall be drawn from a list of
well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including per-
sons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a represen-
tative of a [WTO] Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its
predecessor agreement, or in the Secretariat, taught or published on internation-
al trade law or policy, or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.
Id. art. 8(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1231.
93. Id. arts. 12-15, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1233-35. The WTO Secretariat is specifi-
cally authorized by the rules to assist panels, "especially on the legal, historical and pro-
cedural aspects of the matters dealt with." Id. art. 27(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1243.
94. Id. art. 16(4), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1235.
95. Id. art. 17(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1236. The procedures are not clear as to
the actual appointment method. However, the WTO and its Dispute Settlement Body
have the same membership, Final Act, supra note 1, pt. 2, art. 4(1)-(3), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. at 1145, and are charged to act by consensus whenever possible, id. art. 9(1), re-
printed in 33 I.L.M. at 1148; Understanding, supra note 7, art. 2(4), reprinted in 33 LL.M.
at 1227.
96. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 17(1), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
97. Id. art. 17(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
98. Id. art. 17(3), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1236.
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There is no formal requirement that these judges be lawyers or
that they occupy their Appellate Body positions on a full-time
basis.99 In an effort to gain acceptance for court rulings from less
developed states, the new WTO procedures stipulate that "[t]he
Appellate Body membership shall be broadly representative of
membership in the WTO.' 'lm There is no guarantee that the
United States or any other single WTO member will have one of
its nationals on the Appellate Body.
The Appellate Body has full authority to review the legal
interpretations in the panel decision.1 Once the Appellate Body
has issued its opinion, the decision is binding unless the Dispute
Settlement Body votes unanimously to overrule it.1" This means
the winning party may veto any attempt by other nations to reject
a particular decision.
Given the "consensus to overrule" requirement for panel and
Appellate Body decisions, states disappointed by legal rulings may
be tempted to turn to WTO "legislative" mechanisms to reverse
judicial decisions. As currently structured, these mechanisms are
extremely cumbersome. One such mechanism is to propose a for-
mal amendment to the relevant treaty.1 3 Most important GATT
provisions, including the dispute resolution provisions,"° howev-
er, cannot be amended without unanimous consent of all WTO
members."0 Another possibility would be to propose that WTO
member states approve an "interpretation" of the treaty that re-
verses an interpretation issued by the Appellate Body."6 The
WTO Charter provides that "interpretations" can be adopted with
less than a consensus vote, but it further stipulates that the inter-
pretation procedure "shall not be used in a manner that would
99. This has led critics to warn that these judges may be plagued by conflicts of
interest as they pursue professional careers at the same time as they sit as judges for the
WTO. Nader, supra note 4, at A12.
100. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 17(3), reprinted in 33 LL.M. at 1236.
101. Id. art. 17(6), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1236 ("An appeal shall be limited to
issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel.").
102. Id. art. 17(14), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1237 ("An Appellate Body report shall
be adopted by the DSB and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report .... ").
103. Final Act, supra note 1, pt. 2, art. 10, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1149-50.
104. Id. art. 10(8), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1150.
105. Id. art. 10(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1149 (listing provisions that require unani-
mous consent to amend).
106. Id. art. 9(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1148.
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undermine the amendment provisions in Article X."' 7 Thus, in
the end, the "consensus to overrule" requirement embodied in the
dispute resolution provisions is buttressed by the amendment and
interpretation procedures.
The fourth major change from the old GATT processes in-
volves what happens to a final decision after it is approved by the
Dispute Settlement Body. The WTO rules expressly stipulate that
the defendant must comply with the decision within "a reasonable
period of time."' 8 The WTO is empowered to engage in active
surveillance of compliance measures to assure that the defendant
takes the required steps to remedy its violation."° If the disput-
ing parties disagree about what constitutes a "reasonable period of
time" for compliance, they may resort to binding arbitration over
this issue."' If there is further disagreement about actions taken
to comply, the aggrieved state may resort to the original panel for
a ruling."' Eventually, failing a resolution of the dispute by sat-
isfactory compliance, the complaining state must negotiate with the
defendant to determine what amount of "mutually acceptable
compensation" would be appropriate."' If the parties cannot
reach an agreement on compensation, the plaintiff may request
authority from the Dispute Settlement Body to withdraw conces-
sions,"' subject to the right of the defendant to demand arbitra-
tion regarding the appropriate level of retaliation. 14 Once any
arbitration over the appropriate sanction is complete, the plaintiff
may withdraw concessions in an amount consistent with that au-
thorized by the arbitrators and "equivalent to the level of the
nullification and impairment"1 '5 suffered. 6 There is no appeal
107. Id.
108. Id. art. 21(3), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1238. In general a "reasonable period of
time" for compliance is not to exceed fifteen months "from the date of adoption of a
panel or Appellate Body report." Id.
109. Id. art. 21(6), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
110. Id. art. 21(3)(c), reprinted in 33 1.L.M. at 1238.
111. Id. art. 21(5), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1238. A ruling on this issue must be is-
sued on an expedited, 90-day calendar. Id.
112. Id. art. 22(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1239.
113. Id. The DSB must approve this request unless it votes unanimously to reject it.
Id. art. 22(6), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 22(4), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1240.
116. As always, the Dispute Settlement Body may vote unanimously to reject the re-
quest. Id. art. 22(7), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1240-41:
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to the Appellate Body from a panel determination regarding ap-
propriate retaliation, and a consensus vote of the Dispute Settle-
ment Body would be needed to overturn such a determination.
Thus, the WTO dispute resolution system provides an adjudi-
cation mechanism both to resolve the merits of the dispute and to
enforce the trade sanction for noncompliance. This latter aspect of
the system is important because, until now, the essentially prag-
matic structure of the GATT led it to formally approve a trade
sanction on only one occasion, in the early 1950s."t7 The new
system essentially provides an adjudicative system by which the
WTO may place its full weight behind such retaliation.
The fifth and final innovation of the WTO legal system takes
the form of a pledge by WTO members to refrain from unilateral
action in the global trade arena. In a clear attempt to address con-
cerns about the use of domestic legislative schemes such as section
301, article 23 of the dispute resolution procedures stipulates that
states shall not make any unilateral determinations that treaty
violations have occurred"' or that more than a reasonable peri-
od of time has passed for compliance"9 "except through re-
course to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding.' ' 21 In addition, states pledge
to follow the WTO procedures regarding suspension of concessions
and not to impose sanctions unless they are approved by the Dis-
The parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final and the parties con-
cerned shall not seek a second arbitration. The DSB shall be informed prompt-
ly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall upon request, grant authorization
to suspend concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent with
the decision of the arbitrator, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject
the request.
117. Netherlands Measures of Suspension of Obligations to the United States, supra
note 14; William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51, 60
(1987) (noting that the GATT Council has authorized retaliation only once in its history
under article 23).
118. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 23(2)(a), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1241.
119. Id. art. 23(2)(b), reprinted in 33 T.L.M. at 1241.
120. Id. art. 23(2)(a), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1241. A major confrontation over
whether article 23 bars recourse to § 301 is already in the making. Both the European
Union and Japan have signaled that they view § 30.1 as illegal under the Uruguay Round
agreements. SERVICES OF THE EUROPEAN COMM'N, REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES
BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 7 (1994) (arguing that U.S. efforts to renew
"Super 301" are inconsistent with WTO provisions); GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN, 1994 RE-
PORT ON UNFAIR TRADE POLICIES BY MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS 259 (1994) (arguing
that U.S. attitude of "pursuing market opening in bilateral negotiations backed by the
threat of sanctions is not compatible with the multilateral trade system of the
GATI/WTO").
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pute Settlement Body.21 Supplementing this mandate to use and
follow the WTO dispute resolution system procedures are provi-
sions regarding the jurisdiction of both dispute resolution panels
and the Appellate Body. These provisions admonish these tribu-
nals not to "add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements."2 Just exactly who is to have final
authority for determining when a state has acted inappropriately
under article 23 or when the Appellate Body has added to or
diminished the rights and obligations of WTO member states is
not specified, and consequently the outlines of future, major insti-
tutional disputes between the Appellate Body and various WTO
member states over the scope of Appellate Body jurisdiction are
clearly visible in these rather vague, politically charged provisions.
II. CONTENDING VISIONS OF LEGALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE REGIME MANAGEMENT MODEL AND THE
EFFICIENT MARKET MODEL
This Part takes a deeper look at the reasons why the world
trade dispute resolution system has turned toward legalism in the
WTO Charter. It first discusses the general background against
which all trade legalism has developed: neoclassical free trade
theory and the foreign relations theory of realism. It proceeds to
construct, describe and discuss the two legalist models that most
directly combined to support the creation of the WTO: the Re-
gime Management Model and the Efficient Market Model.
A. Baseline Concepts in International Trade: Free Trade Theory
and Realism
All legalist conceptions of international trade governance
share a common intellectual heritage. All are premised on the
desirability of reaping at least some of the rewards to be gained
from open trade between economic actors in world markets and
all are elaborations of or reactions to the classic foreign relations
theory of "realism."'" Before describing the two legalist models
121. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 23(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1241-42.
122. Id. art. 19(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1237. Indeed, even the DSB itself, which
is made up of all WTO members, cannot add to or diminish the rights provided in the
covered agreements. Id. art. 3(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1227.
123. For some of the classic texts espousing the international relations theory of real-
ism, see ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE
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that will contend for dominance within the WTO, therefore, it is
worth pausing to review the conceptual background against which
both are set.
1. Free Trade Theory. Economic free trade theory is essen-
tially a positive account of how global trade "maximize[s] real
economic welfare, 124 through "exchange between nations based
on underlying differences of comparative advantage. ' 1 5 All le-
galist models presume that economic free trade theory and the
doctrine of comparative advantage are roughly accurate accounts
of the means by which international trade creates global wealth.
Further, all accept to greater or lesser degrees the empirical
assumption that liberal world trade policies in place since the end
of World War II have been responsible for a great deal of the
world's prosperity during this period.'26
Susan Strange has summarized the logic of economic free
trade theory as follows:
Liberal economists believe that the individual pursuit of private
gain is consistent with the general welfare of society, since the
hidden hand of the market ensures that the producer will make
what the consumer wants and at the lowest price, or else he will
go out of business.'Transposing the coincidence of individual and
collective interest from the national to the international level....
the pursuit of national interests by individual states is consistent
with the general welfare of international society-or, in
short .... the world economy will be well served if each indi-
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1975); HANS J. MORGENTHAU,
PoLTICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973);
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, SCIENTIFIC MAN VS. POWER POLITICS 187-203 (1946); Joseph M.
Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988). The modern version of realism was a reaction
against the "legalistic-moralistic" tradition of Woodrow Wilson in the early part of the
20th century. See GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 95 (expanded ed. 1984);
Burley, supra note 21, at 207-08. Wilson believed strongly in the potential for interna-
tional cooperation through a combination of democracy, international organization, and
formal law. However, the failure of Wilson's efforts to promote international peace
through his Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, and the formalistic, metaphysical
positivism exhibited by much international legal thinking gave rise to the rival theory of
realism discussed in the text.
124. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Political Economy of International Trade, 44 INT'L ORO.
261, 271 (1990).
125. FRANKLIN R. ROOT, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT 41-42 (6th ed.
1990); Cohen, supra note 124, at 261.
126. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 7-9 (1988).
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vidual government or state observes the law of comparative costs
and sells on the world market what it produces best.27
Under the doctrine of comparative advantage, global wealth
increases if each state specializes in producing and exporting those
goods and services that it is most efficient at producing. 28 The
state may then import everything else. This specialization occurs
most efficiently through open, competitive markets that accurately
price goods and services, enabling the producers in each country
to discover what they are comparatively good at producing.
2. The Foreign Relations Theory of Realism. While economic
free trade theory provides an account of how wealth increases
through global trade, the foreign relations theory of realism
explains how states behave in their relations with other states.
Realism views states as the primary actors in world affairs and
treats all states as autonomous, self-interested, and animated by
the single-minded pursuit of power. The interstate competition for
power, in turn, creates a world that is characterized by anarchy. In
such an anarchic world, international law is "but a collection of
evanescent maxims or a 'repository of legal rationalizations,
' 129
and international cooperative arrangements have an unstable exis-
tence. States that do not vigilantly protect their vital interests by
taking a cautious (or even a duplicitous) approach to cooperation
are severely penalized. 3 Fueled by the savage experiences of
World War II and the Cold War, realism has dominated interna-
127. Strange, Protectionism, supra note 30, at 238. Under free trade theory, there is a
"coincidence of national and global welfare objectives" and "adjustment costs and risks"
are either assumed away or are "unimportant." Id.
128. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING GATI, supra note 34, at 8-14 (discussing David
Ricardo's classic explanation of the doctrine of comparative advantage and his argument
that nations are better off both individually and collectively with a policy of free trade
than with any other trade policy); EDWIN MANSFIELD, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROB-
LEMS, DECISIONS 357-58 (7th ed. 1992).
129. Burley, supra note 21, at 208 (quoting Richard A. Falk, The Relevance of Politi-
cal Context to the Nature and Functioning of International Law: An Intermediate View, in
THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffman
eds., 1968)); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34
AM. J. INT'L L. 260, 260 (1940) (accusing international legalists of attempting to "exorcise
social evils by the indefatigable repetition of magic formulae").
130. Grieco, supra note 123, at 485, 488.
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tional relations theory since 1945 and continues to be an important
influence in contemporary political science and rhetoric."'
3. The Paradox of Free Trade Governance. The problem of
international trade governance arises because economic free trade
theory and realism are not compatible. On the one hand, interna-
tional trade is useful to provide jobs, wealth, and economic
stability for most states, and states that do not prosper econom-
ically fall behind in the race for international power. On the other
hand, to gain wealth through international trade, states must lower
economic barriers and other protective barriers that are necessary,
according to realist theory, to protect states' vital interests against
possible aggression from power-seeking rivals. Thus, trade means
that states must cooperate in ways that expose them to potential
economic and security threats.
International trade governance systems structured along realist
assumptions thus reflect a deep ambivalence of purpose. First,
these systems assume that a state will comply with international
trade regulators and adjudicators only when it is in the state's
immediate self-interest to do so.132 Giving international tribunals
the power to render "binding" awards is therefore illusory at best
and misleading at worst. Second, the use of rigidly binding adjudi-
cation can actually be destructive to international relations. Such
procedures force what are essentially political disagreements be-
tween power-maximizing states into the legal straitjacket of formal
adjudication, leaving the states ill-equipped to surface, join, and
resolve the real problems and interests that have caused the dis-
pute.'33 Realist dispute resolution processes thus encourage ex-
plicit, power-based bargaining that leaves states legally free (as
realists believe they are free in fact) to exercise discretion based
on their national interests.
The earliest GATT dispute resolution system reflected the
contradiction between realism and free trade through its use of
diplomatic working parties rather than adjudicatory tribunals to
discuss trade differences. 3 Even as the GAIT system became
more procedurally complex and adjudicatory, it retained an essen-
131. Id. at 485.
132. Conversely, if it is in a state's interest to comply with a tribunal ruling, compli-
ance will take place whether or not the system stipulates that the decision is binding.
133. LONG, supra note 16, at 71-73.
134. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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tially realist character by empowering GATT defendants to veto
dispute resolution panel decisions when they came to the GATT
Council for approval. 35 In an early article on GATT jurispru-
dence, Robert E. Hudec summed up the realist approach to trade
dispute resolution quite well:
The key to understanding the GATT legal system is to recognize
that GATT's law has been designed and operated as an instru-
ment of diplomacy. Although the GATT legal system has many
points in common with domestic models, the thing which sets it
apart from others is the overriding concern for "flexibility"-the
insistence that the law's coercive pressures be applied in a con-
trolled fashion which allows room for manoeuvre at every stage
of the process. To achieve this flexibility, the GATT has devel-
oped forms and techniques which work to suppress the law's
natural instinct for final decisions. Adjudication ... [is] not the
terminal event[] one is accustomed to look for in more conven-
tional legal systems .... One must expect to find, therefore, that
GATT law will be of rather uneven quality, varying from issue to
issue and, significantly, from time to time.136
It is these assumptions about the purpose and limits of trade
dispute resolution that the new WTO procedures have shattered.
States are assumed to be ready to comply with binding tribunal
decisions under the new system. Moreover, the system is expressly
135. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. Needless to say, realists are deeply
opposed to the new WTO procedures. Phillip R. Trimble's views on GATT dispute reso-
lution are characteristic of trade scholars who embrace realism. See Trimble, supra note
6. Trimble is "deeply skeptical of notions of international community and world values,"
id. at 1028, and accordingly troubled by the idea of applying "the rule of law" to the
GATT, id. at 1017 (noting Trimble's "reservations" regarding appeals to the "rule of
law" for the GATI). He argues that the creation of a trade "supercourt" would threaten
to attenuate the required "solid connection" between international trade law and the
political interests of the major trading states that make up the world trading communi-
ty-a connection that helps trade norms acquire the acceptance needed to be sustainable
in a realist world. Id. at 1025. According to Trimble, legalistic trade proposals cannot be
squared with "a coherent theory of power that is acceptable to the relevant political
communit[ies]" and ignore the deep-seated "distrust of international supervision" that
makes state compliance, especially by the United States, problematic. Id. at 1027. Finally,
Trimble doubts that judges from a variety of cultures applying necessarily vague rules
could ever transcend the narrow boundaries of economic logic and theory to achieve pre-
dictable decisions that would also be politically acceptable. Id. at 1029.
136. Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J.
WORLD TRADE 615, 665 (1970).
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designed to yield a definitive, timely, legalistic termination to dis-
putes between states over trade.
B. Two Normative Theories of Legalistic Trade Dispute Resolution
If the new trade legalism embodied in the WTO reflects any-
thing, it is a decline in the belief that classical foreign relations
realism accurately describes the way modern trading states behave.
The neoclassical economic model of comparative advantage is also
under pressure, but most see it as still offering the best description
of how international trade creates wealth. 37 Modern versions of
legalism thus share a belief that states seek something in interna-
tional affairs in addition to naked power, most notably wealth and
domestic stability.138 Legalist accounts of international trade dis-
pute resolution conflict, however, because they reflect deep dis-
agreements among scholars regarding the theoretical international
relations construct that should replace realism as the dominant
explanation of state conduct in world affairs. In essence, the WTO
arrived before scholars had reached any clear consensus over what
theory, if any, should replace realism. This lack of consensus will
drive future debates over legalism within the WTO and other
international institutions.
1. The Regime Management Model: Solving a Prisoner's
Dilemma with a Contract Among Sovereign States
a. Description of the model. The Regime Management
Model of international trade adjudication takes its cue from the
international relations theory of "regimes."' 39 Like realism, re-
gime theory treats states as autonomous actors in the international
arena and focuses on state behavior as the key variable in analyz-
ing international relations. Unlike realism, however, regime theory
seeks to explain why self-interested states in an anarchic world do,
137. See generally Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Challenges to the Doctrine of Free Trade, 25
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 219 (1993) (discussing challenges to the doctrine of free
trade).
138. The legalist theories to be constructed in the text are to be distinguished from
the legalist idealism of Woodrow Wilson, which was grounded in a notion that states
would voluntarily submit themselves to a rule of law in order to secure on the interna-
tional level the same ideals of democracy that nations like the United States cherish at
the domestic level. See supra note 123.
139. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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in fact, cooperate with one another."4 Regime theory is a rela-
tively recent intellectual development. In the 1970s, international
organization scholars studying global institutions such as the
GATT and the IMF were convinced that the behavioral assump-
tions of realism were essentially correct and that states acted pri-
marily out of self-interest. 141 The most widely accepted realist ac-
count of global economic cooperative arrangements, hegemony
theory,42 however, did not provide a convincing description of
how these institutions worked. Under hegemony theory, the Unit-
ed States, acting in its own self-interest after World War II, served
as a political and economic guarantor of liberalized trade for a
world of equally self-interested states, much as had the British in
the late nineteenth century. However, in the 1970s and early
1980s, the GATT and the IMIF persisted as viable institutions
1 43
even though U.S. influence as an economic and political hegemon
had declined.'"
Scholars conceived regime theory as an answer to the per-
ceived weaknesses in realist accounts of international cooperation.
Regime theory combines the egoistic assumptions of realism with
the insights of game theory to explain how international arrange-
ments thrive in an anarchic world not dominated by any one na-
tional power or world government.45 In sharp contrast with real-
ism, which emphasizes the anarchic tendencies of state behavior,
regime theory points to rules, norms, law, and implicitly effective
140. Realism and regime theory thus both observe the same. degree of cooperation,
noncooperation, war, and peace among states, but regime theory sees the widespread
instances of cooperation and peace as the interesting phenomenon whereas realism is
preoccupied with the possibility of noncooperation and war. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY 67 (1984) (arguing that governments acting as "rational egoists" may
involve themselves in "the formation of institutionalized arrangements, containing rules
and principles, which promote cooperation"). Thorough summaries of regime theory that
go well beyond the example of trade regimes can be found in the international law liter-
ature. See Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory, supra note 21, at 338-42;
Slaughter, supra note 21, at 227-28.
141. Burley, supra note 21, at 218. Regime theorists argue that cooperation makes it
possible for egoistic states to achieve their objectives by acting with "strategic rationality"
to exploit opportunities for mutual gain. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory,
supra note 21, at 351.
142. See KEOHANE, supra note 140, at 9.
143. See Burley, supra note 21, at 218.
144. See KEOHANE, supra note 140, at 8-10; Robert Kuttner, Managed Trade and
Economic Sovereignty, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES 37, 52 (Frank J. Macchiarola ed., 1990).
145. See Burley, supra note 21, at 218.
8591995]
860 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:829
dispute resolution systems as defining characteristics of mechanisms
that make international cooperative arrangements work. 46
Regime theory also departs from realism in its account of
what motivates states in the international arena. As noted above,
realism assumes that the'acquisition and maintenance of power is
the primary relevant motivation of states.47 Regime theorists
hold that states pursue a variety of goals in addition to power, in-
cluding wealth, political stability, domestic distributional objec-
tives,"4 and even cultural autonomy.'49 While hegemony theory
may have provided a useful explanation for the origins of post-
World War II economic regimes such as the World Bank, the IMF
and the GATT, regime theorists believe that the wealth and stabil-
ity gained from participating in these regimes have now become a
sufficient reason for states to comply with regime norms without a
hegemon to exert pressure toward compliance.5
146. In the regime literature, regimes are defined by "implicit or explicit principles,
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge
in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Re-
gime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
147. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 21, at 349.
148. Just because international trade produces increased wealth does not mean that
this wealth will be spread evenly within a given society. Indeed, it can lead instead to
greater inequality between the rich and the poor. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN,
EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADE OFF (1975) (arguing that society faces a
choice between economic equality and efficiency); Michael S. Knoll, Perchance to Dream:
The Global Economy and the American Dream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1599-1606
(1993) (discussing effect of economic globalization on domestic income distribution and
the implications of a disappearing middle class in combination with expanding groups of
poor and wealthy citizens).
149. Cohen, supra note 124, at 272; see also Abbott, Modern International Relations
Theory, supra note 21, at 350 (noting that states sometimes pursue "quality of life goals"
in addition to power); Lea Brilmayer, Trade Policy: The Normative Dimension, 25 N.Y.U.
J. INT'L L. & POL. 211, 216-17 (1993) (noting that free trade may undermine a "partic-
ular way of life" and that in some countries there is a "general interest in preserving
local culture which extends beyond the narrow economic benefit to certain sectors");
Thomas R. Howell, Trade Protection: Rethinking the American Perspective, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 251, 251-55 (1993) (arguing that developing new technologies, preserving
a "way of life," and preserving a "national economic autonomy" motivate trade policies).
150. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory, supra note 21, at 363 (noting that
once a cooperative norm is in place, violation of it makes defections by others more
costly because it leads "ultimately to the loss of a valuable institution"). Agreements that
depend on future benefits from a relationship for their stability are called "self-enforcing
agreements." See L.G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27, 27
(1980); Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Cooperation in the Liberalization of
International Trade: After Hegemony, What?, 41 INT'L ORG. 1, 25 (1987).
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John Gerard Ruggie has explained that post-World War II
trade structures like the GATT] gained a foothold in international
life because they were based on what he has called an "embedded
liberalism compromise."'' Domestically, each state must balance
the interests of groups that seek protection from foreign im-
ports... against the interests of exporters and others that favor
expanded free trade."i States wish to accommodate the needs of
exporters because trade contributes to domestic employment and
income. At the same time, states are extremely wary of free trade
because it can have unwanted redistributive effects within their
domestic economies that may cause political repercussions." 4
Global trade institutions like the GATT persist, argues Ruggie,
because free trade liberalism is "embedded" within an internation-
al framework that recognizes the need for states to exercise politi-
151. John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 393 (1982).
152. Declining and noncompetitive domestic producers typically oppose free trade. See
Charles K. Rowley & Robert D. Tollison, Rent-Seeking and Trade Protection, in PROTEC-
TIONISM AND STRUCruRAL ADJUSTMENT 141, 151-52 (Heinz Hauser ed., 1986) (contend-
ing that protectionism is a result of political activity by uncompensated "losers" from free
trade, including declining and noncompetitive domestic producers). The same is true for
groups associated with declining producers, such as organized labor. Tim Lang & Colin
Hines, GATT The Pitfalls Amid the Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, Business Sec-
tion, at 13 (calling for "undoing GAT' to prevent "massive unemployment in the devel-
oped world"). Ruggie's "embedded liberalism" perspective on the GATr does not ac-
count for groups such as communitarians and ultranationalists that also oppose free trade
on grounds unrelated to economic self-interest. HERMAN E. DALY & JOHN B. COBB, JR.,
FOR THE COMMON GOOD 233-35 (1989) (arguing that free trade threatens to erode local
communities in order to promote a nonexistent "world community"); Patrick J. Buchanan,
GATT Challenges U.S. Sovereignty, BOSTON HERALD, May 4, 1994, at 35 (criticizing the
proposed WTO dispute resolution provisions and stating that "[w]hether it be foreign aid,
or free trade, intervention or not, what is imperative is that only Americans decide
America's destiny").
153. Groups favoring free trade include multinational firms, large banks, exporters, do-
mestic industries that rely on imported factors of production, and price-conscious consum-
ers. See Kuttner, supra note 144, at 51 (noting that U.S-based banks and multinational
corporations both favor liberal trade); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Consti-
tutional Problem: On the Domestic Policy Functions of International Trade Rules, in PRO-
TECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 152, at 243, 245 (noting that
gainers from free trade include consumers, processing industries, and exporters); Bob
Davis, Trade Accord Gets Consumer Group's Backing, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1994, at A4
(reporting on the endorsement of the WTO by Consumers Union, publisher of Consumer
Reports).
154. Charles Lipson, The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime
Change, 36 INT'L ORG. 417, 425-26 (1982).
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cal control over the distributional consequences of global economic
change."'
International political economist Robert Keohane has pointed
out that world trade institutions embodying Ruggie's notion of
"embedded liberalism" are inherently unstable because the com-
promise on which they rest exposes states to a classic "iterat-
ed" 156 prisoner's dilemma."5 7 Trading states "can benefit from
mutual cooperation, but each can gain more from double-crossing
the other[s]-that is, from 'defection."" 58 Regime theorists postu-
late that state policymakers achieve their biggest payoffs within a
trade regime if they can deliver the best of both worlds to their
domestic constituencies: free access to foreign markets for their
exporters and protection at home for their producers and work-
ers.'59 If all countries engage in absolute protection, however, all
lose the benefits of trade because export markets close, leaving
each state locked within its own domestic market."6 The goal for
155. See id. at 421; Ruggie, supra note 151, at 393.
156. KEOHANE, supra note 140, at 75; Ruggie, supra note 151, at 393. It is important
to the regime theorists' analysis that the play of the prisoner's dilemma be iterated over
an indefinite number of decisional "rounds" so that possible long-run gains from coopera-
tion can be weighed in the calculus against the more concrete short-run gains to be
achieved through defection in any one round. Id.
157. The prisoner's dilemma is one of the most powerful analytic tools in social sci-
ence for the investigation of problems of human cooperation. See ROBERT AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 28 (1984) ("The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma has
become the E. coli of social psychology."). The original scenario depicted two prisoners
charged with committing a crime but held in different cells. Police investigators approach
each prisoner with the same set of choices: confess or remain silent. If either prisoner
confesses and the other remains silent, the confessing prisoner goes free and the silent
prisoner is sentenced to five years based on the testimony of the confessing prisoner. If
both confess, they each receive a three-year sentence. If both remain silent, they each
receive a one-year sentence. The problem is that neither prisoner knows what the other
prisoner is going to do. If one prisoner remains silent, there is a risk that he will receive
the worst result: five years in jail. Yet confessing may bring a higher jail term than if
both remain silent. The safest choice is to confess, but the prisoners are both better off
if they can trust each other to remain silent. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Coopera-
tion in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 2005, 2022 n.50 (1987).
158. KEOHANE, supra note 140, at 67.
159. Regime theorists' view of states' welfare functions conflicts with the neoclassical
economic position that states are individually as well as collectively better off imple-
menting a free trade strategy that subjects their producers to global competitive disci-
pline. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 8-14; supra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text.
160. Bruno S. Frey & Heinz Buhofer, Integration and Protectionism: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 152,
at 167, 170-71 (arguing that "multilateral" trade agreements "create a classical Prisoner's
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trading nations, then, is to devise reciprocal trading arrange-
ments16 under which all markets open just enough so that states
can achieve what W.M. Corden has called the "conservative social
welfare function:" trade-induced economic growth accompanied by
the avoidance of "any significant absolute reductions in real in-
comes of any significant section of the community."'162 Trade
agreements must also take account of realist concerns over possi-
ble changes in the relative distribution of international economic
power brought about by trade.63 Keohane asserts that interna-
tional trade agreements like the GATT act "like contracts"' to
structure carefully circumscribed, reciprocal, multilateral relation-
ships in ways that cut through this prisoner's dilemma and make
patterns of cooperation possible.
International trade dispute resolution mechanisms provide vital
support for trade regimes by giving states the means to police
Dilemma situation in which it is advantageous for every government to be uncooperative
and to break the rules by maintaining and/or imposing trade barriers").
161. Reciprocity is an important, basic principle in international trade treaties. HUDEC,
supra note 37, at 23 ("The concept of balanced exchange was central [to the GATT
negotiations]. The appearance of a sound bargain was usually regarded as essential to the
political support of such agreements ....").
162. See W.M. CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE 107 (1974). The
conservative welfare function is grounded in an assumption that "increases in income are
given relatively low weights [in the state's decisionmaking process] and decreases very
high weights." Id. John H. Jackson, a leading U.S. legal commentator on-the GAIT, has
argued that international trade governance is principally a problem of "'managing' inter-
dependence." JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 4. On the one hand, there
is the need to create the conditions for trade liberalization. Id. at 8 (describing the theo-
ry of "liberal trade" as the "starting point" of any discussion of international trade poli-
cy). On the other hand, there are problems created by free trade, such as "unscrupulous
entrepreneurs [seeking] to evade national government regulation," id. at 5, and concerns
of distributive justice and domestic economic stability, id. at 18.
163. Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of
the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEM-
PORARY DEBATE 116, 117-18 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993); see JACKSON, WORLD
TRADING, supra note 35, at 18-19 (noting the need for states in international trade re-
gimes to protect national security and address legitimate fears of overdependence on
foreign trade).
164. KEOHANE, supra note 140, at 89; see Nicholas G. Onuf, Global Law-Making and
Legal Thought, in LAW-MAKING IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 1, 23 (Nicholas G. Onuf
ed., 1982) (noting that international law scholars have drawn an analogy "between a
treaty and a contract in municipal law" using the "customary rule, pacta sunt servanda");
Edwin M. Smith, Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements, 64 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1549, 1584-86 (1991) (discussing regime theory and stating that internation-
al treaties are "relational contracts"); Sykes, supra note 67, at 270 (referring to treaties
like the GATT as "contracts" among nations).
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violations of the "contractual" obligations that arise from trade
treaties. Just as domestic courts provide assurance for contracting
parties that promises in private transactions will be kept, interna-
tional tribunals with jurisdiction to declare when promises in trade
treaties have been breached force states considering defection from
their trade bargains to weigh the risk that their actions will be
publicly disclosed.1 65 In addition, international 'trade dispute reso-
lution systems reduce transaction costs within the regime, provide
states with valuable information, and make the overall operation
of the regime more predictable."6
The Regime Management Model of international trade dispute
resolution builds on the image of trade treaties as "contracts
among sovereign states" that help stabilize cooperative trade sys-
tems. The model reflects regime theory in two important respects.
First, states are the key actors in a Regime Management Model
dispute resolution system, and, consistent with the realist founda-
tions of regime theory, states use the dispute resolution system to
maintain their control over trade policy as well as to police trade
bargains. In a Regime Management Model system, states monopo-
lize the judicial process by which judgmentg are rendered. Thus,
such systems utilize centralized, international tribunals that limit
standing to states only. The use of centralized tribunals also en-
ables states to draw adjudicators from the elite group of interna-
tional lawyers and bureaucrats whose professional identities and
training makes them sensitive to the diplomatic aspects of trade
problems.'67 International adjudicators, in contrast with domestic
judges, can be expected to understand the usages, customs, and
interpretations that evolve among trading states, to give effect to
the accumulated "practice"'" of trade agreements, and to pre-
165. See JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 112 (arguing that international
trade dispute resolution systems serve the needs of nations in a complex, mixed-motive
bargain by, among other things, "publicly designating (or threatening to do so) the
'wrongdoer' in an international dispute").
166. Id. (noting that dispute resolution systems provide "predictive guidance about the
application of a rule" to future disputants); KEOHANE, supra note 140, at 89-95.
167. Regime Management Model adjudicators tend to be drawn from an elite group
of international lawyers, economists, and diplomats, all of whom share a common under-
standing of trade economics, if not politics. See, e.g., Abram Chayes & Antonia H.
Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175, 190 (1993) (noting that a consensus among
"knowledgeable professionals about the legal rights and wrongs" of an international dis-
pute often exists and leads to resolution of a dispute); Oscar Schachter, The Invisible
College of International Lawyers, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 217 (1977) (describing role of elites
in interpretation and development of principles of international law).
168. Berrisch, supra note 18, at 497; Smith, supra note 165, at 1588-89 (noting that
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serve for states the balance between domestic political control and
free trade summarized in Ruggie's concept of the "embedded
liberalism compromise.' 69
Second, a Regime Management Model dispute resolution sys-
tem is rooted in realist beliefs about state motivation and must
find ways to assert transnational cooperative norms within a frame-
work that assumes states will act to protect their power. Interna-
tional law as interpreted and enforced by international adjudicators
provides such a balance in trade disputes.70 Regime Manage-
ment Model dispute resolution systems therefore feature binding
adjudication based on international, as opposed to domestic, legal
norms. In a world without a formal central enforcement authori-
ty,171 trade regulation under international legal norms provides
states with needed flexibility. This flexibility would disappear
in a system under which treaty obligations automatically became
enforceable as domestic law within the domestic courts because
states would confront their own municipal "rule of law" norms
regarding compliance. 73
"traditional evidence of the intent of the parties at the time of [treaty] ratification pro-
vides much less guidance about the rights and duties imposed by a dynamic [internation-
al] obligation" than does the "contemporary practice of the parties").
169. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
170. At present, GATI treaty obligations do not have direct effect in domestic legal
systems. Hilf, supra note 31, at 290 ("Under no national legal system are GATT rules
considered to be directly applicable.").
171. Robert H. Bork, The Limits of "International Law," NAT'L INTEREST, Winter
1989-1990, at 3, 4 (noting that when nations violate international law, "[n]o police force
goes into action, no grand jury indicts, no petit jury sits, no verdict is announced by a
court or, if one is, the convicted party ignores it"). The lack of enforcement does not
necessarily undercut the character of international law as "law." Anthony D'Amato, What
'Counts' as Law, in LAW-MAKING IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, supra note 164, at 86,
86. Lack of enforcement does direct attention to nonlegal as well as legal incentives for
compliance within international dispute systems.
172. Louis HENKN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTrrUTION 195 (1972) (arguing
that states always retain the option of refusing to perform an international obligation and
incurring a violation of international law). As John H. Jackson has argued, the "spectrum
of utilities" brought to international trade by states argues against rules' being "rigidly
applied" in ways that might "damage the broader international trading system." JACKSON,
WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 113; see also Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dis-
pute Resolution, supra note 21, at 11 (noting arguments for Uruguay Round's emphasis
on flexible settlement). Regime-oriented systems of dispute resolution thus find ways to
implement trade agreements that preserve "'play in the joints' for special circumstances
or the recognition of the need for a new rule." JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note
35, at 110.
173. For this reason, systems seeking to advance the cause of compliance with interna-
tional law often recommend that international norms or judgments be given direct effect
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Table 2 summarizes the attributes of the Regime Management
Model.
TABLE 2
Regime Management Model
Types of Theories Purpose of Source of
Parties with Underlying Dispute Law for
Standing Model Resolution Enforce-
System ment
Purposes
Regime States Realism and Balance Inter-
Management Regime States' national
Model Theory Interests in
Free Trade
and
Autonomy
b. The model in action. The Regime Management Mod-
el is not just a hypothetical construct. Rather, various international
treaty systems reflect the characteristics of the model and seek to
implement the normative goals underlying it. As indicated by the
controversy that attended ratification of the WTO, 74 the notion
of a binding system for resolving trade disputes is relatively novel.
However, there are other areas of international cooperation broad-
ly related to commerce that provide illustrations of the Regime
Management Model in action.
Perhaps the best example in a commercially related field is
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), established
under the Convention on International Civil Aviation.' 75 This con-
in domestic legal systems. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Enforcement of International Law
Against Federal and State Governments, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1269 (1991).
174. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
175. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter CICA]. See generally PAUL S. DEMPSEY, LAW AND FOREIGN
POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 273 (1987) (describing interaction of states and
legal entities in international aviation). The ICAO is organized under the overall jurisdic-
tion of the United Nations. See id. at 274 ("Today, the ICAO is one of the largest spe-
cialized organizations of the United Nations."). Another good example of an international
treaty regime that fits within the Regime Management Model is the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N Doc.
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vention, which has been signed by some 176 states,1 6 provides a
basis for states to cooperate regarding air transport services and
standards.
The ICAO exhibits many of the characteristics of a Regime
Management Model governance system. First, the ICAO serves as
a "contract among sovereign states" designed to achieve gains
from cooperation without sacrificing more state autonomy than is
absolutely necessary to secure these gains. Article 1 stipulates that
the "contracting States recognize that every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.'
177
In the development of international civil aviation, however, states
recognize that cooperation "on the basis of equality of opportuni-
ty" is desirable so that "every contracting State has a fair oppor-
tunity to operate international airlines.' 78
Second, in an effort to maintain their monopoly over interna-
tional civil aviation policy, only states-not airlines, passenger
groups, unions, or others with an interest in how states regulate air
transport-have standing under the convention to participate in the
ICAO governance structure. Moreover, only states have standing
to appear before international tribunals to adjudicate disputes
under the convention.
Third, signatory states agree to refer disputes that cannot be
successfully negotiated to a neutral international tribunal, whose
decision "shall be final and binding' ' 179  under international
law.' If the disputing states have accepted the ,Statute of the
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261. Under this convention, states agree to bind-
ing dispute resolution, id. art. 296, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1324, under one of four
possible neutral procedures, including resort to the International Court of Justice or to a
tribunal especially set up under the convention itself to resolve disputes, see id. art. 287,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. at 1322-23.
176. MJ. BROWN & DJ. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT
STATUS 152 (10th ed. Supp. 1993).
177. CICA, supra note 175, art. 1, 61 Stat. at 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. at 296.
178. Id. art. 44(0, 61 Stat. at 1193, 15 U.N.T.S. at 326.
179. Id. art. 86, 61 Stat. at 1205, 15 U.N.T.S. at 354.
180. Disputants must first resort to the ICAO Council before appealing to an arbitral
tribunal. Id. art. 84, 61 Stat. at 1204, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352; DEMPSEY, supra note 175, at
293. At the Council stage, the disputants are disqualified from voting on their own case.
Id. There are 33 members on the Council, chosen according to their importance to inter-
national civil aviation and geographical parity. No member of the Council has veto pow-
er. Id. The Council acts by majority vote. CICA, supra note 175, art. 52, 61 Stat. 1196,
15 U.N.T.S. at 332. Between 1947 and 1987 only three disputes were adjudicated before
the ICAO Council. DEMPSEY, supra note 175, at 295.
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International Court of Justice, then they resort to that court.181
Otherwise, the convention provides for an ad hoe arbitration pro-
cedure.1" If states fail to abide by their obligations under the
convention, their voting power in the governance structure "shall"
be suspended,1" and "[w]here the Council concludes that an air-
line is not conforming to a final decision, member states shall not
allow the carrier to pass through their airspace.
'' 4
c. The Regime Management Model and trade jurispru-
dence. Theories of international relations that help explain the
structures and intended purposes of trade-related dispute resolu-
tion systems also yield important insights into the basic jurispru-
dential approaches adopted by panelists in deciding actual cases.
The vagueness of many provisions in trade treaties gives adjudica-
tors significant interpretive discretion." In exercising this discre-
tion, adjudicators face choices among competing policy perspectives
that reflect, among other things, the needs of the states that estab-
lished these tribunals and the interests of groups below the nation-
state level. When purely definitional analysis does not dictate an
obvious answer to a dispute, adjudicators' final decisions are
shaped in important ways by their understandings of the political
and economic purposes their tribunals are designed to serve in the
world economy.
The paradigmatic image of the trade treaty in the Regime
Management Model is that of a "contract among sovereign states."
181. CICA, supra note 175, arts. 85-86, 61 Stat. at 1204-05, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352-54.
182. Id. art. 85, 61 Stat. at 1204, 15 U.N.T.S. at 352-54.
183. Id. art. 88, 61 Stat. at 1205, 15 U.N.T.S. at 354. Were the signatory states to
object to a tribunal ruling, they could amend the convention by a two-thirds vote. Fur-
thermore, the same group voting on the amendment may provide that "any State which
has not ratified within a specified period after the amendment has come into force shall
thereupon cease to be a member of the Organization and a party to the Convention."
Id. art. 94, 61 Stat. at 1206-07, 15 U.N.T.S. at 359-60.
184. DEMPSEY, supra note 175, at 293-94; see also CICA, supra note 175, art. 87, 61
Stat. at 1205, 15 U.N.T.S. at 354.
185. GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TOKYO ROUND NEGO-
TIATION 365 (1986) ("Many diverse interests must be accommodated [in trade treaties],
with the result that political documents or treaties that flow from such negotiations are
often conflicted or confusing."); Chayes & Chayes, supra note 167, at 188-92 (stating that
ambiguity in trade treaties exists because language is "unable to capture meaning," be-
cause meanings change over time as circumstances change, and because "[i]ssues that are
foreseen often cannot be resolved at the time of treaty negotiation and are swept under
the rug with a formula that can mean what each party wants it to mean").
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A regime-oriented jurisprudence, therefore, could be expected to
rely heavily on traditional notions of contract enforcement and
interpretation. The type of contract envisioned by a trade regime,
however, is of a special, "relational" sort.186 States do not enter
trade regimes as "one-shot" deals in a faceless, commercial mar-
ket."s Instead, a relatively small number of states enter trade
treaties for the purpose of creating what Edwin Smith has called
"dynamic obligations. ' 18 States enter such relationships knowing
from the beginning that the relationships will require adaptation
"to uncertain or unpredictable circumstances."189 Regime-oriented
adjudicators are therefore likely to interpret trade treaties as con-
tracts embedded in long-term relationships, relationships that must
be taken into account in reading the treaty's terms. When treaty
obligations are both textually clear and feasible, regime-oriented
adjudicators might engage in strict rule enforcement even in diffi-
cult political circumstances because enforcing rules as written is an
excellent way of supporting and generating confidence in a long-
term contractual regime. 9' On the other hand, faced with vague
terms or obligations that, if interpreted too literally, might threaten
the stability of the regime, regime-oriented adjudicators might
show a studied concern for "regime maintenance"' 9' and the
"political 'management' of trade disputes. '' 92
A case that exemplifies the concern of Regime Management
Model trade adjudicators for "regime maintenance" is the famous
Wheat Flour93 GATT dispute. The United States brought the
186. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACr 64-70 (1980); Ian R. Mac-
neil, Relational Contracts: What We Do.and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483 (dis-
cussing relational thought and its effects on law and society).
187. Smith, supra note 164, at 1589-91 (discussing differences between domestic con-
tract law and international treaty law and noting that "formalized obligations and sanc-
tions may provide a critical adhesive" between "total strangers within a diverse national
economy" whereas the "small number of states enhances the importance of reputation as
a limiting factor upon state actions").
188. Id. at 1549.
189. Id.
190. Scott, supra note 157, at 2050-53; Keith A. Palzer, Note, Relational Contract
Theory and Sovereign Debt, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 756-58 (1988).
191. James M. Lutz, GATT Reform or Regime Maintenance: Differing Solutions to
World Trade Problems, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1991, at 107, 114.
192. Petersmann, supra note 81, at 324.
193. European Economic Community-Subsidies on Exports of Wheat Flour, GATi
Doc. SCM/42, GATT BISD 31st Supp. 259 [hereinafter Wheat Flour]. The text of the re-
port can be found in GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Complaint Concerning EC
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Wheat Flour case against the European Community (EC) in 1981
under the Subsidies Code negotiated in the Tokyo Round in
1979."94 The general purpose of this code was to limit the power
of states to gain unfair competitive advantages for locally produced
goods by subsidizing production of these products and thus artifi-
cially reducing their price on the world market. The GATT pro-
hibits subsidies that result in "more than an equitable share of
world export trade in [the subsidized] product" going to the coun-"
try granting the subsidy. 95
The subsidy for wheat alleged to have violated these provi-
sions was part of the EC's "Common Agricultural Policy" in place
since the 1960s. As such, the subsidy was central to the political
stability of the EC. In challenging this subsidy, the United States
"pointed a dagger at one of the key elements of the EC agricul-
tural program," threatening to "smother [the EC] under an ever-
growing pile of surplus products" and potentially requiring either
"radical change in prices or production modalities.', 1  The EC
responded to the U.S. challenge with every defense it could mus-
ter, from accusations of falsified U.S. data to claims that the Unit-
ed States had reneged on a promise to drop all section 301 com-
plaints in return for European agreement to include agriculture in
the Subsidies Code. 97
The dispute was put to a GATT' panel, which focused on
what the signatory nations had meant by the phrase "more than
equitable share." The United States claimed the phrase meant any
historical "increase in market share that could be causally
tied"'1 98 to the EC's export subsidy, which was introduced in
Subsidies to Wheat Farmers, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 899-916 (Mar. 8,
1983). See HJDEC, supra note 56, at 147-51 (discussing facts of Wheat Flour); William H.
Boger III, The United States-European Community Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute,
16 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 173 (1984) (discussing two disputes between the United
States and European Economic Community regarding wheat exports); Massimo Coccia,
Settlement of Disputes in GATT Under the Subsidies Code: Two Panel Reports on E.E.C.
Export Subsidies, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1986).
194. See WINHAM, supra note 185, at 219-23.
195. GATT art. 16(3), 4 GAIT BISD 26 (1989). Article 10(2)(a) of the Subsidies
Code elaborates on this provision, declaring that "'more than an equitable share of
world export trade' shall include any case in which the effect of an export subsidy grant-
ed by a signatory is to displace the exports of another signatory bearing in mind devel-
opments in world markets."
196. HUDEC, supra note 56, at 148.
197. Id. at 148-49.
198. Id. at 149.
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1959.99 The EC argued that the term should be read as "a truce
against using export subsidies to change the status quo division of
the market" as of the end of the Tokyo Round in 1979.2" Nei-
ther side was able to demonstrate what market shares a truly free
market in wheat would have produced during either time period.
Indeed, the EC argued that agricultural subsidies had been distort-
ing the world price of wheat since 1893."1
Faced with this politically charged dispute over an ambigous
text and given the lack of a free market baseline from which to
measure "more than equitable" deviations, the panel rejected the
complaint and ruled that the legal term at issue was too imprecise
to be applied to world wheat trade.0 2 The decision, which was
criticized by some free trade commentators as violating the
panelists' duties to the world trading community2 3 and which
some have argued was responsible for a complete breakdown of
the Subsidies Code,2°4 is clearly understandable in the light of
realist foreign relations theory.
The panel in the Wheat Flour case had three choices. First, it
could have ruled that the EC had violated the GATT and precipi-
tated a severe political crisis threatening the stability of both the
GATIT world trading system and the EC. Second, it could have
ruled affirmatively that the EC had not violated the rule, setting a
pro-subsidy precedent that would have undercut the obvious inten-
tions of the parties in addressing the subsidy issue in the Tokyo
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 148.
202. Specifically, the panel stated that it
was unable to conclude as to whether the increased share has resulted in the
EC "having more than an equitable share" in terms of Article X, in light of
the highly artificial levels and conditions of trade in wheat flour, the complexity
of developments in the markets, including the interplay of a number of special
factors, the relative importance of which it is impossible to assess, and, more
importantly, the difficulties inherent in the concept of "more than equitable
share."
Wheat Flour, supra note 193, 11 4.5-4.6, reprinted in 18 U.S. Export Weekly (BNA) at
899.
203. William J. Davey, The WTOIGATT World Trading System: An Overview, in
HANDBOOK OF GATr DIsPUTE SETTLEMENT, supra note 13, at 7, 47 ("[T]he panel was
criticized by some for having abdicated its responsibility .... ").
204. Id. ("Indeed, one result of the decision was that dispute settlement under the
Subsidies Code broke down completely during the 1980s as one or more signatories
blocked the adoption of all subsequent panel reports issued under the Code's dispute
settlement provisions . . ").
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Round and thus weakening the GATT. The panel chose the third
option: to rule that the dispute was nonjusticiable under the legal
standard that the parties had stipulated, essentially saying that the
issue was still too politically charged to be appropriately removed
from the realm of realist political bargaining to the realm of legal
interpretation. °5
Given the panel's unhappy alternatives and the vagueness of
the legal standard with which to work, the panel's decision sig-
naled that political progress was needed before legal decision-
making would help. This is a highly useful role for trade adjudica-
tors to fill in a realist system. °6 In fact, the dispute over agricul-
tural subsidies between the United States and the EC persisted
over the decade following the decision and led to further negotiat-
ed modifications of agricultural policy in the Uruguay Round.2 7
Another striking example of Regime Management Model juris-
prudence concerns two GATT cases, both arising out of the fa-
mous "Tuna/Dolphin" dispute.2° More than anything else, these
cases demonstrate how Regime Management Model adjudicators
attempt to balance free trade norms with the sovereignty interests
of regime members, shifting this balance as it becomes clear that
prior interpretations are placing stress on the regime structure.
In these cases, two separate GAT panels declared invalid a
U.S. ban on imports of tuna that had been caught using methods
that kill large numbers of dolphins. The decisions have been criti-
cized by environmentalists as demonstrating that the GATT dis-
205. I. Garcia Bercero, Trade Laws, GATT and the Management of Trade Disputes
Between the US and the EEC, 5 Y.B. EUR. L. 149, 168-70 (1985).
Faced with difficult problems of rule interpretation on which the GATT com-
munity lacks a consensus, a panel may either decline to make a ruling
(wheatflour) or risk reaching conclusions that will prove unacceptable to a large
number of GATT members (pasta, citrus). In both cases, the determination of
the independent body is unlikely to be accepted and the question will be re-
ferred to the political institutions ....
Id. at 169.
206. Some commentators have argued that the United States was to blame for the
Wheat Flour decision because its "overly legalistic view of the GATT" led it to expect
the dispute resolution process to create consensus when there was none. See Boger, supra
note 193, at 215.
207. HUDEC, supra note 56, at 150-51.
208. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT
Doc. DS29/R, June 1994, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 [hereinafter 1994 Report]; General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel, Report on United States Re-
strictions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 [hereinafter
1991 Report].
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pute resolution machinery is biased toward free trade ideology and
"stacked against effective solutions to environmental prob-
lems."2"9 In fact, the decisions were driven by concerns for multi-
lateral rule implementation as much as by the policy of free trade.
In response to public concern regarding declining dolphin and
whale populations, the United States enacted the Marine Mammals
Protection Act (MMPA) in 1972.2"' The MMPA requires the
United States to embargo fish and fish products harvested using
harvesting methods that cause the incidental taking of marine
mammals in excess of a numerical quota set by the statute. For
countries that permit "purse seine" driftnet fishing methods, which
have a high incidence of dolphin taking,2 ' this ban can be avoid-
ed only if the country can show that the tuna or other fish it
wishes to sell in the United States were not caught with drift-
nets.212 These standards on driftnet fishing methods apply to
United States as well as foreign fishermen.213
Pursuant to the MMPA, the Secretary of Commerce in 1988
imposed a ban on yellowfin tuna imported from Mexico and sever-
al other countries because these tuna had been caught using drift-
net methods that violated the statute. Mexico responded in 1990
by seeking relief from the ban through the GATT dispute resolu-
tion process, alleging that the ban was a quantitative restriction on
the importation of Mexican-caught tuna that violated article
11.214 The United States did not deny that its law imposed quan-
titative restrictions on imported tuna. It argued, however, that the
MMPA functioned as an "internal regulation" on tuna that treated
domestic and foreign "like products" in a nondiscriminatory way at
the U.S. border and was therefore legal under article 3(4)215 and
209. Patti A. Goldman, Restncturing the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search of
a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1279, 1280 (1992).
210. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
211. Mather H. Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Propos-
al to Amend the GATT in Light of the TunalDolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2098,
2121 (1992).
212. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
213. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 967 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affid,
929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
214. GATI CHARTER art. 11(1) provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o prohibitions or
restrictions[,] ... whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the impor-
tation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party.
215. Id. art. 3(4) provides,
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Note Ad article 3.216 Alternatively, the United States argued that
sections (b) and (g) of article 20, which permit national laws that
are, respectively, "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health' 217  or required for the "conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunc-
tion with restrictions on domestic production or consumption,21 8
exempted the ban.
The panel found that the ban violated the article 11 bar to
quantitative restrictions and was not excused by any of the excep-
tions advanced by the United States. First, the panel analyzed arti-
cle 3(4) and Note Ad article 3 and found that the MMPA did not
directly address itself to tuna as a product within the U.S. market.
Rather, the ban related to the method or process by which tuna
was harvested outside the United States. The MMPA's effort to
protect dolphins in international waters could therefore not be
interpreted as a U.S. "internal regulation" directed at tuna prod-
ucts.
219
With respect to the GATT exceptions for protection of "ani-
mal ... life" and "conservation of exhaustible resources," the
panel applied a simple, bright-line test of territoriality. In the
panel's view, these exceptions to the GAT were designed to per-
mit countries to protect animal life and resources within their own
jurisdictions, not anywhere in the world. To extend state regulato-
ry power beyond this boundary would threaten the GATT as a re-
gime because the "General Agreement would then no longer con-
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territo-
ry of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable
than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, pur-
chase, transportation, distribution or use.
216. Id. art. 3 provides,
Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or requirement
of the kind referred to in [Article 3(1)] which applies to an imported product
and to the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the
imported product at the time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be re-
garded as an internal tax or other internal charge, or a law, regulation or re-
quirement of the kind referred to in [Article 3(1)] and is accordingly subject to
the provisions of Article III.
217. Id. art. 20(b).
218. Id. art. 20(g).
219. Citing several prior GAT" cases for support, the panel reasoned that the excep-
tion for "internal regulations" was designed to allow states to tax, regulate, or ban im-
ported products that were similarly taxed, regulated, or banned for sale in the domestic
market to assure that like products were treated alike. 1991 Report, supra note 208,
7 5.15, reprinted in 30 1.L.M. at 1618.
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stitute a multilateral framework for trade among all contracting
parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade
between a limited number of contracting parties with identical
internal regulations.""2  The U.S. interpretation of the GATT's
environmental exemptions threatened to establish a system under
which "each contracting party could unilaterally determine the
conservation policies from which other contracting parties could
not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under the General
Agreement."'" Given the priority of sovereignty within the
GATT scheme, such a rule would upset the GATI's delicate bal-
ance between preserving states' powers over their own affairs and
the surrender of that power in carefully delineated areas of trade.
The panel suggested that global conservation and environmental
problems would be better addressed through multilateral negotia-
tions among the contracting parties, who might decide to amend
or supplement the GATT or, better yet, develop an independent
multilateral framework for environmental issues.
Outraged conservation and environmental interest groups
strongly objected to the first Tuna/Dolphin decision,' 2 and as a
result of a settlement between the United States and Mexico,'
the decision was never presented to the GAIT Council. 4 The
European Union and the Netherlands, however, instituted a sepa-
rate complaint on the same issue and pressed for another decision
on the scope of article 2 0. The second panel reached the same
220. Id. 11 5.27, 5.32, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 1620-21.
221. Id. 1 5.32, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. at 1621.
222. See, e.g., Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; "No Country Can
Protect Its Own Smidgen of Air or Ocean," WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21 (arguing
that the reasoning of the GATT Panel would invalidate U.S. laws protecting endangered
species).
223. 1994 Report, supra note 208, 1 2.4, reprinted in 30 1.L.M. at 846 (describing a
June 1992 agreement between the United States, Mexico, and a number of other Central
and South American countries to reduce dolphin mortality in the eastern tropical Pacific
area).
224. Hurlock, supra note 211, at 2131 n.179 (discussing how the Mexican government
agreed not to present the Tuna/Dolphin panel decision to the GATT Council as part of
its overall push to improve relations with the United States).
225. The EU-Netherlands complaint sought to assess the legality of the MMPA's
provisions for an "intermediary nation embargo" against an intermediary nation that fails
to certify and prove that it does not buy tuna from a nation covered by a primary em-
bargo imposed under the MMPA. 1994 Report, supra note 208, 11 2.12, 3.3-.5, reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. at 849, 851. The legal issues raised in the EU case regarding the consistency
of the MMPA with the GATT, however, were identical to those in the Mexican case.
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result as the first panel, but for slightly different reasons 6 that
demonstrate a regime-oriented sensitivity to the global politics of
environmental protection. In contrast with the first panel, the
second panel implied that a GATT signatory might, in an appro-
priate case, justify cross-border environmental regulations based on
the GAIT exemption for the "conservation of exhaustible natural
resources" 227 or the protection of "animal ... life."'  As to
both exemptions, the panel observed that the GATT itself does
not limit the power to regulate based on the location of resourc-
es2 9 or living things."0 Nor could an "absolute" rule prohibit-
ing such regulation be deduced from prior GATT cases, other
GATr provisions, or general international law.21
Nevertheless, the second panel still held that the MMPA was
invalid under the GATT. The panel reasoned that the MMPA was
not prima'ily aimed at or strictly necessary for protecting dolphins.
Rather, the MMPA import quotas sought "to force other countries
to change their policies ... within their own jurisdiction, ' ' 2 and
it was these policy changes, not the import quota, that would have
an "effect on the conservation [or protection of the life or health]
of dolphins." 3 The panel felt that this indirect method of con-
servation was overbroad because it "prohibited imports from a
country of any tuna, whether or not the particular tuna was har-
vested in a way that harmed or could harm dolphins, as long as
the country's tuna harvesting practices and policies were not com-
parable to those of the United States."'  Such a system of envi-
ronmental regulation, were it to be adopted by many nations,
would seriously impair "the basic objectives of the General Agree-
ment. ,
5 5
226. See Timothy Noah & Bob Davis, Tuna Boycott Is Ruled Illegal by GATT Panel,
WALL ST. J., May 23, 1994, at A2.
227. GATT CHARTER art. 20(g); 1994 Report, supra note 208, '1 5.12, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. at 890; Frances Williams, Boycott Ruling Irks U.S., FIN. TIMES, May 27, 1994, at
7.
228. GATT CHARTER art. 20(b); 1994 Report, supra note 208, 5.29, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. at 895.
229. 1994 Report, supra note 208, 5.15, reprinted in 33 IL.M. at 891.
230. Id. 1 5.31, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 895-96.
231. Id. IT 5.16-.17, 5.32, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 891-92, 896.
232. Id. J1 5.24, 5.37, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 894, 897.
233. Id
234. Id
235. Id. 11 5.26, 5.38, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 894, 896.
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This crucial revision to the reasoning of the first panel's deci-
sion is itself a classic example of regime-oriented interpretation.
The uproar over the first panel's decision created considerable
pressure within the United States to revise the GATT to include
explicit environmental exemptions that would prove very difficult
for the rest of the world to accept. Moreover, the second panel's
decision was issued just as the new WTO agreement was being
considered by the U.S. Congress and environmental lobbyists were
using the first panel's decision in advertisements to generate oppo-
sition to the WTO proposal.2 The second panel's shift to a nar-
rower ground of decision that held out a theoretical possibility of
cross-border environmental regulation, even as it struck down the
embargo provisions of the MMPA, served to enhance overall re-
gime stability by asking for less political commitment from its
regime members as the price of regime membership.
2. The Efficient Market Model: Enhancing Welfare by Re-
ducing Legal Barriers to Trade
a. Description of the model. Both realism and regime
theory reflect international law's traditional preoccupation with
states as the unit of action and analysis in international rela-
tions."7 To explain the next model of trade legalism, the Effi-
cient Market Model, I will introduce both a new explanation for
state behavior and a new conception regarding the function of in-
ternational law. This model borrows from the foreign relations
theory of "liberalism" under which the state is conceived of as the
agent for particular domestic constituencies' interests, not as a self-
motivated actor seeking power or political stability. 8 A corollary
to this reduction in the status of the state as the main, autono-
mous unit in international society is a shift in the focus of interna-
tional law. Under the liberal view, the proper purpose of interna-
tional law is to enhance the welfare of individual citizens or
236. Indeed, the second panel made reference to the pending proposal for the WTO.
Id. 5.43, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 898-99.
237. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 39/27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining treaties with reference to
states); Philip Allott, State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law, 29
HARV. INT'L LJ. 1, 14 (1988) ("The subjects of international law are states . . ").
238. Reif, supra note 29, at 738 (stating that under liberal international relations theo-
ry, state preferences are constituted by their "particular domestic sociolegal structures"
and states in international society "represent parts of their constitutive society").
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groups, not the welfare, power, or stability of governments as
political entities."3
The Efficient Market Model views trade legalism as a means
for globally oriented business interests and their government al-
lies2" to overcome domestic resistance to free trade, reduce the
legal transaction costs that states impose on the movement of
goods and services across national borders, and thereby enhance
consumer welfare for citizens of all nations. The model relies
heavily on a normative commitment to economic free trade theory
and the doctrine of comparative advantage as descriptions of how
trade creates wealth for both individual citizens and groups. Recall
that the doctrine of comparative advantage holds that states are
better off, individually as well as collectively, if they produce only
what they are comparatively efficient at producing and import the
rest of what they need. Thus, under neoclassical free trade doc-
trine, the reduction of barriers to imports enhances welfare at the
national as well as the international level.241
The road to reduced trade barriers, however, is blocked by
well-organized domestic interest groups securing "special interest"
laws that are wealth-enhancing to them but costly to the popula-
tion as a whole.242 Producers that are "losers" in the global econ-
239. This view has most recently been put forward by international legal scholars
favoring the foreign relations theory of "liberalism," but it harkens back at least to Im-
manuel Kant. Allott, supra note 237, at 26 (proposing a manifesto for "the new interna-
tional law" that would, among other things, "acknowledge the peoples of the world as
the true subjects of international law"); Fernando R. Tesbn, The Kantian Theory of Inter-
national Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 54 (1992) ("Liberal theory commits itself . . . to
normative individualism, to the premise that the primary normative unit is the individual,
not the state."). It is no coincidence that Kant himself proposed that an "International
Court of Trade" be among -the international legal institutions necessarily implied by his
theory. Id. at 99-100.
240. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma, supra note 21, at 520. Abbott writes that
"responsible public official[s]" may work to implement free trade policies over the objec-
tions of the political forces for protection in the pursuit of long-term political interests.
He also notes that although appointed officials are responsive to the goals of their elect-
ed superiors, they are less influenced by political pressure than their elected counterparts
and more likely to hold in view the national interest and welfare of consumers; addition-
ally, among elected officials, the President is more likely to be sympathetic to liberal
trade policy than a congressman because he faces a broader political constituency. Id. at
516-18.
241. Tumlir, supra note 32, at 406 ("[T]he legally flimsy international [free trade] rules
represent a truer expression of the national interest of all the countries concerned than
the mass of national [economic] legislation .... ").
242. Wolfgang Michalski, Costs and Benefits of Protection, in PRToECTONISM AND
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 152, at 25, 25 ("Protectionist measures yield few
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omy mobilize labor and other affected constituencies to lobby for
laws to protect them from foreign competition.243 Such trade bar-
riers include both restrictions on imports and domestic legal rules
that operate in a biased fashion against foreign traders.2' In eco-
nomic terms, these groups obtain "rents"245 from the majority of
benefits and impose substantial costs, chiefly on the protecting country but also on its
trading partners."); see also Edward J. Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall
in Tariffs and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 290-91
(1987) (citing dxample of special interest groups blocking the opening of U.S. markets for
exports from developing countries). Both regime theory and economic free trade theory
recognize the importance of public choice theory and its relationship to law. Regime
theory is preoccupied with cooperative behavior by states in international settings, howev-
er, and is agnostic regarding the priorities that states bring to the international bargaining
table. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. Economic free trade theory, by
contrast, is normatively opposed to protectionism and other domestic forces that seek
restrictions on free trade. See James Bovard, The Morality of Protectionism, 25 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 235, 248 (1993) (arguing that protectionism is "oppressive"). For a gen-
eral review of public choice theory, see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
243. See Robert E. Baldwin, Trade Policies in Developed Countries, in INTERNATION-
AL TRADE: SURVEYS OF THEORY AND POLICY 183, 184-94 (Ronald W. Jones ed., 1986);
Cohen, supra note 124, at 264-65; JJ. Pincus, Pressure Groups and the Pattern of Tariffs,
83 J. POL. ECON. 757 (1975); Rowley & Tollison, supra note 152, at 151-52 (explaining
protectionism as a result of (1) political activity by uncompensated "losers" from free
trade; (2) a lack of awareness by free trade "winners;" (3) the differential representation
resulting from a geographical concentration of those who will benefit from protectionism;
(4) the perverse effects of logrolling in voting legislatures; and (5) the short-term benefit
to governments from tariff revenues).
244. RENI DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE xi, 3 (1985) (arguing
that the "independent judges" in international commercial arbitration forums are able to
supplant "the State monopoly of lawmaking and the confiscation of justice by the State"
by developing "in appropriate cases, a jus gentium and lex mercatoria of a new type, free
of the contingencies and prejudices which dominate the [legal] scene in the various
States"). David emphasizes that businesses seek arbitral alternatives to domestic courts
both to improve the efficiency of the administration of justice, id. at 10-13, and to seek
"another justice" compatible with the needs of international trade, id. at 13-18 ("Busi-
nessmen may endeavour to develop, through the device of arbitration, a commercial law
of their own (droit corporatif), different in some measure from the legal rules emanating
from State organs, which the courts apply[, and t]he craving for such a new international
law cannot be denied."). See Thomas E. Carbonneau, National Law and Judicialization of
Arbitration: Manifest Destiny, Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error, in INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY?
115, 116-17 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1993) [hereinafter INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION] (discussing how domestic "legal processes [that] are too rigid to
adapt and to undergo reform" fuel the demand for international commercial arbitration
services); see also DAVID, supra, at 350-51 ("When parties request that arbitrators adjudi-
cate their dispute in accordance with international law or with the general principles of
law, their intention is to escape from the national systems of law.").
245. Rowley & Tollison, supra note 152, at 143-45 (discussing concept of economic
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the population. The general population acquiesces in paying these
rents because the costs are "hidden and diffuse 24 6 in the econ-
omy as a whole. Elected officials, meanwhile, "concern themselves
far more with the impact of trade policy on producer interests
than on consumer interests" because producer interests tend to
mobilize for elections. 47 The Efficient Market Model sees trade
legalism as a way to overcome such political failures so as to im-
prove general welfare.248
Richard Cooper has noted that domestic trade policy has two
"tracks" on which it is conducted: a "high" political track requiring
considerable attention by political officials and subject to political
accountability, and a "low" track of rule-oriented dispute adjudica-
tion in which individual cases are determined by domestic tribunals
under technical criteria established by law and administrative regu-
lation.249 Protectionist forces have been adept at moving their
domestic agenda from the "high" track of visible political debate
to the "low" track of technical regulation and adjudication. In such
"low" track proceedings as domestic anti-dumping and countervail-
ing duty cases, protectionists are able through "misdirection and
"artificial rents" produced when government intervention introduces "man-made scarcity"
by government decree in response to public pressure for protection from market com-
petition).
246. Heinz Hauser, Domestic Policy Foundation and Domestic Policy Function of Inter-
national Trade Rules, in PROTECIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 152,
at 9, 12-13.
247. Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safeguard". A Positive Analysis of the GATT
"Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHi. L. REV. 255, 275 (1991). Of
course, producers of intermediate goods are themselves consumers of foreign component
parts for their final products. Governments may well attend to the needs of consumers
that are, in effect, value-added resellers.
248. When legal barriers restrict imports, domestic producers enjoy artificially protect-
ed markets. This means they can raise prices, forcing consumers to transfer their wealth
to the protected industry. See Michalski, supra note 242, at 29-30. Further, with the high-
er prices imposed, the country will invest more resources than it should in producing the
protected item and delay shifting those resources to other, more advantageous products.
Id. at 32-34. Moreover, according to free trade advocates, protection does not really save
jobs, as protectionists often assert in political forums. See, e.g., Lang & Hines, supra note
152, at 13. Rather, it simply favors one group of protected workers at the expense of
others who would be able to work in more productive industries if trade distortions were
removed. Free trade advocates believe the dwindling demand for unskilled workers in
developed countries is more a function of technological innovations such as robots and
computers than of competition from cheap labor abroad. Workers of the World, Compete,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 2, 1994, at 70 ("Many economists prefer to blame the dwindling de-
mand for unskilled workers on the technological revolution of the past decade.").
249. Richard N. Cooper, Trade Policy Is Foreign Policy, 9 FOREIGN POL'Y 18, 18
(1972-1973).
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obfuscation" to secure protectionist rulings "without being called
to task" by those who are disadvantaged by their actions." The
Efficient Market Model of international trade dispute resolution
takes Cooper's insight one step further by conceptualizing the
international trade adjudicatory system as a "low" technical/legal
track that operates at the international level to serve as a check
on both the "high" and the "low" track domestic trade systems of
individual states.2 1
Although a normative belief in the welfare consequences of
free trade grounds the Efficient Market Model, international trade
adjudication systems gain legitimacy from domestic legislatures'
approval of these systems. The ,most obvious reason for such ap-
proval is that global economic interests have become powerful lob-
bying forces at the domestic level. 2 The emerging profile of the
world economy strongly supports this claim. For example, the vol-
ume of "international production," i.e., the production of goods
within a country under the global strategy of a foreign-owned and
foreign-directed multinational enterprise, now exceeds the total
volume of international trade. 3 Thus, intrafirm transfers account
250. J.M. Finger et al., The Political Economy of Administered Protection, 72 AM.
ECON. REv. 452, 454 (1982); see also Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 44 ("Law...
is widely perceived by political decision makers as 'mostly technical,' and thus lawyers
are given a more or less free hand .... The result is that important political outcomes
are debated and decided in the language and logic of law." (citing Eric Stein, Lawyers,
Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1981))).
251. The use of supranational institutions and mechanisms through which the public
officials charged with managing foreign affairs may make decisions without resorting to
domestic legislatures is a relatively common phenomenon. Note, Discretion and Legitimacy
in International Regulation, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1099, 1099 (1994) (noting use of amend-
ment procedures for treaties, "nonunanimity" voting provisions in international agree-
ments, and the delegation of discretion to foreign policy officials).
252. The U.S. example illustrates how foreign firms have rapidly gained influence in
domestic political markets in recent years. Bruce Kogut and Michelle Gittelman have
pointed out that "[less than 6 per cent of [U.S.] industrial output was from foreign-
owned companies at the start of the 1980s. The percentage is now close to 20 per cent."
BRUCE KOGUT & MICHELLE GITELMAN, THE LARGEST FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 1 (1994).
As of 1994, 105 of the largest foreign multinational corporations operating in the United
States could be added to the Fortune 500 industrial rankings based solely on the sales of
their U.S.-based operations. Id. at 1-2. Moreover, "foreign firms hired 12 per cent of the
manufacturing workforce in 1991, and paid them 14 per cent of total compensation." Id.
at 8-9. As the welfare of executives and workers becomes increasingly intertwined with
the success or failure of foreign enterprises that must engage in international trade to
survive, governments are likely to become more inclined to resist protectionist impulses.
253. Strange, The Name of the Game, supra note 30, at 242 (noting that the
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for as much as half of somd countries' total imports. 4 The legal
burdens of moving intrafirm goods across borders act "as an addi-
tional tax on internal transfers; and the less they exist, the bet-
ter." 5 Multinational business firms have thus found it in their
interests to become powerful players in domestic trade politics. 6
Within the developing world, multinational firms "have begun
to resemble states," 7  rivaling nations in power and influence
and able to "keep 'sovereignty at bay"' because of their sheer eco-
nomic size, which sometimes exceeds that of the states where they
do business." s In industrialized states, the power of multination-
als is less relative to the total number of rival interest groups, but
global firms provide significant resources toward winning legislative
mid-1980s were a "milestone" because the volume of international production exceeded
the volume of international trade for the first time in history); A Disquieting New
Agenda for Trade, ECONOMIST, July 16, 1994, at 56 (citing U.N. statistics showing that in
1991 firms' sales of goods through foreign affiliates exceeded value of their trade in
goods and services). Multinational firms based in the United States lead the world in
direct investments overseas, and their stakes are rising. Fred R. Bleakley, Foreign Invest-
ment by Multinationals Rebounds, Benefiting China, U.N. Says, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31,
1994, at A2 (reporting that multinationals worldwide invested some $195 billion in foreign
affiliates and other companies in 1993, $50 billion of which was invested by U.S.-based
multinational firms in other companies outside the United States).
254. WINHAM, supra note 185, at 53-54 n.63 (citing a 1977 study finding that over
48% of the value of total U.S. imports originated with exporters who were related by
ownership to the importing firms); Winfried Ruigrok, Paradigm Crisis in International
Trade Theory, 25 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1991, at 77, 77 (noting that only 25% of world
trade is truly "free" and governed by GAT rules, and that the balance is intracompany
trade (25%), bilateral trade governed by preferential agreements (25%), and barter trade
(25%)); Strange, Protectionism, supra note 30, at 253. Many multinational firms ultimately
locate major production facilities in the markets where final sales will take place to re-
duce the costs associated with exporting. For example, in the United States, the Japanese
car manufacturer Honda intends by the year 2000 to produce in the United States over
75% of the Hondas sold in the United States. The No. 1 Carmaker: The U.S.?, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Aug. 16, 1994, at C1.
255. WINHAM, supra note 185, at 54.
256. Ronald Facchinetti, Global Lobbying in the New Europe, CORP. BOARD, Jan.
1995, at 19 (examining the techniques used by multinational firms lobbying European
Union institutions and comparing these techniques with those used when these firms
lobby the U.S. Congress); Bruce Stokes, The American Marketplace Has Gone Global, 26
NAT'L J. 1426, 1430 (1994) (describing membership of -multinational firms in the Emer-
gency Committee for American Trade, a powerful lobby group in the United States, and
discussing how trade lobbying has become a "profit center" for Washington law firms in
recent years); Globe-Totting, ECONOMIST, Sept. 3, 1994, at 62 (reporting on U.N. Confer-
ence on Trade and Development study that places the number of multinationals in oper-
ation in 1992 at 37,000, controlling more than 200,000 affiliates and employing some 73
million people).
257. Strange, The Name of the Game, supra note 30, at 242.
258. IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 14 (1989).
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fights for both free trade agreements259 and friendly, supranation-
al legal rules governing business conduct.
21
In addition, the global financial market now dominates most
local markets, including those of many large players like the Unit-
ed States.26' Global investment funds therefore go where they
can find the highest returns, not to where they produce the best
effects for a given economy.262 States' control over their own
capital markets, including their own currencies, is slipping.263 Fi-
nally, a growing number of industries are what Jagdish Bhagwati
has called "footloose," i.e., "shiftable" from one country to anoth-
er based on small changes in efficiency that can result from regu-
latory moves.2" This gives corporations increasing leverage to
block inefficient laws altogether or, alternatively, to help create su-
pranational legal tribunals that can temper or annul the application
of these laws.
Free trade interests help their cause by using effective legisla-
tive "packaging" for free trade agreements. Dispute resolution sys-
tems such as the WTO are voted on as part of trade treaties that
259. See David S. Broder & Michael Weisskopf, Business Prospered in Democratic-led
103rd Congress, WASH. PosT, Sept. 25, 1994, at Al ("Business mobilized tremendous
forces to secure ...congressional support [for the NAFTA]. The NAFTA issue united
the lobbying power of U.S. corporations and the Mexican government, which paid U.S.
lobbyists and public relations experts $25 million to sell the pact here.").
260. Cf. W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDI-
CATION AND ARBITRATION 127-34 (1992) (discussing passage of international arbitration
laws in Belgium and Switzerland that drop the requirement of confirmation of arbitral
awards in a local court so as to entice global businesses to use their jurisdictions to
arbitrate claims). See generally David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formu-
lating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the
European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ. 423 (1991) (discussing potential lowest-com-
mon-denominator effect of market pressures on jurisdictions between which there is rel-
atively free mobility of capital and describing EC efforts to harmonize corporate law to
prevent such a "race to the bottom").
261. Strange, The Name of the Game, supra note 30, at 246 ("Local financial markets
are now ancillary to the global one, not the other way around.").
262. Kenichi Ohmae, New World Order: The Rise and Fall of the Region-State, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 16, 1994, at A12 ("[In a global economy, b]oth capital and corporate pres-
ence flow to those areas where global economic logic is-and can be seen to
be-consistently and reliably at work.").
263. Peter Gumbel & Bob Davis, G-7 Countries Show Limits of Their Power, WALL
ST. J., July 11, 1994, at A6 (discussing inability of United States and other industrialized
nations to control fall of U.S. dollar on world markets).
264. Bhagwati, supra note 137, at 229 (noting that different environmental or safety
standards among countries can lead to complaints by producers that competitors are
deriving "their lethal competitive edge because of some 'unfair' [regulatory] advantage
that they 'should not' have").
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are loaded with free trade benefits and side payments that appeal
to a broad group of constituencies.26 These benefits include not
only increased trade but also solutions to politically troubling do-
mestic issues that gain the approval of groups that might not oth-
erwise have a stake in the trade debate.266 Moreover, trade coali-
tions spend enormous resources on behalf of trade initiatives that
include international adjudicatory dispute resolution systems.2 67 In
the United States, "fast track" voting rules often apply to trade
treaties, and these rules forbid amendments or separate votes on
particular provisions.268 Thus, potentially controversial dispute
resolution systems obtain approval as part of the overall package
of attractive treaty terms. The fast-track procedure makes it much
265. H. Richard Friman, Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining
Tactics in International Economic Negotiations, 47 INT'L ORG. 387, 390-91 (1993) (discuss-
ing how policymakers use side payments to domestic constituencies as a tactic to gain
domestic support for international economic agreements); Kevin Merida & Tom
Kenworthy, For Some in House, Last-Minute Deal-Making Leaves Bitter Taste, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 18, 1993, at All (describing "deals President Clinton cut" assuring special
treatment for sugar, citrus, vegetable, beef, peanuts, appliances, and other products to
secure lawmakers' votes for the NAFTA). In the battle to pass the WTO, U.S. protec-
tionists succeeded in strengthening their rights under domestic anti-dumping laws in spite
of U.S. agreement to weaken these laws. Robert Keatley, Congress Inserts Rules in
GATT Treaty That Make It Harder to Trade Globally, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1994, at
A6; Peter Passell, An End Run on GATT, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1994, at 33 ("Industries
including steel, autos, and semiconductors have become expert at using the law against
dumping, or importing goods below what is considered fair value, and they view the
enabling legislation for GATT as an opportunity to increase their leverage.").
266. See Friman, supra note 265, at 391-95 (discussing use of issue redefinition as a
tactic to gain domestic political support for international trade agreements). To secure
passage of the NAFTA, treaty proponents in the United States emphasized that the
NAFTA would solve the problem of illegal immigration from Mexico in addition to cre-
ating domestic jobs and better new markets for U.S. products. Gary C. Hufbauer &
Jeffrey J. Schott, Options for a Hemispheric Trade Order, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REv. 261, 282-83 (1991) (discussing full range of interests brought to the NAFTA by
Mexico, Canada, and the United States, including U.S. concerns about illegal immigrants
from Mexico).
267. For example, backed by globally minded businesses, the Mexican government
spent more money lobbying to secure passage of the NAFTA than has any other foreign
principal, public or private, in the history of the United States. James Gerstenzang,
Mexico's NAFTA Lobbying Called a Record, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1993, at D3; see
Broder & Weisskopf, supra note 259, at Al.
268. The "fast track" voting procedure requires a single vote up or down on the
entire trade deal, thus foreclosing the possibility of amendments that might separate the
substantive provisions from the dispute resolution system. See, e.g., Alan F. Homer &
Judith H. Bello, U.S. Trade and Policy Series No. 20: The Fast Track Debate: A Prescrip-
tion for Pragmatism, 26 INT'L L. 183 (1992) (describing fast-track procedures).
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more likely that the voting coalition needed for passage will hold
together.
In summary, the Efficient Market Model of international trade
dispute resolution views international trade laws and tribunals as
devices by which governments and businesses that favor free trade
may circumvent domestic protectionist groups and increase the
world's wealth.169  The mechanisms used to accomplish these
goals are efficiency-enhancing international legal rules capable of
trumping municipal laws and international trade tribunals that can
supplant meddlesome domestic courts and agencies. Ultimately,
Efficient Market Model advocates envision internationally devel-
oped free trade norms becoming the "rule of law" for individual
states by giving these norms direct legal effect in domestic courts
and by making the awards of international tribunals convertible
into domestic court judgments with only minimal substantive scru-
tiny. In contrast with the Regime Management Model, which
restricts standing to assert claims to states, the Efficient Market
Model gives business parties standing to directly assert pro-trade
norms before both international and domestic tribunals, thus en-
abling them to gain legal leverage over their own and other
governments' economic policy choices.27
269. Hauser, supra note 246, at 16 (stating that international trade agreements func-
tion as constitutions imposing frameworks of constraints on discretionary economic policy
that "restrict national governments in the choice of protectionist instruments"); Frieder
Roessler, Discussion to Session IV Competition and Trade Policies. The Constitutional
Function of International Economic Law, in PROTECTIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUST-
MENT, supra note 152, at 303, 307-08 (stating that institutions such as the GATT help
offset the political "bias" caused by the fact that domestic producers are "better orga-
nized than consumers").
270. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening the Domestic Legal Framework of the
GATT Multilateral Trade System: Possibilities and Problems of Making GATT Rules Ef-
fective in Domestic Legal Systems, in THE NEW GATI' ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, supra note 31, at 33, 70-71.
271. See Ronald A. Brand, Private Parties and GATT Dispute Resolution: Implications
of the Panel Report on Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930, J. WORLD TRADE,
June 1990, at 5 (arguing for direct participation by commercial parties in GATT proceed-
ings); Hilf, supra note 31, at 321-22; Roessler, supra note 269, at 305-12; Tycho H.E.
Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade in Services: The Case for Sidestepping the GATT,
19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 439-40 (1994) (arguing that treaties governing trade in services
should include private rights of action on behalf of business parties so that such parties
can bypass the need "to lobby their national governments to champion an issue before
foreign governments" and supplement "the limited resources of a relatively small number
of government officials [who] serve as advocates in . .. trade disputes").
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TABLE 3
Efficient Market Model
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Types of Theories Purpose of Source of
Parties with Underlying Dispute Law for
Standing Model Resolution Enforce-
System ment
Purposes
Efficient States and Foreign Reduce Inter-
Market Commercial Relations Legal Trans- national and
Model Entities Liberalism action Costs Municipal
and Free and Fully
Trade Integrate
Theory Global
Market
Regime States Realism and Balance Inter-
Management Regime States' Inter- national
Model Theory ests in Free
Trade and
Autonomy
b. The model in action. A number of international
commercial dispute resolution systems and institutions, all of which
seek to reduce the legal transaction costs imposed on global busi-
nesses by nation-states, provide illustrations of the Efficient Mar-
ket Model. These agreements include the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA),272 international commercial arbitra-
tion treaties such as the New York Convention on the Recognition
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention"),273
and the World Bank's International Center for Settlement of In-
vestment Disputes (ICSID).274
272. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 289 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. The NAFTA was supplement-
ed by "side agreements" on enviommental and labor issues. North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993);
North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 1499 (1993).
273. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New
York Convention].
274. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
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Unlike Regime Management Model systems like the ICAO,
which emphasize state monopoly on power, use institutions such as
the International Court of Justice, and rely exclusively on interna-
tional law norms, Efficient Market Model systems operate to limit
the power of states to regulate transnational commerce. They do
so by granting commercial parties direct access to tribunals along
with states and by empowering tribunals to issue judgments with
binding effect within the domestic legal systems of nation-states.
The NAFTA, which came into effect on January 1, 1994, con-
tains dispute resolution provisions to serve both states and private
parties." The dispute resolution provision that most clearly re-
flects the Efficient Market Model is NAFTA article 19. This ar-
ticle creates a binding, supranational arbitration scheme accessible
directly by private business parties276 through which businesses
may overturn final anti-dumping and countervailing duty decisions
of domestic trade regulators.2" These arbitration panels, which
are directed by the treaty to apply the domestic law of the state
that issued the anti-dumping or countervailing duty decision, 78
provide the last word on such allegedly unfair trade claims.
79
tionals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
275. See David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, 34 HARV. INT'L LJ. 407, 431 (1993); Andrew K. Rose, Note, Old Wine, New
Skins: NAFTA and the Evolution of International Trade Dispute Resolution, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 255, 260-83 (1993) (providing a detailed comparison of the NAFTA and the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement dispute resolution systems).
276. Both private parties and states have access to this process. NAFTA, supra note
272, art. 1904(5), 32 1.L.M. at 683. Consistent with the thesis advanced in this Article
regarding the importance of business interests in the development of the WTO system,
there is evidence that exporters were behind the creation of the NAFTA article 19 sys-
tem and its predecessor in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. See GILBERT R.
WINHAM, TRADING WITH CANADA 18-19 (1988) (discussing role of business interests in
developing the chapter 19 binational arbitration process for anti-dumping and countervail-
ing duty cases in the Canada-U.S. agreement).
277. The NAFIA offers parties who wish to appeal anti-dumping and countervailing
duty decisions issued by national regulatory authorities a choice of appellate procedures.
Aggrieved parties may either use the regular domestic system of judicial review of the
country that issued the decision or request that a binational NAFTA arbitration panel
hear their appeal. NAFTA, supra note 272, art. 1904, 32 I.L.M. at 683-84.
278. If the parties elect to use an article 19 panel, the panel will apply the substan-
tive national law and standard of judicial review of the importing state that has issued
the contested ruling. Id. art. 1904(2), 32 I.L.M. at 683. Article 19 panels consist of five
arbitrators, a majority of whom must be lawyers. Id. Annex 1901.2(2), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
279. The NAFTA provides that panel decisions may be appealed by states, id. art.
1904(13), 32 I.L.M. at 683, to three-member "Extraordinary Review Committees," id.
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The New York Convention has provided businesses with a
widely used system ° through which to obtain domestic enforce-
ment of international commercial arbitration awards resolving con-
tract and other transactional disputes, " subject only to minimal
standards of domestic judicial review for basic fairness2 and
consistency with national public policy.' The international com-
mercial arbitration system has become increasingly free of state
regulation as courts have narrowed the New York Convention's
"public policy" exception to include only those awards that violate
deeply held, fundamental fairness standards and as states, ea-
ger to gain business as arbitration forums, have revised their do-
mestic arbitration laws and lifted various legal restrictions on pro-
ceedings taking place within their borders.' The jurisdictional
Annex 1904.13(1), 32 I.L.M. at 688, which may reverse a panel decision only if an arbi-
trator is guilty of "gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest," if the panel
"seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure," or if the panel "manifestly
exceeded its powers," and only if such wrongful conduct "materially affected the panel's
decision and threatens the integrity of the binational review process," id. art. 1904(13), 32
1.L.M. at 683. Conceptually, it is important to note that article 19 panels are international
dispute resolution tribunals that not only are accessible directly by private parties but
also have the final word on domestic questions of law without even cursory, domestic
court review. Huntington, supra note 275, at 431 ("[Article 19 procedure] is quite unusual
in the world of international trade treaties."). In this sense, these tribunals closely track
the Efficient Market Model.
280. REISMAN, supra note 260, at 108-09 (stating that the New York Convention "is
the most comprehensive and, until now, successful effort" to channel international arbitral
processes and rules through national judicial systems). A number of worldwide commer-
cial arbitration forums such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, the
London Court of Arbitration, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and the American
Arbitration Association in New York offer arbitration services to commercial and state
parties under the umbrella of this convention. Id. at 107 ("The great bulk of internation-
al commercial arbitration, thousands of cases each year, is conducted under the auspices
of a number of private international organizations.").
281. The New York Convention establishes that the domestic courts of all signatory
countries will enforce arbitration agreements in international and maritime contracts. The
prerequisites for such enforcement are minimal. The agreement to arbitrate must be in
writing and must be capable of withstanding an attack that it is "null and void, inopera-
tive or incapable of being performed." New York Convention, supra note 273, art. 2(1),
(3), 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38, 40.
282. ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958, at 296-311 (1981) (discussing grounds for challenging arbitral award based on basic
notions of "due process").
283. Id. at 359-68.
284. Id. at 366 ("[T]he courts have refused enforcement [on the basis of the public
policy exception] in very exceptional cases only [and have] generally given a narrow in-
terpretation and application to the Convention's public policy provisions.").
285. REISMAN, supra note 260, at 127-31 (discussing how Belgium and Switzerland
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sweep of international commercial arbitration, meanwhile, has
expanded rapidly in recent years. For example, the U.S. Supreme
Court has ruled that international arbitration panels operating
without the constraint of substantive judicial review have the pow-
er to decide cases under both antitrust and securities laws of the
United States. 6 Such jurisdiction effectively "privatizes" these
public regulatory schemes by taking them out of the hands of
domestic judges and placing them in the hands of ad hoc interna-
tional adjudicators.'
Perhaps most interestingly, the ICSID arbitration system per-
mits private parties to sue states using an international arbitral
procedure that is wholly self-regulatory, featuring its own internal
appeals process.' Once the ICSID arbitration scheme has run
its course, states agree to enforcement of awards against them in
their own domestic courts without even the minimal "public poli-
cy" review permitted under the New York Convention.289 In es-
sence, ICSID permits private business creditors to obtain virtually
automatic collection of awards against state debtors using debtor
have recently passed international arbitration laws that bar post-award review by courts
unless one of the parties is a citizen in order "to attract a quantity of arbitral business
that would otherwise not have selected their venue").
286. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-40
(1985) (holding that federal antitrust claims are arbitrable by international arbitrators);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513, 519-20 (1974) (holding that claims un-
der the 1934 Securities Exchange Act are arbitrable by international arbitrators); G. Rich-
ard Shell, Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 458-60 (1993).
287. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Remaking of Arbitration: Design and Destiny, in
LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 19 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990); Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism: Assessing the Folly of
Mitsubishi, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 282-83 (1986); Comment, The Relaxation of
Inarbitrability and Public Policy Checks on U.S. and Foreign Arbitration: Arbitration Out
of Control?, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1661, 1663 (1991).
288. Albert Jan van den Berg, Annulment of Awards in International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 244, at 133, 134 n.2 ("[ICSID provides for] a
self-sufficient system of truly international arbitration .... ").
289. John T. Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in
Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government of Jamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 90,
104-05 (1976). The ICSID treaty requires contracting states to "recognize an award ren-
dered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations im-
posed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that
State" without regard to "public policy" notions. ICSID Convention, supra note 274, art.
54(1), 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194. This undertaking renders an award that
may be binding as a matter of international law binding under the defendant's own do-
mestic legal system subject only to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. art. 55, 17
U.S.T. at 1292, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194; Schmidt, supra, at 105.
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nations' own courts-the strongest extant example of an Efficient
Market Model scheme.
c. The Efficient Market Model and trade jurispru-
dence. The Efficient Market Model not only provides a useful
perspective on the purposes, dynamics, and structures of interna-
tional trade adjudication systems, but also illuminates a jurispru-
dential theme that appears in trade cases. In contrast with regime-
oriented interpretation, which emphasizes the contractual nature of
trade treaties and the need for "regime maintenance," trade-ori-
ented interpretation sees adjudication as a utilitarian instrument
for helping the world trading community to attain its goal of "an
open world trading system free of government restrictions. 290
Adjudicators motivated by the normative values embodied in
the Efficient Market Model can accomplish this goal by interpret-
ing the qualifying language, exceptions, and limiting conditions in
trade treaties narrowly and, when possible, by ignoring or finessing
these barriers to free trade altogether. Such adjudicators can be
expected to seek bright-line rules that further the "long-term legal
objective of protecting ... the national as well as individual self-
interest in liberal trade and in 'rule-oriented' decision-making pro-
cesses."
291
A prominent example of trade-oriented jurisprudence in the
GATI is the DISC case, a decision that invalidated a U.S. scheme
to promote exports by giving special tax breaks to U.S. corpora-
tions qualified as "domestic international sales corporations"
(DISCs).' As the plaintiff, the European Community argued
that the tax deferral benefits offered to DISC corporations were
export subsidies that violated article 26(4) of the GAIT.29 The
United States countered that its DISC program was not a "subsi-
290. WINHAM, supra note 185, at 404.
29L Petersmann, supra note 81, at 324.
292. GAIT BISD, 23d Supp. 98, 113 (1977). Among other things, 95% of DISC re-
ceipts had to result from export sales. Id.
293. Article 16(4) prohibits governments from granting subsidies on the export of
industrial products:
[C]ontracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form
of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which
subsidy results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the
comparable price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic mar-
ket.
Art. 16, 4 GATI BISD 27 (1969).
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dy," but was rather a way of creating a "tax haven" for U.S. ex-
porters similar to the havens used by companies in Europe, where
exporters often incorporated "shell" subsidiaries in a low- or no-
tax jurisdiction through which to channel export sales and save
taxes.294
Essentially, the United States made a regime-oriented, rela-
tional contract argument that past "GATT practice" supported its
narrow interpretation of the word "subsidy" in article 26(4).295
Furthermore, the United States asserted that even if the DISC
program was a subsidy, the European Community had failed to
carry its burden of proving the required element of article 26(4)
that the DISC program directly caused exported U.S. goods to be
sold for prices below those at which the same goods were sold do-
mestically.2 96 Finally, passing both the subsidy and pricing issues,
the United States claimed that the EC could not show that it had
suffered "nullification or impairment" of treaty benefits as a result
of the DISC program.
The GATT panel, which included economists from the Lon-
don School of Economics and Italy's University of Turin,2' held
that the DISC law violated the GATT. The panel's reasoning
clearly reveals its Efficient Market Model assumptions regarding
the purposes of GAIT adjudication in the world economy. The
panel first dismissed the relational contract argument that many
nations had historically used their tax systems to encourage ex-
ports, holding that "one distortion could [not] be justified by the
existence of another one., 298 Instead, the panel "started by ex-
amining the effects of the DISC legislation in economic
terms., 299 Viewed economically, the panel found that the tax
program "conferred a tax benefit ... related to exports ... [,
which] would result in more resources being attracted to export
activities than would have occurred in the absence of such benefits
294. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the
DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1443, 1447-48 (1988).
295. John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in
GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 747, 766 (1978).
296. Hudec, supra note 294, at 1451.
297. GATT BISD, 23d Supp. 98 (1977). The other three members of the five-person
panel were a counselor from Sri Lanka's GAIT mission in Geneva, the director of trade
policy for the Department of Trade and Industry in Wellington, New Zealand, and a
counselor from Sweden's delegation to the European Community. Id.
298. Id. at 114.
299. Id. at 112.
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for exports. ' 3° It therefore held that the tax program was a
"subsidy. ,301
Having found a subsidy to exist, the panel went on to deter-
mine if the plaintiff had shown the requisite "bi-level pricing" re-
quired by article 26(4). Although the EC had made no showing
whatever on this required element, the panel reasoned that "from
an economic point of view," an export subsidy could be presumed
to either lower prices, increase sales, or increase profits per unit,
and "it was to be expected that all of these effects would oc-
cur."3 2 Thus, a "concentration of the subsidy benefits on prices
could lead to substantial reductions in prices ... in export mar-
kets ... [that did not need] to be accompanied by similar reduc-
tions in domestic markets., 33 This presumption was based en-
tirely on economic speculation, but it permitted the panel to rule
that the DISC program caused bi-level pricing in violation of arti-
cle 26(4).
Finally, as to the requirement of "nullification and impair-
ment," the panel relied on a prior GATT case to hold that once a
plaintiff proves a GATT violation, this proof constitutes a prima
facie showing of nullification of benefits,3 4 subject to rebuttal by
the defendant.0 5 Since the panel had already assumed that such
a violation occurred, it concluded that "there was a prima facie
case of nullification or impairment of benefits which other con-
tracting parties were entitled to expect under the General Agree-
ment., 30 6 In effect, the panel built its findings of liability and im-
pairment on a double presumption regarding the existence of bi-
level pricing and the probability of harm flowing from such pric-
ing. Both presumptions rested on neoclassical economic theory.
The DISC decision caused significant controversy. Among
other things, it was criticized as being poorly drafted, and the
United States effectively delayed its adoption by the GATT Coun-
cil for over a decade.0 7 In the light of the Efficient Market
300. Id.
301. Id. This sweeping conclusion potentially labeled as a GATr-proscribed "subsidy"
any tax policy that benefited exports.
302. Id. at 113.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 114.
305. Jackson, supra note 295, at 771.
306. GAIT BISD, 23d Supp. at 114.
307. HUDEC, supra note 56, at 95; Jackson, supra note 295, at 764. The United States
ultimately amended its tax laws in response to the DISC decision to protect the integrity
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Model, however, the DISC case can be seen as an example of
economic theory forming the foundation for mandatory legal pre-
sumptions.308
Another example of Efficient Market Model trade jurispru-
dence is the line of cases in the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
in which the court held that individuals, not just Member states,
have standing to assert European Community trade norms within
their domestic legal systems.3" The 1963 decision of the ECJ in
Van Gend & Loos3t0 exemplifies this jurisprudential thread in
European law. The case involved a challenge by a private Dutch
importer against the Dutch government's attempt to impose cus-
toms duties on specified imports. The importer sued in a Dutch
court, alleging that the duties violated European Community
law.311 Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, on which the ECJ
based its jurisdiction, authorizes the ECJ to issue "preliminary
of the GATT dispute resolution process, HUDEC, supra note 56, at 94, but the U.S.
amendments "made no significant change in the underlying export subsidy," id. at 95.
308. Radical free trade advocates seek to transform economic free trade theory into a
system of rights and law. See PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 463 (arguing that "[t]he
constitutional lawyer should recognize freedom of [international] trade as a basic individu-
al right and should not misunderstand it as a mere 'economic theory' "). A striking ex-
ample of an international trade adjudicator confusing economics and law can be found in
one of the decisions issued by a dispute resolution panel under the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement, the precursor to the NAFTA. See Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Pork from
Canada, No. USA 89-1904-11, 12 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 2119 (Binational Panel 1990); Andreas
F. Lowenfeld, Binational Dispute Settlement Under Chaper 19 of the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Appraisal, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 269, 302-34
(1991). The Pork case involved an allegation by the National Pork Producers of the
United States that Canadian pork processors were receiving countervailable subsidies from
the Canadian government, allowing the Canadians to sell pork in the United States at
artificially low prices. In a series of decisions and remands, members of the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) leveled charges that the panel had reached a "counter-
intuitive, counterfactual, and illogical" conclusion in overturning the ITC's ruling. One of
the panelists was a Canadian professor of economics, John Whalley. In a written panel
opinion, Whalley called for the ITC to adopt reasoning in accord with the "mainstream
economics profession" as insurance against reversal by panels in the future. Pork, 12
I.T.R.D. at 2133; Lowenfeld, supra, at 316. It is difficult to imagine a more pointed ex-
ample of trade-oriented decisionmaking than an economist who is sitting as a judge on
an international trade arbitration panel calling on domestic legal authorities in an "ad-
ministered protection" system to substitute economic theory for domestic legal standards.
309. Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 42 (describing ECJ cases that gave individuals
standing to sue in domestic courts using European Community norms).
310. Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend &
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
311. Id. at 4-5.
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rulings" on any question involving the interpretation of community
law arising in the national courts.3 t2
Although article 177 was included "[a]lmost as an after-
thought,313 and was originally intended "simply to ensure uni-
form interpretation of Community law throughout the Member
States,314 the ECJ seized on article 177 to rule that the Dutch
plaintiff had the right to assert the priority of European Communi-
ty law in his own country's courts:
[T]he Community constitutes a new legal order.., for the bene-
fit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit
within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only
Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the
legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only
imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by
the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as
upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Com-
munity a5
Cases such as Van Gend & Loos harken to a period in the
history of the EU when it was primarily an Efficient Market Mod-
el legal system concerned *with removing inefficient barriers to
trade. Within the total context of European integration, this legal
system has become much more, as will be discussed later.31 6
III. LEGALIST MODELS AND THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
This Part investigates thred important questions regarding the
WTO's international trade dispute resolution system. First, what
legalist vision best accounts for the structure of the WTO's legal
312. Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 58.
313. Id.
314. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE LJ. 2403, 2420 (1991).
315. Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12. The ECJ has subsequently held that indi-
viduals may rely directly on EC law to sue other individuals. See, e.g., Case 4375,
Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455
(holding that article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, which requires equal pay for equal
work, had direct effect within member states and could be relied on by a private individ-
ual in a suit against another private individual).
316. See infra notes 385-93 and accompanying text.
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system? Second, what sort of WTO dispute resolution system re-
forms are various proponents of legalism likely to advance as glo-
bal economic integration proceeds? Finally, what kind of justice
should we expect from the new international trade legalism?
A. Global Business Interests and the Structure of the WTO
Legal System
As argued in Part II, the development of the WTO's binding
dispute resolution structure cannot be readily reconciled with the
international relations theory of realism.317 States in a realist
world marked by interstate anarchy would not find sufficient com-
mon ground or trust to create the WTO's binding dispute resolu-
tion mechanism, particularly when one considers that the WTO
system is coupled with a system of trade sanctions for securing
compliance with adjudicatory awards. Leaving realism to one side,
therefore, let us see how the legalist models presented in Part II
help explain certain general aspects of the WTO's legal system.
Both the Regime Management Model and the Efficient Mar-
ket Model support the WTO's use of a binding dispute resolution
process. Under the Regime Management Model, a binding inter-
national law enforcement mechanism based in international law
will discourage defections from the trade treaty "bargain" and help
solve the prisoner's dilemma among trading states. Such a system
provides more dependable enforcement, adds pressure towards
compliance, reduces transaction costs, and inspires more confidence
that trade rules will apply equally to all states than does a
nonbinding, power-based bargaining process.
At a time when there is no global superpower or other cen-
tral enforcement mechanism committing nations to comply with
negotiated trade norms, state leaders motivated by a Regime Man-
agement Model understanding of trade governance might well
negotiate a binding dispute resolution system such as the one
adopted by the WTO. For example, although the United States is
still a dominant trading nation, it is no longer the hegemon it was
and must therefore meet on roughly equal terms in the trade
arena with the European Union, Japan, and the emerging trading
blocs of Asia and South America.318 In such a world, the United
317. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
318. Kuttner, supra note 144, at 52 ("[T]he relative shrinkage of the United States
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States benefits from having access to a binding dispute resolution
system because the threat of binding adjudication forces other
nations to live up to their trade promise of more open markets.
The cost of this access, however, is that the United States itself
must live up to its obligations. Compliance with trade norms will
sometimes involve a loss of domestic control over economic and
social priorities.319 Under the Regime Management Model, con-
sent to binding trade adjudication is part of the price of participa-
tion for all states seeking to participate fully in the world market.
The Efficient Market Model also supports the WTO's adop-
tion of binding dispute resolution, but for quite different reasons.
Under this model, global business interests and their government
allies seeking to establish an efficient global market would like to
discard burdensome domestic legal regulations and procedures that
interfere with free and open trade. Binding international dispute
resolution systems and transnational legal rules help to circumvent
these barriers to efficient trading. A treaty system like the WTO
is, under this view, a step in the direction of a truly global system
of international commercial dispute resolution through which busi-
nesses may gain independence from state regulation.
Unlike the Regime Management Model, which points to a rel-
ative decline in U.S. power as the trigger that has caused states to
turn toward binding dispute resolution, the Efficient Market Model
suggests that state leaders the world over-including in the United
States-are losing control over economic matters to global market
forces.320 As the structure of the world economy undermines
state control over domestic economic events, state leaders seeking
to reap the rewards of expanding trade must accommodate the
needs of global traders through acquiescence in binding dispute
systems in which the needs of private commerial parties can be addresed~
economy makes such a role [as a hegemon] unsustainable. The issue is how best to ad-
just to the new realities.").
319. Katz, supra note 28, at A10 (arguing that Congress should approve the WTO
because "[i]f we expect other countries to observe international trading rules, we must
also be prepared to observe the rules we helped to write" and noting that "[t]he WTO
ensures that member countries agree to the obligations of all of the agreements, not just
those they like").
320. See Ohmae, supra note 262, at A12 ("Economic borders have meaning, if at all,
not as the dividing lines between civilizations or nation-states, but as the contours of
information flow. Where information reaches, demand grows; where demand grows, the
global economy has a local home."); supra notes 244-55 and accompanying text.
321. This phenomenon appears to be most apparent at present in regional trade re-
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Both the Regime Management and the Efficient Market mod-
els also support the use of a self-contained appeals procedure such
as the WTO Appellate Body to assure that the rules developed
within the WTO dispute resolution system by various panels are
consistently applied by judges who have the greatest experience in
the political and legal operation of the WTO. The appeals process
gives the WTO system as a whole protection against the rulings of
idiosyncratic "rogue panels" that might, depending on the global
trade model motivating the system, injure the regime" or an-
nounce economically inefficient interpretations of trade rules. The
exact role the Appellate Body will play in the WTO remains to be
seen. Suffice it to say at this point that potential judges for this
court may bring with them normative beliefs that incline them to-
ward either of the models discussed above and still be wholeheart-
edly legalist in orientation.
Given that both models theoretically support the development
of a binding process and appellate review in WTO dispute resolu-
tion, which of the two models provides the best description of the
specific adjudication structures adopted by WTO? The answer is
clear: the Regime Management Model.
First, the WTO dispute resolution system recognizes states as
the only parties with standing to bring or defend a claim. This lim-
itation is strongly consistent with the Regime Management Model's
image of trade agreements as "contracts among sovereign states."
Second, the WTO system is binding for WTO members under in-
ternational law only, thus giving states somewhat more flexibility
at the compliance stage of adjudication than would a system that
made judgments binding under the municipal law of the disputing
parties.3' Third, the WTO rules specifically instruct trade adjudi-
cators to apply the "customary rules of interpretation of public in-
gimes such as the NAFTA and the EU. The governance structures of both the NAFTA
and the EU demonstrate that within these regional trade spheres states must yield large
areas of legal control to supranational tribunals and rules to accommodate the needs of
transnational business. Systems such as the New York Convention and the ICSID demon-
strate that these same economic forces are at work to achieve a similar result at the
global level.
322. For example, with respect to the Regime Management Model, the Appellate
Body will provide an opportunity to reexamine cases in light of any extraordinary politi-
cal responses that a given panel decision might spark. The Tuna/Dolphin cases discussed
in Part II reveal the value to a trade regime of having such a "second look" built into
the structure of a. binding system. See supra notes 208-36 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
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ternational law"324 in their decisions-a source of law that strong-
ly reflects relational contract norms in a "contract among sover-
eign states" at the international level.3"
There is one significant aspect of the new WTO system that
the Regime Management Model does not adequately explain, how-
ever: the unanimity voting requirement to overturn a panel or
Appellate Body ruling. The Regime Management Model is con-
cerned with regime stability and maintenance as well as with rule
enforcement. A binding dispute resolution process serves these in-
terests only if such a process does not pose the constant threat of
destabilizing the regime. The WTO structure raises just such a
specter because it leaves literally no exit for states seeking relief
from decisions through some sort of politically accountable system
of checks and balances. Every WTO country except the winner of
a case could vote to overrule a decision, and the new WTO sys-
tem would still provide no relief from a manifestly unacceptable
rule. In such a case, the political stresses on the regime would be
enormous.
Such a peculiar voting scheme does not square well with the
Regime Management Model's normative concern for political play
in the joints of the dispute resolution system. States could have
adopted a voting rule similar to that of the International Civil
Aviation Organization, under which the immediate parties to a dis-
pute would be disqualified from voting.32 6 Such a rule, coupled
with a requirement of a two-thirds or even three-fourths majority
to overturn a decision, would have achieved binding decisions in
all but the most politically charged cases and would have been
more consistent with Regime Management Model values.
To fully understand the "consensus to overrule" voting
scheme, therefore, one must go beyond the Regime Management
Model and reexamine the negotiating history of the WTO legal
system in the light of the Efficient Market Model. As recounted in
324. Understanding, supra note 7, art. 3(2), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 115.
325. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 167, at 175 n.2 (stating that treaty law, based on
19th-century models, "adopts, implicitly or explicitly, a contractual model of bilateral rela-
tionships"). U.S. Trade Rep. Michael Kantor was quite clear about his own "contractual"
understanding of the WTO in testimony before Congress prior to the approval of the
Uruguay Round: "This is a contract organization .... No one wants this contract organi-
zation to become more than it is." Gatt Hearings, supra note 28, (testimony of U.S.
Trade Rep. Michael Kantor).
326. See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
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Part I, globally oriented business interests demanded that an effec-
tive means be found to open foreign markets. When the GATT
dispute resolution system proved a clumsy and unreliable tool for
this purpose, pro-trade businesses prodded their governments to
use unilateral threats and sanctions under such schemes as section
301. The use of these unilateral mechanisms, in turn, set in motion
a complex political response.
The business community as a whole was disturbed by the
prospect of worldwide resort to selective, arbitrary sanctions under
provisions like section 301. Trade sanctions not only injure selected
business communities in both the sanctioned and sanctioning
states,327 but also pose the risk that the targeted state will re-
spond with reciprocal sanctions designed to cause maximum injury
to the domestic economy and political credibility of the state that
started the "trade war." Commercial interests and their govern-
ment allies therefore sought a more effective, centralized, multilat-
eral legal system to enforce trade rules. As these discussions evol-
ved, it became clear that to be effective, the dispute resolution
mechanism would need to be virtually automatic, with little room
for the political maneuvering that caused dissatisfaction with the
GATT system.
The economic pressures that led governments to seek reforms
of the GATT dispute resolution process thus pushed states further
than they might otherwise have wished to go and led them to
adopt a strictly binding system with a "consensus to overrule" vot-
ing requirement. This ultrabinding system does more than provide
incremental change from the realist GATT system of 'the past.
Rather, it is a substantial step toward the long-run goals of an Ef-
ficient Market Model system.
327. This point was recently brought home vividly in the United States when Presi-
dent Clinton was forced to back down on a threat to impose trade sanctions on China
for failure to make progress on human rights policy. Robert S. Greenberger & Michael
K. Frisby, Clinton's Renewal of Trade Statrs for China Followed Cabinet Debates,
Congress's Sea Change, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1994, at A18. Hundreds of thousands of
American jobs and billions of dollars in contracts were at risk if the United States had
withdrawn "most favored nation" status from China as Clinton had said he would do. Id.
at A18 (reporting that congressional attitudes about imposing trade sanctions on China
changed because "lawmakers stared into the abyss and feared that a rupture of trade
with China could mean big job losses in their districts"); Louis Uchitelle, Back to Busi-
ness on China Trade, N.Y. TIMEs, May 27, 1994, at D1 (detailing efforts of multination-
als such as Boeing and AT&T to reverse Clinton's threat to link human rights with
trade).
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The Efficient Market Model also helps us understand why the
government officials negotiating this agreement might embrace
such a delegation of sovereignty to the WTO court. The model
suggests that WTO defendants frequently prefer to lose cases. If,
as the Efficient Market Model assumes, governments are allied
with globally oriented business interests, favor free trade results,
and regret defending protectionist laws and practices, then a for-
mally binding adjudication system with no exit makes sense. Un-
like the old GAIT system with its veto powers and political flexi-
bility, the new V/TO system can deflect the blame for causing free
trade's inevitable dislocations within domestic economies and pro-
vide political officials with "cover" against domestic criticism.3"8
Government officials will still hear cries of protest from domestic
parties that oppose an Appellate Body ruling, but these officials
can credibly answer domestic critics by saying, "The WTO has
ruled. To resist now will threaten our overall economic well-being
because we need a strong WTO to open other markets to our pro-
ducts." They will face no further obligation to seek diplomatic
reversal of the ruling because such steps would be legally futile
under the rules.
While the Efficient Market Model suggests that globally ori-
ented businesses would have ideally preferred a system in which
they themselves could enforce trade rules against both foreign and
domestic governments, the adoption of the "consensus to overrule"
voting scheme for the WTO advances the goal of a world "free
for trade" in a number of ways. Under the new WTO system, in
contrast with the old GAIT system, defendants will face enormous
pressure to comply with the wishes of the WTO because the credi-
bility of the WTO as a legal institution will hinge on defendants'
cooperation.3 29 The former GATT system, which permitted losing
328. PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at xxvii-xxviii (noting that "governments often glad-
ly accept GATT dispute settlement reports" that require them to introduce trade mea-
sures "which they were previously prevented from using by domestic political pressures
from powerful protectionist groups"); Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma, supra note
21, at 520-25 (emphasizing that international trade rules help "responsible public offi-
cial[s] . . . divert some of the political responsibility for a negative vote [on protection]
to the rules themselves, casting them as a superior external force that takes the matter
out of the officials' hands"); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a Constitutional
Problem: On the "Domestic Policy Functions" of International Trade Rules, in PROTEC-
TIONISM AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, supra note 152, at 243, 258-60 ("GAT
rules . . . assist governments and public officials . . . in resisting protectionist pressures
and implementing economically efficient trade policies . . ").
329. ORAN YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 73-74 (1989) (arguing that defi-
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defendants to veto decisions that they found unacceptable, was not
at such risk when states chose to resist dispute resolution results.
In addition, the new WTO system will make the imposition of
costly trade sanctions on recalcitrant defendants virtually automat-
ic. This power will add new "bite" to the dispute resolution pro-
cess and push parties to comply with trade rulings. As states bar-
gain toward solutions for their trade differences within the WTO
legal structure, these new pressures toward compliance will give
export interests and multinationals seeking "to bring down trade
barriers enhanced negotiating leverage.33
B. Looking Toward the Future of the WTO: Reform Proposals
A major question facing the new WTO system is whether it
will satisfy the needs of the global business community that helped
bring it into being or whether this community will eventually seek
further reforms. There are reasons to suspect that business inter-
ests will soon be forced to apply further pressure for reform.
First, although the WTO system is stronger than the old
GATT process at the Council confirmation and sanctioning stages,
states are still likely to bring fewer cases than exporters and multi-
national firms would like to see brought. Associational concerns
among states about preserving good diplomatic relations on a va-
riety of non-trade matters may cause them to forbear suing certain
violators, thus frustrating private interests that are suffering losses
from the existence of a trade barrier. Indeed, the WTO's "consen-
sus to overrule" voting scheme may make states somewhat more
reluctant than before to initiate proceedings because the conse-
quences of engaging the dispute resolution system will be much
more significant. Moreover, free rider problems are likely to
plague enforcement, because all states will enjoy the benefits of
litigation that eliminates trade barriers while the diplomatic costs
ance of an important treaty regime risks precipitating a chain reaction leading to a more
general collapse of the cooperative structure).
330. Businesses will still, as before, be able to petition states to bring cases complain-
ing of trade barriers and thus push for binding WTO decisions that they favor. See supra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text. In this regard, it has been suggested that multina-
tional firms may use their power over smaller developing states as leverage to employ a
"rent a government" litigation strategy within the WTO. See Nader, supra note 4, at A12
(arguing that under the new WTO rules "multinationals . . . will have strong motivation
to see that such challenges [to anti-business laws] are made" by using a "rent a govern-
ment" litigation strategy).
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of bringing any specific WTO complaint will fall on only a few
states.31 Some evidence for a possible enforcement gap is sup-
plied by the experience of the Regime Management Model ICAO
dispute resolution system, which has adjudicated only a handful of
cases since 1947.332
Second, even among cases that are brought, states will likely
settle more cases short of a definitive declaration of rights than
businesses would prefer. Once again, associational concerns will
cause states to seek compromises on a case-by-case basis, while
global business interests might prefer to see the WTO make a
binding declaration that an entire class of trade rules or practices
violates VTO trade norms.333
If these assumptions are correct and states prove to be un-
faithful agents for global business interests, these interests will
eventually press for further reforms. Consistent with the Efficient
Market Model, business interests will demand that the WTO per-
mit participation in its adjudication system by commercial parties
directly affected by disputes. This could occur in a number of
ways. First, business parties may obtain the right to appear as
"friends of the court" before the Appellate Body in cases in which
they have a substantial underlying stake.3' Participation of this
sort already occurs informally through communication between
counsel representing corporate interests, state representatives, and
dispute resolution panelists.335 Second, commercial parties may
331. Frey & Buhofer, supra note 160, at 171 (arguing that such free rider problems
can cause free trade regimes to erode, bringing on inevitable "protectionist cycles.")
332. Detlev Vagts & Charles Kent, Book Review, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 436 (1989)
(reviewing DEMPSEY, supra note 175) (noting that only three disputes were submitted to
the ICAO Council for formal judicial resolution over a period of 40 years); see supra
note 180 and accompanying text; cf. DEMPSEY, supra note 175, at 300-02 (arguing that
the "political" nature of the ICAO Council and the "cost of lengthy adjudication pro-
ceedings" make it unattractive for states to adjudicate cases).
333. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resohtion, supra note 21, at 123 (con-
tending that rule-based GAT[ decisions produce and refine fixed reference points, "mak-
ing private ordering more effective and less costly ... [, whereas] compromise settle-
ments . . . produce no new reference points and muddy the existing ones").
334. See M.C.EJ. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL
TRADE RELATIONS 240 (1985) (advocating private-party access for preliminary,
nonbinding interpretations of the GATT).
335. See Transcript of Discussion Following Presentation by Kenneth W. Abbott, supra
note 73, at 161 (remarks of Professor Lowenfeld) (noting that "there usually is some
kind of a private dispute behind these [GATT] cases" and that panelists on a GAIT
case he was hearing had received a telegram while they were deliberating indicating that
the private parties had settled).
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gain access to WTO-sponsored mediation or conciliation processes
,operating parallel to the state-controlled adjudication track. Again,
there is precedent for such activities from the GATT expe-
rience.336 Third, business parties may seek standing as full partici-
pants with the power to bring claims under GAT rules.337 Fi-
nally and most radically, private interests may persuade WTO
states to permit certain world trade rules to be directly enforced as
rules of law in domestic courts.338 This could happen either by
making certain international trade norms the rule of law in a de-
fendant's domestic courts339 or by making particular judgments of
the Appellate Body specifically enforceable by private parties in a
defendant's judicial system. Such systems of direct enforcement
now exist by treaty in a number of commercial areas.34
Advocates for a Regime Management Model may meet these
suggestions with their own proposals to permit the WTO to partic-
ipate in and ultimately bring cases that, for one reason or another,
states are reluctant to file."4 This development could be seen as
a natural extension of the already extensive participation of the
Secretariat in advising and drafting opinions for dispute resolution
panels. Moreover, because the WTO can be characterized as an
agent of the states that make up the WTO, such a reform might
be presented as less threatening to states than opening the WTO
legal system to direct participation by private parties. 2 Howev-
336. Id. at 162-63 (remarks of Professor Patterson) (discussing how European and
Japanese copper smelters, who were the private interests behind a GATT case between
Europe and Japan, participated in a GATr-sponsored mediation of the dispute together
with representatives of the two governments involved).
337. Brand, supra note 271, at 12-21. Curiously, John H. Jackson, whom I would
characterize as a Regime Management Model scholar, see supra note 162 and accompa-
nying text, is also on record as favoring private-party participation in GATT proceedings.
See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTI-
TUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 207-09 (1984). This surprising position
perhaps reflects Jackson's high degree of confidence in the ultimate power of states to
control the GAT' machinery.
338. See PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 421-27.
339. See Roessler, supra note 269, at 311. See generally Note, supra note 173, at 1287
(arguing that "judges should be as willing to apply internationally created law as they are
domestic law").
340. See supra notes 272-89 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round
and Beyond, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31, 75-78 (1992).
342. Indeed, within the European Union the Commission has the power to bring an
enforcement action before the European Court of Justice against a member state that has
failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty of Rome. GEORGE A. BERMAN ET AL.,
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er, such a reform would break the monopoly of states on the
WTO dispute resolution system and would therefore advance the
Efficient Market Model as well as the Regime Management Mod-
el. In addition, in some cases the WTO might be even less in-
clined than private parties to settle cases short of a definitive
ruling, a factor that would serve both global traders' collective
interests and the goals of the Efficient Market Model. 3
There is of course no way to predict the actual future direc-
tion of WTO reform. The normative models presented in Part II,
however, help anticipate the structural changes that different
groups may propose. It also seems likely that, over time, at least
some of these proposals will find acceptance as participants seek
to address the system's shortcomings.
C. International Relations Theory and WTO Jurisprudence
The third subject area that the analysis in Part II illuminates
is the type of jurisprudence one can expect from the WTO dispute
resolution system. Part II demonstrated that models of trade legal-
ism derived from international relations theory have surprising re-
levance to this inquiry. The vague provisions of the WTO trade
agreements leave enormous room for interpretation of such terms
as "equitable share of the market," "like products," and "subsidy."
Moreover, the customary theories of interpretation governing inter-
national treaties, while regime-oriented, are indeterminate at best.
Without an objective, strictly neutral method of interpreting inter-
national trade texts,3" WTO adjudicators will enjoy a significant
zone of interpretive discretion within which to legitimately imple-
ment their preferred model of legalism.
Although the Regime Management and Efficient Market mod-
els do not exhaust the possible theories of trade adjudication rea-
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 292 (1993).
343. Private parties with concrete economic stakes in a trade dispute might be ame-
nable to a settlement if their economic losses were compensated with side payments. The
WTO would not have concrete economic stakes in disputes and would therefore be more
likely to litigate cases solely to establish a precedent.
344. Many legal scholars believe that an "objective" rule of law is impossible even
within a single society because of the long-run indeterminacy of language and social prac-
tices. See Francis J. Mootz III, Is the Rule of Law Possible in a Postmodern World?, 68
WASH. L. REV. 249, 251 (1993) ("A striking feature of much postmodern legal thought,
particularly its post-structuralist variant, is its flat rejection of the possibility of the Rule
of Law."). These difficulties are exacerbated in the international setting, where there is
no agreement on a common language.
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soning, they are useful guides to some important classes of cas-
es." States and other parties concerned with the crucial task of
nominating potential judges to the WTO Appellate Body would
therefore do well to consider whether candidates for this new
court have strong inclinations toward either of these normative
frameworks.
Overall, there is reason to believe that Appellate Body deci-
sions will tend to drift toward reliance on economic free trade
theory and the doctrine of comparative advantage to ground their
legal analysis. Adjudicators sympathetic to the Efficient Market
Model will of course advocate the use of economic theory as a
jurisprudential device. Indeed, Efficient Market Model advocate
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, the former head of GATT's Office of
Legal Affairs and Secretary to the Uruguay Round Negotiating
Group on Dispute Resolution,"6 has advocated that the legal re-
gime for international trade style itself on the famous Lochner
period of U.S. legal history, when laissez-faire "freedom of con-
tract" was viewed as a constitutional norm superior to all federal
and state law in the United States.347 Even regime-oriented adju-
345. As demonstrated in Section II(B), supra notes 185-236, 290-316 and accompa-
nying text, particular adjudicators held beliefs about the GAT dispute resolution system
that corresponded with the political and economic assumptions underlying both the Re-
gime Management and Efficient Market models.
346. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
347. Petersmann advocates that the world's constitutional democracies add a "freedom
to trade" to their list of constitutionally protected individual rights as a way of defeating
protectionism. See PETERSMANN, supra note 19, at 311-13. Petersmann's proposal would
require judges to overturn protectionist legislation at the request of commercial plaintiffs.
In U.S. legal history, "[s]cholars generally consider the Lochner era to be the high water
mark" for judicially imposed, libertarian notions of "freedom of contract" under the U.S.
Constitution. Shell, supra note 286, at 447-62. During the late 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, both state courts and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court actively overturned legisla-
tion limiting employment relations and other commercial arrangements on the grounds
that such laws interfered with freedom of contract, an "essential component of individual
liberty protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments" of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
at 447; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Supreme Court's "freedom of
contract" decisions became increasingly unpopular as they collided with pressing social
needs that accompanied the Great Depression in the 1930s and the New Deal legislation
that President Roosevelt proposed to bring the United States out of this domestic eco-
nomic crisis. When "Roosevelt threatened to 'pack' the [Supreme] Court if it did not
alter its [economic] substantive due process views," the Court reversed course and over-
ruled the Lochner line of cases. Shell, supra note 286, at 450 n.89; see West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S.
525 (1923)); see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 808 n.1 (1988)
(stating that West Coast Hotel "finally overruled" Lochner) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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dicators will likely view the doctrines of comparative advantage
and free trade as a "basic policy" of world trade agreements"8
and will seek to implement these doctrines as long as concerns for
state autonomy are satisfied.
It therefore seems likely that when domestic political realities
make it difficult or impossible for the leading states in the world
trade system to take the risk of championing a particular free
trade reform, the WTO Appellate Body may step into the role of
an advocate for the free trade agenda. At the extreme, as in the
DISC case, adjudicators may turn to economic theory to create
evidentiary presumptions that favor free trade, use economic as-
sumptions about likely market behavior, and impose obligations on
states to adopt "least trade restrictive" means to accomplish non-
trade policy goals, thereby invalidating socially useful laws that
pose a threat to trade.349
If Appellate Body adjudicators assume this role armed with
economic free trade logic as a jurisprudential guide, Petersmann's
Lochner scenario may not be so farfetched. The United States and
other nations would then face governance by a group of unelected,
multinational judges striking down domestic laws on the basis of
economic theory. Petersmann's Lochner suggestion serves at the
very least to emphasize the direction in which WTO jurisprudence
is set to move without substantial diversification of the parties with
standing to participate in the WTO system and of the norms on
which the WTO legal system will draw for decisions.
348. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1231 (1992).
349. For example, in the old GATT system a doctrine evolved that the exceptions to
free trade responsibilities in article 20 were to be interpreted "narrowly" so as to pre-
serve free trade values to the greatest extent possible. See Canada-Import Restrictions
on Ice Cream and Yoghurt, Panel Report adopted Dec. 5, 1989, GATT BISD, 36th
Supp. 68, 84-85 (1990). GATT panels also held that a member state "is bound to use,
among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of
inconsistency with other GATT provisions." United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930, Panel Report adopted Nov. 7, 1989, GATT BISD, 36th Supp. 345, 393 (1990).
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IV. TOWARD A TRADE STAKEHOLDERS MODEL:
Civic REPUBLICANISM AND THE
WORLD TRADE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
The advent of the World Trade Organization dispute resolu-
tion system marks a sea change in trade governance from realism
to legalism. However, the analyses presented in Parts II and III
demonstrate that the models of legalism currently dominating the
intellectual landscape suffer from being exceedingly narrow in
scope. Both the Regime Management Model and, to an even
greater extent, the Efficient Market Model rely heavily on norma-
tive commitments to economic theory as a foundation for legal in-
terpretation. The two dominant models also seek, in different
ways, to limit participation in trade dispute resolution so that their
respective legalist visions can be implemented without having to
take account of potentially controversial social and environmental
issues inevitably surrounding trade.
The closed character of the two dominant models of trade
legalism poses problems for the WTO of long-range stability, dis-
tributive fairness, and procedural justice. First, a trade governance
system concerned substantially, if not primarily, with the value of
maximizing economic wealth underemphasizes explosive wealth dis-
tribution issues that can lead to domestic or even regional political
instability. Research has shown that people care passionately about
relative, not just absolute, gains.35° Any governance structure for
global trade that focuses too narrowly on maximizing wealth with-
out taking into account distributional consequences is likely to en-
counter strong, perhaps even violent, resistance from the losers in
the distributional tug-of-war.35' With improvements in mass com-
munications, problems of social comparisons among citizens both
within and across societies will become an increasingly contentious
350. DEAN G. PRuIT & JEFFREY Z. RUBIN, SOCIAL CONFLICT 15-16, 19-20 (1986)
(discussing how invidious social comparisons between groups can be the source of social
conflict and even "political violence" when "people whose outcomes are better than our
own seem similar to us in basic merit ... or when people whose outcomes are equal to
our own appear to have lower merit than we do").
351. The eruption of civil strife in the poor, rural state of Chiapas, in Mexico, in
reaction to the NAFTA may be an example of such a phenomenon. The Other Mexico,
N.Y. TMEs, Jan. 4, 1994, at A14.
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issue in trade policy in .the years ahead. Such domestic instability
can threaten the viability of the WTO.
Second, a global trade jurisprudence developed under limited
standing rules raises issues of procedural justice. Both the Regime
Management Model and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the Efficient
Market Model exclude from participation in WTO dispute resolu-
tion processes many parties affected by trade, potentially alienating
them from trade adjudication outcomes and silencing them insofar
as they might contribute to wiser, more contextual decision-
making.352
The Regime Management Model limits standing in trade dis-
putes to states, leaving a host of interests clamoring for "places at
the table" in international public policy debates. These interests
include private commercial parties,353 indigent citizens in develop-
ing countries with weak governments,35 4 environmentalists,3 5 la-
352. See Lawrence Susskind & Connie Ozawa, Negotiating More Effective International
Environmental Agreements, in THE INTERNATIONAL POLInCS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 142,
158-59 (Andrew Hurrell & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 1992) (noting that a lack of dem-
ocratic process in rule formation at the global level may harm support for compliance at
the domestic level).
353. See supra notes 252-64 and accompanying text.
354. See Riding, supra note 3, at 48 (noting that some development experts believe
many African and Caribbean nations that are the "poorest of the poor" may suffer as a
result of the Uruguay Round agreements because of increases in the price of cereals on
world markets); see also SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 258, at 3-9 (commenting that
Third World states' demand for a "New International Economic Order" is not given
proper priority, despite their majority position in world trade organizations, due to the
greater economic power of industrialized market economy countries); Roshani M.
Gunewardene, GATT and the Developing World: Is a New Principle of Trade Liberaliza-
tion Needed?, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 45, 68 (1991) (contending that the GAT' is
a "pawn in the hands of developed countries"); Sean Flynn, Sutherland Speaks of a De-
fining Moment in World History of Trade, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 16, 1993, at 12, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Itimes File (reporting on the Coalition for Development Action's
statement issued in Geneva that opposed the Uruguay Round because "the world's poor-
est people would lose through higher food prices, less support for breadline farmers, and
higher costs for seeds and medicines"); Lawrence Ingrassia, Developing Nations Feel
Shortchanged by GATT, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1993, at A6 (arguing that developing
countries got "crumbs" from new GAT' deal).
355. See Jeffrey L Dunoff, Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the
Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407 (1992)
(describing the growing conflicts between free trade and environmental protection inter-
ests and proposing a framework for the limited use of trade barriers to protect global
environmental resources); Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the
Global Environment: A Multilateral Approach, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185 (1994) (de-
scribing increased use of unilateral trade measures to promote environmental protection
and proposing a multilateral approach under the auspices of the GATT to the pursuit of
environmental goals).
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bor interests,5 6 and consumer groups.357 Such groups are rele-
gated to the domestic political arena, where governments can exer-
cise substantial agenda control. The Efficient Market Model advo-
cates that private commercial parties share access with states to
trade dispute resolution machinery. But one of the notable charac-
teristics of this model is that only members of the "global business
civilization" gain the privilege of litigating trade cases. The Effi-
cient Market Model thus assures that there is discussion at the glo-
bal level of the needs of the business community and the econom-
ic burdens of domestic legal regulation, but noncommercial inter-
ests such as the poor, environmentalists, consumers, and labor are
shut out except insofar as the laws of comparative advantage pro-
mise to "lift all boats" on a rising tide of global economic
growth."'
The exclusion of so many interests with a stake in internation-
al trade policy from the WTO process by which disputes are re-
solved and treaties interpreted points up the need for new thinking
about how trade and non-trade values are to be integrated at the
global dispute resolution and policy formation level. One possible
solution might be to abolish the WTO as a centralized trade fo-
rum and transfer its responsibilities to some other global institu-
tion, such as the United Nations, with a mandate to handle trade
disputes within representative forums that address social and envi-
ronmental issues. Another answer might involve the creation of se-
parate but coequal dispute resolution and governance mechanisms
for trade, social, and environmental issues.359 Conflicts among
these various global institutions would then be placed on the agen-
da of some sort of "megacourt" or governing council.
356. See RICHARD J. BARNET & JOHN CAVANAGH, GLOBAL DREAMS: IMPERIAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 289-309 (1994); Richard J. Barnet &
John Cavanagh, Just Undo It: Nike's Exploited Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, at
Cl (calling for new global rules "grounded in international trade agreements" to protect
workers' health and safety).
357. Robert E. Hudec, "Circumventing" Democracy: The Political Morality of Trade
Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 321-22 (1993) (noting that ways need to
be found to include environmental and consumer groups in trade negotiations).
358. Bhagwati, supra note 137, at 233.
359. Daniel C. Esty has suggested that the Bretton Woods international economic
institutions be augmented with a "Global Environmental Organization" to promote "opti-
mal national environmental policies." Daniel C. Esty, The Case for a Global Environmen-
tal Organization, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 10, at 287.
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My own preference for a new model of global trade gover-
nance is to use the existing structure of the WTO as a base on
which to build a new, more inclusive institution. This preference is
essentially driven by pragmatic concerns. The Uruguay Round
took nearly a decade to negotiate and has achieved domestic polit-
ical approval at significant political cost. My sense is that the com-
plex web of global and domestic institutions that need to be en-
gaged for social progress to occur will be better able to focus on
social and environmental concerns using a trade baseline than any
other single perspective. By leveraging off the widely shared con-
sensus that some sort of economic development through trade is a
social "good," those seeking progress on social and environmental
values may seek incremental changes within the WTO structure to
broaden the base of participation and enrich the set of free trade
and political norms now in ascendance. To help conceptualize such
a reform program, I offer what I call the "Trade Stakeholders
Model" for global trade governance through the WTO as an alter-
native to the approaches discussed in Part II.2
The Trade Stakeholders Model emphasizes direct participation
in trade disputes not only by states and businesses, but also by
groups that are broadly representative of diverse citizen inter-
ests. 361 It also eschews reliance on any ideology such as free
360. The concept of "stakeholders" has a broad literature in the field of corporate
governance and business ethics. See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGE-
MENTr A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The
Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 65, 68 (1995) (describing stakeholder theory as holding "that all persons or
groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and
that there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another");
Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 14 (1992). Like the use of the term in this Article, these theories advo-
cate participation by and consideration of an array of social and community interests in
decisions that have traditionally been dominated by narrowly conceived economic consid-
erations.
361. Of course, the mere participation of NGOs in trade decisionmaking does not
guarantee legitimacy, because NGOs may have agendas unrelated to the public interest
or be co-opted by governments. See David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the
Law: Studies of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational
Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 494 (1994); see also FELICE MORGENSTERN,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 87-89 (1986) (noting that non-
governmental organizations do not always truly represent the constituencies that they
purport to represent). But NGO participation is at least an improvement from Regime
Management and Efficient Market systems that systematically exclude non-trade interests
from entering into the trade dialogue.
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trade theory to define an objective "good" for global society.
Rather, the priorities for global society are open-ended and subject
to deliberation by those whose lives will be affected by economic
decisions.
The WTO Charter itself contains the germ of this model in its
preamble, which states that the purpose of the agreement is to
enhance trade and consumption while "raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and.., allowing for the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustain-
able development"362 Reference to distributive concepts such as
"full employment" and "standards of living" and the environmen-
tally sensitive idea of "sustainable development" indicate a concern
for issues that go beyond the notion of maximizing material wealth
through trade.
A. Description of the Model: Liberalism with Civic Republican
Values
Like the Efficient Market Model, the Trade Stakeholders
Model traces its theoretical roots to the international relations
theory of "liberalism."3' 6 Under both models, international politi-
cal arrangements are ultimately aimed at improving the welfare of
individuals, not states as political entities, and individuals are
therefore proper subjects of international law and institutions.
Unlike the Efficient Market Model, however, the Trade Stake-
holders Model seeks broad participation in trade dispute resolution
for all parties with a stake in trade policy, not just commercial
parties.
In addition, the Trade Stakeholders Model seeks broad partic-
ipation as an end in itself, not as a means to another goal, such as
economic efficiency for global markets. The Trade Stakeholders
Model thus views trade dispute resolution as part of a wide-rang-
ing deliberative process by which an emerging global social system
can set its priorities.
In recent years, a number of international law scholars work-
ing primarily in the areas of human rights and the environment
have begun to elaborate a "liberal" view of international relations
under which citizen-sponsored, nongovernmental organizations
362. Final Act, supra note 1, preamble, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. at 1144.
363. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
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(NGO) would assume enhanced roles in the development of inter-
national law and the resolution of global conflicts.3" Scrapping
the idea that states are the exclusive subjects of international
law,365 these reformers seek mechanisms under which NGOs and
individuals may assert international environmental and human
rights standards against states in domestic 366 as well as interna-
tional367 legal systems.
364. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING
MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 43-61 (1994) (advocating greater cooperation
between governments and NGOs in the formulation and execution of international envi-
ronmental policy); Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Re-
gime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 519, 548-65 (1991) (describing
extensive scope of participation by NGOs in human rights and labor regimes and arguing
that NGOs "should be empowered to bring complaints against states failing to live up to
their obligations"); Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes. Matter? Epistemic Communities and Medi-
terranean Pollution Control, 43 INT'L ORG. 377, 380 (1989) (discussing how experts work-
ing through international and nongovernmental organizations were able to alter the bal-
ance of power within individual governments, thereby setting in motion a process of
convergence toward compliance with an environmental regime's norms); Peter M. Haas et
al., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE
EARTH 24 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993) (noting that international institutions like
NGOs do not "supersede" states but rather "create networks over, around, and within
states that generate the means and the incentives for effective cooperation among those
states"); Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community, and International Law, 30
HARV. INT'L L.. 393, 396-401, 412-17 (1989); Paul C. Szasz, International Norm-Making,
in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 41, 51 (Edith B. Weiss ed.,
1992) (describing role of NGOs in environmental policymaking); David A. Wirth, Legiti-
macy, Accountability, and Partnership: A Model for Advocacy on Third World Environ-
mental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645, 2655-57 (1991) (same); Tim Carrington, In the Third
World, Self-Help Groups Pop Up to Fill Gaps Left by Governments, WALL ST. J., July
11, 1994, at A8 (detailing role of NGOs in developing countries).
365. Haas et al., supra note 364, at 3 (summarizing the "profound skepticism regard-
ing the ability of the nation-state system to solve" environmental problems).
366. See Gregory W. MacKenzie, Note, ICSID Arbitration as a Strategy for Levelling
the Playing Field Between International Non-Governmental Organizations and Host States,
19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 197 (1993). MacKenzie argues for a system that would
permit NGOs to bring international arbitral complaints against host states to facilitate
food distribution. These judgments would, as under the ICSID system, be fully binding
under domestic law. Domestic regulatory bodies already enforce some international stan-
dards, including environmental ones. See also David A. Wirth, A Matchmaker's Challenge:
Marrying International Law and American Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 377,
401 (1992) (describing implementation of an air pollution treaty by the EPA under pre-
existing statutory authority under the Clean Air Act); Note, supra note 251, at 1103-04
(describing several methods by which Congress would assign responsibility for implemen-
tation of international obligations to administrative agencies and arguing that such assign-
ment would substantially increase compliance with international law).
367. See Sands, supra note 364, at 394 ("NGOs should be granted standing to enforce
these [environmental] rights in the international arena by negotiating with states and ap-
pearing before international institutions and tribunals.").
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The Trade Stakeholders Model for WTO dispute resolution
builds on the work of these scholars. It would operate within the
context of world trade governance by requiring the WTO to open
its dispute resolution system to all groups with a stake in the out-
comes of trade decisions.3" In theory the model would also favor
enforcing a limited set of globally defined, international trade-
related labor, environmental, safety, and consumer norms within
domestic, not just international, legal systems. While this legal
program potentially has a broad sweep, it is important to empha-
size that the type of social and environmental norms the Trade
Stakeholders Model is concerned with is limited to those with a
strong nexus to the activities of international trade, not to any and
all economic activity. The social and environmental mandate of the
WTO under the model would therefore have built-in limits that
would leave much to domestic political processes or regulation by
other international bodies.
One approach to understanding the Trade Stakeholders Model
is U.S. legal scholarship advocating a "civic republican" approach
to constitutional democracy. 69 As summarized by Mark Seiden-
feld,37 civic republicanism sees democratic ideals as best fulfilled
in a system in which "government decisions are a product of delib-
eration that respects and reflects the values of all members of soci-
ety." '37t Under this theory, "government's primary responsibility is
to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and
to reach consensus on the common good., 372 An important con-
dition making this deliberative process possible is "open access to
the policymaking process" for interest groups that "consolidate
368. The United States has advocated steps that are consistent with the Trade
Stakeholders Model value of openness and participation in WTO dispute resolution pro-
cesses. The Statement of Administrative Action that accompanied the Uruguay Round
implementing bill provided that the United States would press the VTO to open all
important meetings within the WTO, including those of the Appellate Body, to the public
and "permit 'interested parties' to submit amicus briefs to dispute settlement panels and
the appellate body." After Free Trade Euphoria, Now Comes the Hard Part, Special Re-
port: Outlook 1995 International Trade, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 129, 130
(Jan. 20, 1995) [hereinafter After Free Trade Euphoria].
369. See Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988).
370. Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1992).
371. Id. at 1514; see also Sunstein, supra note 33, at 45-48 (describing Madisonian
Federalists' conception of a "deliberative democracy").
372. Seidenfeld, supra note 370, at 1514.
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people with common private interests and backgrounds."373 One
of the crucial means through which domestic interest groups gain
access to the policymaking apparatus is standing to litigate claims
before both administrative tribunals and courts.374
The civic republicanism analogy is not perfect as applied to
the WTO. Civic republicanism is a theory for implementing the
ideals of constitutional democracy at the domestic level, and the
WTO is presently an international institution made up of both
democratic and nondemocratic states. Nevertheless, the ideals of
constitutional democracy are certainly relevant to the normative
aspirations of an organization like the WTO. Moreover, at present
all of the most important states in the global trading system, such
as the United States, EU member states, Canada, and .Japan, are
democracies. The WTO therefore serves as a kind of international
regulatory agency for the formulation and adjustment of trade pol-
icy among large democratic states and regions.375 The question
under the Trade Stakeholders Model is whether this institution can
be encouraged to open its processes to nongovernmental actors so
as to make more legitimate decisions regarding trade issues.
The WTO brings out the same tensions discussed in the civic
republicanism literature between the traditional "representative"
model of governance,376 which in the WTO context relies on
states to represent collective interests of their citizens, and the
civic republican "participatory" model, which seeks to expand
deliberative processes to a broad array of parties and interest
groups so that "all interests potentially affected by [an action will
have] ... meaningful opportunities to engage in discussion about
the action. '377 At the very least, the civic republican analogy of-
fers a conceptual framework within which to begin theorizing
about an alternative model for global trade governance that em-
braces values such as participation, deliberation, and context-based
373. Id. at 1530.
374. Sunstein, supra note 33, at 74-75 (discussing need for broad rules of standing for
public interest groups in administrative and judicial decisionmaking).
375. Many of the most important WTO members are also members of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), membership in which is limit-
ed to democracies. See Ronald Rogowski, Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institu-
tions, 41 INT'L ORG. 203, 212-13 (1987).
376. Seidenfeld, supra note 370, at 1531.
377. Id. at 1530.
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decisionmaking-values that are largely absent in the Regime
Management and Efficient Market models.
In summary, the Trade Stakeholders Model, like the Efficient
Market Model, seeks to break the monopoly of states on interna-
tional dispute resolution machinery and to extend the power to
enforce international legal norms beyond states to individuals. As
a corollary to this emphasis on the individual as the proper subject
of international law, the Trade Stakeholders Model also envisions
direct applicability of some international legal standards in domes-
tic courts as well as in international tribunals.
Unlike the Efficient Market Model, however, the Trade Stake-
holders Model would open the courthouse door to a broad array
of trade stakeholders, not just commercial interests. In addition,
the Trade Stakeholders Model differs from both the Efficient Mar-
ket Model and the Regime Management Model in embracing a
vision of civic republican "participatory legalism" to rival the nar-
rowly conceived "economic legalism" of the two now-dominant
models in the trade arena. 78
Table 4 summarizes the attributes of the Trade Stakeholders
Model in comparison with the Regime Management and Efficient
Market models.
378. John Barton and Barry Carter have written a particularly strong, visionary state-
ment of support for an international legal regime that would reflect the core Trade
Stakeholders Model values of broad participation, liberal focus on individual rights, and
enforcement of international legal norms in domestic courts. See John H. Barton & Barry
E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 81 GEo. LJ. 535 (1993).
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TABLE 4
Trade Stakeholders Model
[Vol. 44:829
Types of Theories Purpose of Source of
Parties with Underlying Dispute Law for
Standing Model Resolution Enforce-
System ment
Purposes
Trade States and Foreign Maximize
Stakeholders All Trade Relations Participation Inter-
Model Stakeholders Liberalism and national
and Civic Consensus and
Republican Among All Municipal
Theory Groups
Affected by
Trade
Efficient States and Foreign Reduce
Market Commercial Relations Legal Inter-
Model Entities Liberalism Transaction national
and Free Costs and and
Trade Fully Inte- Municipal
Theory grate Global
Market
Regime States Realism and Balance
Management Regime States' Inter- Inter-
Model Theory ests in Free national
Trade and
Autonomy
B. The Model in Action
Several existing international institutions exhibit traits consis-
tent with a Trade Stakeholders Model.379 The International La-
bor Organization (ILO) allows workers' and employers' organiza-
tions to participate with their governments as formal members of
379. In addition to the examples given in the text, many of the established interna-
tional adjudication tribunals, such as the International Court of Justice, have established
procedures under which NGOs may participate in cases as amici curiae. See Dinah
Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Judicial
Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 611-12 (1994).
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national delegations. The ILO gives these substate groups "access
to a number of mechanisms to adjudicate nonobservance of
binding standards established under ILO auspices., 380  David
Wirth has noted that these procedures, while far from being uni-
versally effective, "have been highly successful in encouraging ILO
member states' adherence to binding treaty obligations like those
in World Bank loan agreements.,
381
Within the field of environmental protection, Philippe Sands
has pointed out that the 1974 Nordic Convention3 2 "grants indi-
viduals, groups, and non-governmental organizations access to a
legal system under international law ... treat[ing] such persons as
members of a community [by giving] expression to their concerns,
interests, and rights."' The Nordic Convention provides that
any person who is or may be affected by "environmentally harmful
activities" may challenge that activity before an appropriate court
or agency and seek compensation.3 8
The most comprehensive example of a Trade Stakeholders
Model legal system is that of the European Union.3' The EU
has transformed itself from a simple trade alliance exhibiting many
Efficient Market Model characteristics into a socially responsive
confederation of fifteen states386 that permits individuals as well
380. Wirth, supra note 364, at 2664; see PIERRE PESCATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRA-
TION 6 (Christopher Dwyer trans., 1974) (discussing the ILO as precedent for the ideas
of "representativity" that underlie the European Union); NICHOLAS VALTICOS, INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOUR LAW 239-55 (1979) (describing the "[g]eneral [s]upervisory [m]achinery
of the ILO"); Ernest A. Landy, The Implementation Procedures of the International Labor
Organization, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 633, 640, 648-59 (1980) (discussing methods by
which the ILO hears and acts on complaints).
381. Wirth, supra note 364, at 2664.
382. Nordic Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, 1092
U.N.T.S. 279, (entered into force Oct. 5, 1976) [hereinafter Nordic Convention].
383. Sands, supra note 364, at 414.
384. Nordic Convention, supra note 382, art. 3, 1092 U.N.T.S. at 296.
385. The European Union began when France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux coun-
tries signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity. Weiler, supra note 314, at 2405. The European Economic Community became the
"European Community" in 1987 with the signing of the Single European Act and finally
became the European Union in 1993 after the signing of the Treaty on Union at
Maastricht. See Europe After Maastricht: Not the Union They Meant, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6,
1993, at 56 (noting that the name of the European Community changed to the "Europe-
an Union" on November 1, 1993).
386. Norwegians Vote Against Joining European Union, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at
A19 (noting that Sweden, Finland, and Austria have recently voted to join the EU while
Norway voted to reject membership). These 15 states contain a population of over 350
million people and form the largest trading bloc in the world. Weiler, supra note 314, at
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as states to assert a wide array of transnational standards in legal'
disputes at both the regional and the domestic level.
The EU's political institutions include the European Commis-
sion,3" the Council of Ministers,3" and the European Parlia-
ment.389 At the hub of this complex political arrangement is the
EU's judicial arm, the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has
jurisdiction to hear claims brought by states, the Commission, and,
most importantly for present purposes, individuals.39 As a result
of a line of ECJ interpretations of the EU's basic treaties, begin-
ning with the Van Gend & Loos decision discussed above in Part
11,391 private parties within the EU have the right to assert in
their own domestic courts transnational legal norms developed by
the various branches of the EU. Scholars have recently summa-
rized the rights of individuals to assert EU norms as follows:
Until 1963 the enforcement of the Rome treaty, like that of any
other international treaty, depended entirely on action by the
national legislatures of the member states of the community. By
1965, a citizen of a community country could ask a national court
to invalidate any provision of domestic law found to conflict with
certain directly applicable provisions of the treaty. By 1975, a cit-
izen of an EC country could seek the invalidation of a national
law found to conflict with self-executing provisions of community
secondary legislation, the "directives" to national governments
passed by the EC Council of Ministers. And by 1990, community
citizens could ask their national courts to interpret .national legis-
2405.
387. The Commission is the EU's executive branch and has responsibility for imple-
menting EU laws and policies. It consists of over 12,000 employees, headed by 17 com-
missioners appointed for four-year terms by the joint action of the member states. JACK-
SON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 35, at 80.
388. The Council of Ministers is the most important of two "legislative" arms of the
EU and consists of one representative from each member state. Typically, the Commis-
sion proposes legislation in the form of regulations or directives, and the Council of
Ministers must approve these proposals, most often by a weighted majority vote. Id.
389. The European Parliament consists of 567 representatives elected directly by the
voters of member states. Id.; see Craig R. Whitney, European Parliament Backs 4 New
Members, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1994, at A14 (noting that European Parliament would in-
crease from 518 to 567 members after new elections in June 1994 and that Germany
would have the largest bloc, increasing its representation to account for German unifica-
tion). Under current practice, the Parliament is able to amend and in some cases reject
legislation approved by the Commission and the Council. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING,
supra note 35, at 79-81.
390. Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 42.
391. See supra notes 310-16 and accompanying text.
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lation consistently with community legislation in the face of un-
due delay in passing directives on the part of national legisla-
tures.a9
Crucially, for purposes of the Trade Stakeholders Model, the rights
enforceable under European law have expanded along with the list
of parties able to assert them. EU regulations now cover labor
standards, environmental concerns, human rights, and other social
issues, in addition to economic rights for businesses. 39 3 What be-
gan as an Efficient Market Model system, therefore, has evolved
into a prime example of transnational participatory legalism in
action.
C. The Trade Stakeholders Model and Trade Jurisprudence
Because the world trade governance system historically has
been dominated by narrowly conceived regime and free trade
models, there are no good examples from GATT trade adjudica-
tion of decisions that reflect Trade Stakeholders Model values. A
number of ECJ cases may serve as models for a Trade Stakehold-
ers Model jurisprudence, however.
Using what has come to be called "teleological jurispru-
dence, '394 the ECJ has played a central role in transforming the
392. Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 42. Citizens of European Union member
states enjoy the protection of EU law in two distinct ways. First, certain EU laws are
directly applicable to member states without any legislative action by the state. BERMAN
ET AL., supra note 342, at 180-82. Second, and more importantly for purposes of the
argument in the text, the ECJ has held that both regulations and directives of the EU
may have "direct effect" within the legal systems of member states such that individuals
can assert EU law as a source of rights in their own domestic courts against their own
governments and, in some instances, in disputes with other private parties. Id. at 180-92.
393. This trend culminated in the Protocol on Social Policy attached to the Treaty on
European Union negotiated at Maastricht, Netherlands, in December 1991 and signed by
11 of the 12 member states. Treaty on European Union and Final Act, Feb. 7, 1992,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 357-58; John T. Addison & W. Stanley Siebert, Recent Devel-
opments in Social Policy in the New European Union, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 5,
5-6 (1994).
394. Teleological jurisprudence was recently described by a former ECJ judge as using
"concepts such as the customs union, equality of treatment and non-discrimination, free-
dom of movement, mutual assistance and solidarity" with a view to accomplishing "eco-
nomic interpenetration and finally economic and legal unity as the supreme objective."
PESCATORE, supra note 380, at 88. Teleological jurisprudence has played a major role in
the development of European human rights law under the ECJ. J.H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy
and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the
Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Com-
munity, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (1986).
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European Union's legal system into one that is responsive to social
as well as economic concerns. Perhaps most dramatically, the ECJ
has become a champion for a transnational system of human rights
in Europe.395 Although the basic treaties of the European Union
contain no specific provisions for the protection of human rights,
the ECJ has found that "respect for fundamental rights forms an
integral part of the general principles of law protected by the
Court of Justice" '3 96 and has gone on to recognize that individuals
have protected rights, inter alia, to property, to practice a trade or
profession, to privacy, to freedom from discrimination based on
sex, to practice their religion, and to engage in trade union activi-
ty.
397
Apart from its jurisprudence of fundamental rights, the ECJ
has also been an energetic interpreter of European Union direc-
tives and other legislative actions protecting individual stakeholder
interests in the economic arena.398 For example, the ECJ recently
decided a case, Webb v. EMO Air Cargo (UK), Ltd.,399 involving
a woman who had been dismissed by her English employer be-
cause, being pregnant, she could not fully perform her duties. The
plaintiff, Webb, was hired specifically to replace another woman
who was taking maternity leave, but she was hired for an indefi-
nite period, not just as a temporary worker who would depart
when the original employee returned. Two weeks after starting
work, the plaintiff discovered that she, too, was pregnant and
would therefore be absent on maternity leave during a portion of
the original employee's leave. She was then terminated.
In response to Webb's suit, the English Employment Appeal
Tribunal and Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal because, under
English antidiscrimination law, the employer would and could have
395. The protection of human rights in Europe is not limited to the ECJ; there is
also a detailed human rights convention and the European Court on Human Rights.
Manfred A. Dauses, The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the Community Legal Or-
der, 10 EUR. L. REV. 398, 400 (1985).
396. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
flir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1134.
397. 1 A.G. TOTH, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
286-87 (1990).
398. See, e.g., Addison & Siebert, supra note 400, at 8-13 (summarizing the scope of
European Union labor market regulation).
399. 2 CEC (CCH) 393 (E.C.J. July 14, 1994) (declaring that European Union legal
norms granted rights to women employees to forbid a British air cargo company from
dismissing a pregnant clerk); Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1994, at Al (reporting
on Webb case).
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fired a man similarly disabled from performing his duties under
these circumstances.4" The ECJ overruled the English courts. It
held that the EU directive underlying the English law does not
permit courts to equate pregnancy with an illness or other patholo-
gical disability."°1 Moreover, the woman in question was hired for
an indefinite period, not as a temporary replacement, and thus was
entitled to the full protections of the law regardless of the short-
term expectations of her employer. Termination by reason of her
pregnancy was therefore barred.4"
Decisions such as Webb depend on underlying social legisla-
tion that is not currently a part of the WTO treaty structure.
However, the EU started life as the European Steel and Coal
Community, an organization with a narrow, economic focus. The
foundation for the ECJ's current progressive jurisprudence as illus-
trated in Webb lies in the overall Trade Stakeholders Model ap-
proach to interpretation and standing that over time has come to
characterize the EU legal system. The WTO is capable of similar
evolution as global economic integration proceeds.
Within the specific context of the WTO, Philip Nichols has
recently argued that the WTO Appellate Body should interpret
the WTO's basic treaties in a way that would permit non-trade
values to trump free trade norms in certain cases.4 3 His interpre-
tive rule would allow laws to survive WTO scrutiny when they are
enacted "for the purpose of reflecting an underlying [non-trade]
societal value" rather than for the purpose of frustrating trade and
when "the impediment to trade [is] incidental."'  Nichols's pro-
posal is broadly reflective of Trade Stakeholder Model values and
would, in effect, protect trade stakeholders' voices at the domestic
level by assuring that their efforts to assert legitimate, nonprotec-
tionist interests would be respected by the WTO.
While it is perhaps risky to put too much weight on a com-
parison between a regional legal system among European democ-
racies and the WTO, there is at least significant potential as the
WTO matures for the WTO Appellate Body to assume a role si-
400. Webb, 2 CEC (CCH) at 401-02.
401. Id. at 403.
402. Id. at 403-04.
403. Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values 5 (forthcoming 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
(1995)).
404. Id.
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milar to that of the ECJ. Both courts are strategically located at
the legal epicenter of their respective governance systems. As
scholars have noted, the ECJ has periodically stepped in to render
legal rulings advancing the cause of economic and social integra-
tion when EU countries have been "unwilling to stick to their
treaty obligations" and "policymaking leadership [has been needed]
to prevent the rapid erosion of the community.""4 5 The Appel-
late Body, like the ECJ, is positioned to be the "keeper of the
norms" in the WTO's turbulent political environment and may
therefore eventually be in a position to advance a Trade Stake-
holders Model vision of trade governance. Such a development
would hold considerably more promise than Petersmann's vision of
the latter-day Lochner era assuming as is now the case for the
ECJ, that the range of parties able to have their voices heard
would extend beyond those of the "global business civilization"
and the range of norms embraced by the WTO would be broader
than the simple models of neoclassical economics.
D. The Need for Direct Political Participation in the WTO
The comparison of the EU and WTO legal systems demon-
strates how far the VTO must travel to arrive at a Trade Stake-
holders Model adjudication scheme. The comparison also reveals
that ultimately, individuals and NGOs will need to become more
deeply involved in the legislative process by which the world trade
community creates rules and standards-not just the adjudicative
process by which these rules are applied. The EU example under-
scores the importance of political institutions such as the European
Commission and the European Parliament in the process of devel-
oping socially responsive rules to govern economic and trade obli-
gations. The legislative system under which the WTO now oper-
ates is a relatively primitive, "one state, one vote" regime that
sharply limits the opportunities for international political dialogue
between states and individuals directly affected by trade policy de-
cisions. If the VTO legal system is to escape the twin problems of
overreliance on states to represent public interests and overcom-
mitment to economic theory as the foundation for a jurisprudence
of world trade, it must evolve new political mechanisms that will
permit broader participation for those affected by trade decisions.
405. Burley & Mattli, supra note 21, at 46.
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The civic republican theory that grounds the Trade Stake-
holders Model of dispute resolution also emphasizes open, explicit
legislative and regulatory bargaining as processes for resolving
conflicts of interest between actors with a stake in political out-
comes. A broader set of political processes within the WTO would
permit more policy flexibility than the current WTO adjudication
system and would encourage a set of checks and balances to
emerge among the legislative, judicial, and regulatory arms of a
trade system. Regulatory rulemaking systems that bring together
not only states, but also private commercial parties, as well as
social and environmental interest groups, might also result in the
drafting of more precise rules that all parties would be willing to
implement without resort to adjudication.6
Interestingly, a start has been made toward injecting stake-
holder values into WTO policymaking by a group of policy inno-
vators operating under the umbrella of a group called "The Policy
Dialogue on Trade and Environment." 7  The purpose of the
group is to provide WTO policymakers on the WTO's new Com-
mittee on Trade and the Environment 8 with "a continuing fo-
rum for discussion of major issues before the Committee and for
generating consensus ... on solutions that preserve the potential
gains of a liberalized trading system while at the same time pro-
moting the goal of sustainable development." 4 9
The Policy Dialogue group, sponsored by several U.S. founda-
tions and facilitated by members of the U.S.-based Consensus
406. See Note, supra note 251, at 1109-11. An analogy can be drawn between the
proposal in the text and domestic "regulatory negotiation" rulemaking and litigation pro-
cesses in U.S. administrative law. See, e.g., Philip J. Harter, The Role of Courts in Regu-
latory Negotiation-A Response to Judge Wald, 11 CoLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 51, 57-60 (1986)
(summarizing the regulatory negotiation process).
407. See Abram Chayes & Lawrence Susskind, The Policy Dialogue on Trade and
Environment: Report on First Meeting at Talloires, France, Sept. 29-30, 1994 (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
408. When trade ministers met in Marrakesh in April 1994 to ratify the Uruguay
Round agreements, they agreed to establish a special committee within the WTO to
address environmental issues. After Free Trade Euphoria, supra note 368, at 131. The
committee met informally on several occasions in 1994 and had its first official meeting
on February 16, 1995. U.S. Delegate Tells WTO Panel to Limit Environmental Policy-
Making Role, DAILY REP. ExEc., Feb. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Nwltes File.
409. Consensus Building Institute, Inc., The Policy Dialogue on Trade and Environ-
ment, Proposal Narrative 4-5 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Letter
from Lawrence E. Susskind to G. Richard Shell (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with author).
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Building Institute, convenes on an informal basis WTO officials,
national ambassadors to the WTO, representatives of environmen-
tal NGOs, members of the business community, and academic ex-
perts to "shadow" the operation of the WTO Committee on Trade
and the Environment. The group schedules its meetings to precede
formal sessions of the WTO committee and addresses the same
items that are scheduled for discussion by the committee. The
ambassador who serves as the chair of the WTO committee, WTO
officials with committee responsibilities, and other government
representatives serving as committee members attend both the
Policy Dialogue sessions and the committee meetings that follow,
assuring that the non-state members of the Policy Dialogue group
have an opportunity for meaningful input even though they are
barred from attending the formal committee meetings. The com-
mittee itself is not a rulemaking body, but it is empowered to set
the agenda for WTO discussion in the environmental area. The
Policy Dialogue group therefore serves as a nascent example of a
WTO Trade Stakeholders Model deliberative forum in which all
trade stakeholders have a "place at the table" when rules are
formulated.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to suggest the specific
forms that Trade Stakeholder Model political institutions within
the WTO could or should take. It is clear, however, that stake-
holders in trade decisions deserve to have and will continue to
demand a direct voice in the way the WTO makes trade policy.
The need for international trade institutions to acquire democratic
legitimacy represents a major challenge and opportunity for legal
and political science scholarship in the next decade. Although
states will continue to play a central role in trade governance,
states cannot retain their monopoly on dispute resolution and go-
verning institutions and still adequately address the needs of an
integrated and economically interdependent world.4 ' Additional-
ly, while the EU is itself far from perfect," the EU's structure and
experience should be a prominent part of discussions regarding the
evolution of the WTO. Finally, the experiences of countries such
410. See Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organ'ization and Social Issues, 28 J.
WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1994, at 17, 33 (arguing that "[s]ince trade is important to linking
the world together, it seems appropriate for the WTO to undertake formal co-ordination
with other international institutions and to establish serious work groups on the environ-
ment, labour standards, culture, community or any other issue with systemic implica-
tions"); Sands, supra note 364, at 396-401.
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as the United States in developing 'broadly inclusive processes for
regulatory rulemaking along the lines advocated by civic republican
scholars deserve close scrutiny as points of departure for the types
of interest-based bargaining and rulemaking that should attend the
drafting of global trade rules. In this way, such rules will do justice
not only to commercial interests and states worried about preserv-
ing their sovereignty, but also to social, consumer, environmental,
and labor interests that have a stake in trade policy.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the new World Trade Organization
dispute resolution system. This system dramatically alters the exist-
ing GAT scheme for resolving trade disputes by making adjudi-
catory decisions automatically binding among WTO member states
in nearly every case, by creating a permanent trade appeals court,
the WTO Appellate Body, to hear appeals from dispute resolution
panel decisions, and by making it much easier for states to retali-
ate when defendant states fail to comply with dispute resolution
rulings.
The Article has attempted to probe these developments
through constructing and analyzing three theories of trade legalism.
These models can be used not only to understand the history and
structure of many existing international trade dispute resolution
systems, but also to study certain jurisprudential techniques and
choices made by trade adjudicators in actual cases.
Applying the models to the new WTO system, the Article
concludes that the Regime Management Model-with its emphases
on state standing, international law as a source of binding norms,
and the mixed motives brought by states to trade systems-best
explains the existing design of the WTO. However, the Article has
argued that both the unwieldy consensus voting rule for overturn-
ing WTO dispute resolution decisionmaking and the political dy-
namics that led to the adoption of the WTO innovations demon-
strate the importance of the Efficient Market Model.
My study of international relations theory as a key to the
jurisprudence of international trade reveals that free trade theory
and the doctrine of comparative advantage are likely to loom large
in the future development of the WTO system. In the absence of
meaningful political institutions to complement the powerful new
adjudicatory system of the WTO, therefore, the new mechanism
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may easily evolve into a forum that lacks democratic legitimacy
and, ultimately, effectiveness.
Pointing to this and other normative weaknesses shared by
both the Regime Management and the Efficient Market models, I
have proposed a new model for trade governance called the Trade
Stakeholders Model. This model would grant broad participatory
rights to diverse constituencies affected by trade policy similar to
the rights accorded individuals within the European Union and by
the European Court of Justice. The Trade Stakeholders Model
points not only to broader rules of judicial standing but also to the
need to develop distinctive and innovative political mechanisms
such as the Policy Dialogue on Trade and Environment to comple-
ment the WTO's adjudication procedures.
The debate in which this Article participates is an old one. At
issue is the primacy of the nation-state as the autonomous unit of
political organization in what is sometimes a dangerous world. I
agree with those who see the nation-state as an increasingly inef-
fective agent for both the domestic and the global interests that
must be brought together if economic development and prosperity
are to translate into something we can collectively recognize as a
"quality of life." World trade is not monopolized or even substan-
tially controlled by political forces. Yet, as we have seen in the
WTO legal system, states still seek whenever possible to monopo-
lize the means by which disputes over economic growth and allo-
cation are resolved.
This is not a situation that private interests having direct and
sustained stakes in global trade-multinational businesses, export-
ers, factor importers, financial institutions, and others-will long
endure. The choice will ultimately be between an Efficient Market
Model system in which states interact only with private commercial
interests in solving the problems of global economic integration
and a system such as the Trade Stakeholders Model in which a
broader array of social interests will have a voice in trade deci-
sionmaking. My belief is that participation and the opportunity to
engage in deliberation are themselves part of what it means for
life to have "quality." It follows that representatives for all parties
affected by trade policies should be present when important trade
questions are considered. This dynamic is already playing itself out
in regional trading systems such as the EU and the NAFTA, and
the same voices will ultimately demand to be heard at the global
level.
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Global economic integration appears to generate a need for
dispute resolution and governance systems. Moreover, these sys-
tems have a tendency over time to gain a kind of technical auton-
omy, operating more or less independently of the governments
that established them. The Regime Management, Efficient Market,
and Trade Stakeholders models help us to see beneath the surface
of many seemingly diverse systems and identify the common
threads that bind these systems into meaningful patterns. In the
end, however, these models are but abstractions pointing to an
even more fundamental dynamic in the world economy-the com-
petition between national politics on the one hand and global
economic forces on the other for the hearts and minds of individu-
al citizens the world over. Ultimately, trade policy must come to
reflect the trade-offs that citizens make among their needs as
members of national communities and as consumers, workers, and
investors participating in the emerging global business civilization.
The way people strike the balance among their potentially conflict-
ing needs, along with the success of international institutions in
transforming the potential for conflict in the trade area into oppor-
tunities for social advancement and development, will shape the
history of much of the next century.
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